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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
Despite the very real difficulties that are currently being encountered, the 
essential message of this Review is that the economy will eventually rebound, 
and return to its medium-term growth path. The analysis in the Review 
suggests that the Irish economy is resilient in the face of adverse 
circumstances. When we wrote the last Medium-Term Review in December 
2005 we were more concerned that a misplaced sense of economic 
invincibility had taken hold in Ireland and we sought to draw attention to 
the very real dangers facing the economy at that time. Unfortunately, some 
of these problems have now come to pass (along with some we did not 
envisage). However, if properly managed the slowdown that is occurring in 
the economy today should pass and the economy should recover fully in 
the early years of the next decade. 
Introduction 
 
While our understanding of the key factors driving the economy has 
evolved over recent years, our view of its likely medium-term growth rate 
has not. The forecast for the growth in GNP over the period 2007-2015 is 
identical to what it was when we published the last Review in December 
2005, an average of around 3¾ a year.1 This expectation is based on a 
detailed examination of the potential growth in productivity and the likely 
development in the labour force. Our analysis suggests that, even if the 
current downturn were to be more severe than anticipated, the economy 
would eventually recover more vigorously to realise the medium-term 
growth rate. This resilience is crucially dependent on the assumption that 
appropriate policies are pursued. 
 
GNP is a crude measure of well-being and a number of other factors 
will be important if the standard of living, broadly defined, is to continue 
rising. Important among these issues are the delivery of a public and a 
private infrastructure suitable for a rich economy in the 21st century, the 
provision of high-quality public services and the protection of the 
environment. An innovation in this Review is the inclusion of detailed 
environmental forecasts that contribute to our understanding of the 
sustainability of development in Ireland. 
 
 The Irish economy has entered into a new phase of development and 
structural change is affecting how it behaves in response to developments 
in the world economy (Chapter 2). Business and financial services are in the 
process of “taking over the baton” from the manufacturing sector as the 
key channel through which growth in world trade is transmitted to the Irish 
economy. While this analysis indicates that the manufacturing sector still 
The 
Behaviour of 
the Economy 
 
1 The housing shock in the 2005 Review, which included a US slowdown, is compared to 
the Benchmark forecast in this publication. 
VII 
VIII MEDIUM-TERM REVIEW 2008-2015 
remains very important to the economy, net expansion of employment in 
the sector will only occur in the high tech industries where the technology 
involves skilled workers in the production process. Ireland’s recent 
performance shows that its comparative advantage on world markets is 
shifting towards the production and export of business and financial 
services.2 Major employment growth in the future is expected to occur in 
this sector, which is among the most human capital intensive in the 
economy. 
 
There are other changes under way in the labour market where the 
characteristics of migration have changed. Whereas in the past there was 
emigration, with a large potential supply of mobile Irish labour that moved 
backwards and forwards from the UK, the rest of the EU or even the US, 
today there is net immigration, with the bulk of the mobile workers being 
foreigners. In addition, the rapid growth of the economy in recent years 
means that public infrastructure and housing are in short supply, raising the 
cost of living in Ireland. These changes make the supply of labour less 
sensitive to wage rates affecting the labour market in two important ways: 
 
1. Unlike the 1980s and early 1990s when there was spare capacity, in the 
future, if the economy is growing rapidly, any domestic stimulus to the 
economy from fiscal policy would tend to raise domestic wages and prices, 
tending to crowd out the domestic tradable sector.  
 
2. In the past, most of the incidence of reductions in labour taxes 
ultimately accrued to employers, leading them to increase output and 
employment. By contrast, today a significant part of any cut in labour 
taxation would accrue to employees, so that the positive impact on 
competitiveness and employment would be more limited than in the past. 
We, nonetheless find that a shift from labour to environmental taxation has 
a positive effect on growth and employment. 
 
 The global forecast underlying this Review anticipates that the problems in 
the US economy, which began in the housing sector and now encompass 
the financial sector, will result in a major slowdown in that economy this 
year. However, it is anticipated that a recovery will begin next year, 
returning the US to its trend growth path by 2010 or 2011. For the Euro 
Area the slowdown is expected to be milder this year and, consequently, 
the recovery in 2009 and 2010 will be less pronounced. This external 
environment is particularly unfavourable for Ireland due to exchange rate 
changes, which reduce Irish competitiveness on world markets.  
Background 
Assumptions 
 
The structure of the population remains very favourable for the next 
twenty years, with Ireland’s dependency rate being considerably lower than 
that of our EU neighbours. There will be a very substantial increase in the 
supply of skilled labour out to 2020. While the growth in aggregate labour 
supply from domestic sources (natural increase and increased female labour 
force participation) is slowing, there will continue to be significant net 
 
2 The business and financial sector includes banking and insurance, real estate, IT services, 
R&D, professional and personal services and other market services not included 
elsewhere. Obviously only some of these sub-sectors are fully tradable. 
   EXECUTIVE SUMMARY IX 
immigration. However, this forecast anticipates that the inflow will be 
much smaller than in the current decade. 
 
A broadly neutral fiscal policy is assumed over the forecast horizon with  
the share of current expenditure and taxation in GNP remaining relatively 
unchanged out to 2015. It is assumed that the National Development Plan 
will be implemented as planned and that, after the current Plan is 
completed, further major investment will be needed out to around 2020. 
Thereafter, with the necessary infrastructure in place, government capital 
expenditure should fall to levels more normal in a developed EU economy. 
As a result, the state’s debt, net of financial assets, will disappear after 2020. 
 
In line with the increased priority being attached to environmental 
policy, we assume that a carbon tax will be introduced in 2010 at the 
market price of carbon. It is assumed that the resulting revenue will be used 
to keep labour taxes lower than they would otherwise be. 
 
 Summary details of the Benchmark forecast are shown in Table 1 for five-
year periods out to 2020.3 This Table shows a gradual slowdown in the 
average rate of growth of GNP from 2000 through to 2020. However, the 
rate of increase in income per head (GNP per head) is expected to remain 
broadly unchanged. The growth in labour productivity, measured by GNP 
per worker, was  particularly  low  in  the first half of this decade due to the  
Forecast 
Table 1: Forecast Summary, Benchmark 
      
 1995-
2000 
2000-
2005 
2005-
2010 
2010-
2015 
2015-
2020 
 Average Annual Growth, % 
GNP 8.6 4.4 4.1 3.8 3.5 
GNP per head 7.5 2.6 2.4 2.6 2.4 
GNP per worker 3.5 1.2 2.0 2.5 2.4 
Non-Agricultural Wage Rates 5.9 6.0 4.2 4.3 4.8 
Consumption Deflator 3.4 3.3 2.4 2.8 3.2 
Employment, April 5.0 3.2 2.0 1.2 1.1 
Labour Force, April 3.4 3.0 2.6 0.9 0.9 
Energy use 6.2 3.2 1.9 1.6 1.7 
Greenhouse gas emissions 3.1 0.4 0.0 0.1 1.0 
For end Year: 2000 2005 2010 2015 2020 
Net Immigration, thousands 26 55 10 15 15 
Unemployment rate, ILO Basis % 4.3 4.2 6.6 5.3 4.4 
Balance of Payments, % of GNP -0.3 -4.2 -5.6 -0.6 3.0 
General Government Balance, % of GNP 5.1 1.2 -1.4 1.2 3.8 
Debt/GNP Ratio4 34.0 25.5 21.0 21.1 5.8 
Housing Completions, thousands 49.8 81.0 46.8 48.6 47.1 
      
 
3 Detailed year-by-year numbers are set out in Appendix 3. 
4 The National Pension Reserve Fund has been netted off the debt. 
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exceptional level of investment in housing, which had low or negative 
productivity growth. With building having a much smaller weight in future, 
the rate of productivity growth is expected to average around 2½ per cent a 
year in the next decade. 
 
The increase in wage rates, while slower than in the boom years, will 
continue at a significant pace reflecting above average productivity growth 
in Ireland relative to the EU. The rate of inflation in consumer prices, 
measured by the consumption deflator, will remain low.  
 
The unemployment rate is rising quite rapidly at the moment and we 
expect that the future return to full employment will lag the economic 
recovery. As a result of the higher unemployment and increased 
competition within the EU for immigrants from the New Member States, 
net immigration will continue at a very much reduced rate than in the 
recent past.  
 
Population growth and the relatively small number of dwellings per 
adult in Ireland (relative to the EU-15) mean that there will be a continued 
need for more dwellings out to 2020. This demographic pressure will place 
a floor on the housing market in the medium term. 
 
 Over the last fifteen years the pressures on the environment have risen 
much more slowly than the rate of economic growth – there has been a 
substantial decoupling between economic growth and environmental 
pressures. This has occurred partly because of technological progress and 
the modernisation of the power generation sector, but mostly because 
growth was concentrated in the environment-friendly services sectors. 
Based on the forecast for the economy, the new ESRI environment model, 
ISus, shows a further decoupling between economic growth, energy use, 
emissions to air, and waste. In some cases – sulphur dioxide, ammonia, 
hazardous and other waste, and carbon dioxide from electricity – there is 
even a reduction in environmental pressure. However, these trends are not 
sufficient to meet the stated targets of environmental policy. 
The 
Environment 
  
In the areas of waste and climate change – perhaps the most significant 
environmental challenges for Ireland – the trends are in the opposite 
direction of the declared policy targets, even though the Benchmark scenario 
assumes an acceleration of policy implementation. 
 
The projected price level in the EU Emissions Trading System is likely 
to drive change in electricity generation, resulting in a fall in carbon dioxide 
emissions from power generation by 2020. Ireland will also easily meet the 
EU renewables target in power generation. However, the assumed carbon 
tax would not be high enough to induce a major reduction in emissions 
elsewhere before 2020.  
 
For waste, there is a similar discrepancy between the stated ambitions of 
government and the actual policies in place. The amount of waste arising 
will continue to increase as the population grows and gets richer. Although 
the share of waste that is recycled will be higher in future, there is an 
upward trend in the amount of waste to be incinerated and disposed of in 
landfills.  
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In sum, although we expect that the rate of progress in environmental 
protection will accelerate, there will remain a substantial gap between the 
ambitions of policy makers and reality – particularly for climate change and 
waste – unless new policy initiatives are put in place. 
 
 Because of the uncertainty that surrounds all forecasting exercises, this 
Review examines three scenarios. The first two scenarios focus on how 
competitiveness on world markets affects the Irish economy. They provide 
possible upper and lower bounds for our medium-term forecasts. The high 
growth scenario examines what the economy would look like if growth 
were an average of 0.7 per cent a year above the Benchmark forecast because 
of enhanced competitiveness. The “wasted opportunity” scenario considers 
the possibility that a serious loss of competitiveness could see the economy 
under-perform by an average of 0.7 per cent a year. The results suggest that 
there are significant downside risks over the medium term if policy does 
not promote competitiveness, broadly defined.  
Alternative 
Scenarios 
 
A third scenario looks at the possibility that the current slowdown in the 
world economy could be sharper and deeper than in the Benchmark.  This 
scenario suggests that a severe liquidity crisis in the US could lead to a 
more serious recession there, with serious short-term consequences for 
Ireland. In such an event the Irish government deficit could mushroom, 
posing serious problems for policymakers. However, what this scenario 
also shows is that, if the problems in Ireland were appropriately managed, 
the US recession would not do long-term damage to the Irish economy. In 
the medium term, when the global economy recovered, the rate of growth 
in Ireland would accelerate to return the economy to its medium-term 
growth path. 
 
 The changing behaviour of the economy holds significant implications 
for fiscal policy. While not immediately relevant, because of the current 
economic downturn, in the future it will be important to tighten fiscal 
policy when the economy is growing rapidly, resulting in substantial 
surpluses in the “good times” (i.e., adopt a counter-cyclical policy). This 
will leave scope to loosen fiscal policy in the “tough times”. If such a policy 
had been adopted consistently since the end of the 1990s there would have 
been more scope today to insulate the economy from the current 
downturn. Fiscal policy has a greater impact now than in the past and, with 
EMU membership, it is the only effective tool open to the government to 
manage the housing market. 
Medium-
Term 
Challenges 
 
While governments can smooth the cycle through appropriate use of 
fiscal policy, this policy is not the appropriate instrument to influence 
productivity growth and living standards in the long term. Instead, 
structural policy, including investment in public infrastructure, is the 
appropriate policy instrument that governments can use for such longer-
term goals. Efficient delivery of the National Development Plan and of 
other public services will be very important for future growth in living 
standards. 
 
The shift from dependence on growth in the manufacturing sector to 
growth in business and financial services as the driver of the economy has 
important implications for industrial policy and for policy on R&D and 
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human capital. We have extensive experience in facilitating new 
manufacturing firms to set up in Ireland. However, in the future most of 
the additional jobs will be in the business and financial sector. The supply 
of labour with appropriate skills for the services sector will be important 
for future growth. This will involve not only ensuring an adequate output 
of graduates but it will also be necessary to ensure that Ireland is an 
attractive location for the skilled workers in the sector, be they Irish or 
foreign. Thus ensuring a good urban infrastructure, high quality health care 
and education and a clean environment may be of substantial indirect 
benefit to the sector through its potential effects on labour supply. 
 
Research on investment priorities suggests that the implementation of 
policies to ensure efficient use of the infrastructure is at least as important 
as the physical investment itself. Enhanced competition in the production 
of public services together with improved regulation where competition is 
not feasible and where network benefits need to be exploited (e.g. public 
transport) will be important In particular, there is a need for policy on 
physical planning to focus on developing sustainable urban centres that are 
good to live in. This not only involves investment but it also requires an 
appropriate regulatory response to move towards much denser 
development. If good value is to be obtained from the huge investment in 
infrastructure, and if we are to develop sustainable urban centres, it will be 
important to move fairly rapidly towards some system of congestion 
charging, as is happening in other EU countries. Given the EU’s plans for 
reducing emissions of greenhouse gases, and given its proposed limits for 
Ireland, the current trend towards dispersed development and long distance 
commuting is simply not sustainable on environmental grounds. 
 
While the end is not quite in sight in the race to deliver an adequate 
public infrastructure, the major investments are likely to be completed 
around 2020. After that the funds that will be released as public investment 
is wound down will need to be reallocated to dealing with the “greying” of 
Ireland.  
 
This Review suggests that the fundamentals of the Irish economy are 
sound. Even if the immediate future may prove quite difficult, the 
resilience of the economy is such that, if properly managed, it is likely to 
return to healthy economic growth in the medium term. 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
When we wrote the last Medium-Term Review in December 2005 we were 
concerned that a sense of economic invincibility had taken hold in Ireland 
and that the very real dangers facing the economy at that time were being 
ignored. While in that Review we did not want to overdo the sense of 
foreboding, mindful of the fate of Cassandra,5 still wanted to alert readers 
to our concerns. For this Review the task is rather different. Some of the 
potential difficulties that concerned us in 2005 have now come to pass 
(along with some we did not envisage). In addition, there is widespread 
concern about the immediate future prospects for the world economy. 
However, our essential message in this Review is upbeat, recognising that 
there is a danger that Irish society could be transfixed by the current very 
real difficulties, missing the opportunity to plan and prepare for a better 
future in the next decade.  
1.1 
Background 
 
This focus on medium-term prospects is not intended to obscure the 
serious immediate problems facing the economy. However, the conclusion 
of this Review is that, whatever the severity of the immediate economic 
difficulties, if appropriately managed the current downturn will not do 
lasting damage to the economy’s long-term growth potential. As a result, 
when the economy exits from its current difficulties we anticipate a return 
to steady growth. While this medium-term growth in GNP will be 
somewhat slower than we have been accustomed to – around 3.5 per cent a 
year – it will, if delivered, represent a very satisfactory performance. Of 
course GNP is a crude measure of well-being and a number of other 
factors will be important if the standard of living, broadly defined, is to 
continue rising. Among these important issues is the delivery of an 
infrastructure, public and private, suitable for a rich economy in the 21st 
century. Alongside this is the need to provide high quality public services 
efficiently.  There will also need to be investment in protecting and 
developing our environment. An innovation in this Review is the inclusion 
of detailed environmental forecasts. 
 
Setting Ireland in an international context, we must recognise that when 
Ireland had a standard of living well below that of our EU neighbours, 
there was a lot of room to outperform them. Now that we are richer than 
most other EU countries, outperforming our neighbours becomes much 
more problematic. The Benchmark forecast in Chapter 4 suggests that the 
Irish economy, if properly managed, can continue to make marginal 
improvements in living standards relative to our neighbours out to 2015.  
 
 
5In Greek mythology Cassandra was fated to forecast the future with accuracy and always 
to be ignored. 
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To some extent this superior prospective performance will be facilitated 
by a broadly favourable demographic profile  that is not available to other 
EU members. Because this bonus will not last indefinitely, some of it 
should be used to prepare for the challenges of an ageing population that 
will affect Ireland in the second quarter of this century. 
 
This Review analyses some important changes in the underlying 
behaviour of the economy that have become apparent in recent years. 
These changes have been incorporated in a revised version of the 
HERMES macro-economic model that is used to prepare our forecasts. 
For the first time the Review uses a new sustainable development model, 
ISus, to extend the coverage of the forecasts to examine the likely pressures 
on key environmental variables. 
 
In Greek mythology HERMES was the messenger of the gods and one 
of his tasks was to bring dreams to mortals. We feel that the medium-term 
forecasts for economic growth in this Review are not merely “dreams” but, 
with appropriate public policies, they can be turned into a reality over the 
coming decade.  
 
 In recent years the Irish economy has undergone significant changes, 
which affect the way it operates.  The working of the labour market has 
altered and the services sector is playing an increasing role in transmitting 
increases in world trade into demand for Irish output. For this reason we 
have overhauled the HERMES macro-economic model to capture the 
changing processes which drive growth in Ireland. The alterations in 
behaviour and how we have captured them in the revised model are 
discussed in Chapter 2. The understanding gained from this analysis has 
been very important in developing our medium-term forecasts for the Irish 
economy. 
1.2 
Outline of 
the Review 
 
In Chapter 3 we consider a range of background assumptions which 
drive our forecasts. First, we have developed a forecast for the major world 
economies based on the January 2008 National Institute Economic Review, and 
the IMF’s January 2008 forecast.6 This Benchmark forecast sees the US 
economy undergoing a major slowdown this year and next and then 
recovering. More recent forecasts suggest a more severe downturn and this 
possibility is considered in a separate scenario described in Chapter 6. The 
Benchmark scenario sees the major world economies recovering in 2010 and 
returning to trend growth in subsequent years. The second set of 
assumptions is derived from the ESRI’s demographic model. These relate 
to future population structure, labour force, household formation and 
educational attainment. The third set of assumptions relate to the public 
finances. 
 
Chapter 4 sets out our Benchmark forecast, which has been developed 
using the HERMES model based on the assumptions set out in Chapter 3. 
The figures for 2008 and 2009 are taken from the Spring Quarterly Economic 
 
6Forecasts have changed since January involving downward revisions in growth 
projections. The possibility that the world economy, especially the US, could perform 
significantly worse than we have assumed in our Benchmark forecast is considered in the 
third scenario in Chapter 6. 
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Commentary. This forecast includes numbers year by year out to 2015 for the 
major economic aggregates and for five-year average growth rates 
thereafter out to 2025.7  
 
Chapter 5 of this Review produces the first set of forecasts using the 
ESRI’s new ISus sustainable development research model.8 This model 
relates pressures on the Irish environment to key economic aggregates – 
for example how economic growth affects the quantity of greenhouse gas 
emissions. The model has been used in conjunction with the HERMES 
model to produce detailed energy and environmental forecasts for Ireland 
out to 2025. These forecasts are consistent with the Benchmark economic 
forecast outlined in Chapter 4. This is the most ambitious exercise of its 
kind undertaken in Ireland and it throws new light on the sustainability 
implications of the economic growth forecasts.  
 
Because forecasts are inevitably uncertain, Chapter 6 examines three 
scenarios around the Benchmark forecast. The first and second scenarios 
examine the possibility that the Irish economy grows on average by 
between one half and one percentage point a year more or less than in the 
Benchmark forecast. These scenarios can be used to stress test policies to 
ensure that they are likely to prove robust in the face of an uncertain future. 
 
The third scenario considers what the implications would be of a more 
severe and long-drawn out recession in the US relative to that assumed in 
Chapters 3 and 4.  
 
Our conclusions are set out in Chapter 7. These conclusions draw out 
some of the key implications of the analysis contained in the Review for 
public policy. The discussion suggests that, while there are dangers for 
future development inherent in the forecasts, prudent policy could 
minimise these risks and help ensure that the Irish economy realises its 
considerable potential to produce a further increase in living standards. 
 
The forecasting record of past Reviews is analysed in Appendix 1. This 
shows than past publications have had a reasonable track record in 
forecasting the average medium-term growth rate. However, they have 
been less successful in predicting turning points. The Benchmark forecast for 
the 2008-2015 period in this Review is almost identical to the housing shock 
scenario in the last Review. Two and a half years’ additional data have not 
changed our view as to the medium-term growth potential of the economy. 
However, the timing of the growth in the economy in this Review is rather 
different than in the last. As a result of this analysis we put much more 
emphasis in this Review on the five-year average growth rates than on the 
forecasts for individual years. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
7More details of the numbers are available on CD from ESRI. Details, including the price, 
are available from admin@esri.ie 
8This model has been developed as part of a programme of research at the Institute 
funded by the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). 
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 The forecast presented in this Review, and the analysis underlying the 
range of different scenarios, has been developed with the assistance of five 
different economic models. In developing our forecast for the world 
economy and the external environment for the Irish economy we have 
used the NiGEM world model of the National Institute of Economic and 
Social Research in the United Kingdom. This model allows us to simulate 
different options on how the US economy will adjust to its current 
problems and how these different options are likely to affect the rest of the 
world. The benefit of such a model is that it allows “what if” experiments 
to explore the sensitivity of forecasts to changes in assumptions. This 
model has proved an essential tool in preparing a consistent set of forecasts 
for the major world economies of relevance to Ireland. 
1.3 
Methodology 
 
In analysing changes in the population structure that are taking place we 
have used the ESRI’s demographic model. This model uses very detailed 
data from successive CSO Labour Force Surveys and Quarterly National 
Household Surveys on labour force status, broken down by level of education, 
age and sex. The model is driven by the educational attainment of the 
population. In the model individuals, as they reach the age of 20 years, are 
assigned a level of education based on current trends. This level of 
education has a major impact on their labour force behaviour. The model is 
used to project births, deaths, the population, the labour force, the number 
of households, and the human capital of the work force. The level of 
migration is taken from the HERMES macroeconomic model. The 
demographic model differs from that used by the CSO in that educational 
attainment drives labour force participation.  
 
The HERMES macroeconomic model has been used for two decades in 
preparing successive Medium-Term Reviews. Major changes were made in 
2002 to incorporate a sub-model of energy demand and greenhouse gas 
emissions from energy use (Fitz Gerald, Hore and Kearney, 2002).9 We 
have re-estimated the latest version of HERMES using data from the CSO 
National Income and Expenditure, 2006. The forecasts for 2008 and 2009 are 
based on the Spring Quarterly Economic Commentary. Appendix 1 of the 
Medium-Term Review: 2003-2010 provided a description of the key 
mechanisms in that model. As discussed in Chapter 2, this latest version of 
the model takes account of the major changes in the behaviour of the Irish 
economy that have recently been identified. 
 
Finally, a new model relating economic activity to energy use and 
environmental pressures has been developed – ISus (O’Doherty, Mayor and 
Tol, 2007). This model is designed to take the forecasts from HERMES 
and use them to predict likely environmental pressures. These pressures 
include emissions to air, especially greenhouse gas emissions, solid waste, 
and water. The ISus model has been used in Chapter 6 to produce forecasts 
of energy demand and environmental pressures out to 2025 based on the 
macro-economic forecasts in Chapter 4. When forecasting energy use in 
electricity generation the ISus and HERMES models are supplemented by a 
model of the electricity sector (McCarthy, 2005). 
 
9Development of this sub-model was supported by research grants from the 
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and Sustainable Energy Ireland (SEI).  
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As discussed in Appendix 1, our forecasting record, while better than 
average, is still not perfect. As a result, in preparing the forecasts we have 
examined a number of scenarios reflecting the range of uncertainty that 
surrounds our estimate of the potential output growth of the Irish 
economy. While any forecast involves many assumptions that rely on the 
authors’ judgement, these models are essential tools in ensuring the 
coherence of the forecast published in this Review. They force a high degree 
of consistency on those using them. In addition, the models, taken 
together, are an indispensable tool for undertaking the kind of sensitivity 
testing we have used extensively in this Review, and in developing sets of 
scenarios that are internally consistent. 
  
2. THE BEHAVIOUR OF 
THE IRISH ECONOMY 
To the outside world the recent history of Ireland is viewed as something 
of an economic miracle. From a relatively low standard of living within the 
EU-15 in the early 1990s, over the course of a little more than a decade the 
standard of living rose to take Ireland to the top of the scale in recent years. 
This achievement naturally provokes interest in whether Ireland has found 
the “elixir of eternal growth” and what the secret of the success actually is. 
In particular, can that prescription, which worked so well for Ireland, be 
applied elsewhere with equally advantageous results?  
2.1 
Introduction 
 
The answer from recent research is that there is no secret ingredient that 
can be prescribed for other economies. While there are some exceptional 
elements to the Irish experience, which are elucidated later in this chapter, 
the main lesson of research is that Ireland pursued very unwise economic 
policies with exceptional consistency in the forty years after Independence 
and it was not until the 1990s that Ireland reaped a reward for very belated 
policy reforms, implementing changes that had occurred a quarter of a 
century earlier in most of Ireland’s EU neighbours.  
 
This issue of Ireland’s recent economic success has already been 
addressed in an extensive literature. The first phase of exceptional growth 
in the economy, from the early years of the 1990s through to the early years 
of this decade, has been extensively analysed (MTR 1997 and 1999, Fitz 
Gerald, 2000, Honohan and Walsh, 2002, O’Gráda, 2002). These papers 
suggest that to a significant extent this growth represented a catch up by 
the Irish economy to the standard of living of its neighbours in North-
Western Europe, a catch up which had been delayed for many years by past 
policy failures. However, the analysis also indicated that the rapid growth 
owed a significant amount to demographic particularities, to the way 
Ireland connected with the globalisation process, FDI and corporation tax, 
(Barry, 2002), and to investment in human capital (Bergin and Kearney, 
2007). The analysis in these papers differs as to the emphasis placed on 
these different factors but agrees about the range of factors involved. 
 
This chapter, rather than replaying an old film, considers a new script on 
how recent developments in the economy suggest a different phase of 
development over the coming decade. This new phase of development is 
unlikely to see growth on the scale of the late 1990s. However, in the light 
of the changing structure of the economy apparent in recent years, there 
remains the prospect that the Irish economy will experience continued 
growth for some years to come at rates somewhat above the long-term 
trend for the EU-15. While on the basis of income per head Ireland comes 
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across as one of the rich countries in the EU, this may not be the best 
measure of welfare, as discussed in Section 2.2. 
  
This chapter considers the evidence that the economy has entered a 
rather different phase of development. The evidence for a change in 
behaviour comes from a range of sources. In many cases sub-models of 
important processes have been estimated and included in the HERMES 
macro-economic model used in the rest of this Review. These sub-models 
are briefly discussed in Appendix 2. 
 
Section 2.3 examines some of the key trends apparent in the recent data 
for the economy. Section 2.4 considers the growing importance of the 
market services sector, in particular that of business and financial services. 
Section 2.5 examines changes in productivity and in the terms of trade in 
recent years and considers how recent trends may affect development out 
to 2020. It also considers how investment in human capital may affect 
future trends in productivity.  
 
The last decade has also seen a radical change in the behaviour of the 
labour market. This change has been concentrated on the factors affecting 
the supply of labour, and its elasticity with respect to real after tax wages. 
The changing shape of the supply curve of labour, and the change in the 
factors affecting wage formation in Ireland, have important policy 
implications. These are discussed in Section 2.6. The housing market and 
the factors driving it are discussed in Section 2.7. Section 2.8 summarises 
the implications of this analysis for the Irish economy in the medium term. 
 
 There are many different ways of measuring living standards. Probably 
the best income based measure is Gross National Disposable Income 
(GNDI), which takes account, inter alia, of EU transfers and, more 
important, changes in the terms of trade (the purchasing power of Irish 
exports relative to imports). However, when comparing living standards 
across countries the most common approach is to compare GDP per head 
or per person employed, adjusted for the cost of living. In the case of 
Ireland GDP is not the appropriate measure because of the large amount 
of profits repatriated abroad by foreign firms, which are not available for 
domestic consumption. For that reason here we use GNP for Ireland 
instead of GDP. For other EU countries GNP is very similar to GDP. 
2.2 
Measuring 
Living 
Standards 
 
By the conventional measure of living standards Ireland is now one of 
the richest countries in the EU. Figure 2.1 shows the trend in GNP per 
capita relative to the EU-15 over more than four decades.10 This graph 
shows that, measured in terms of GNP per head, there was very limited 
change in Ireland’s relative position between 1960 and 1990. However, 
from 1990 onwards there was very rapid convergence, taking Ireland to an 
income per head, adjusted for purchasing power, which is 10 per cent 
above the average for the EU-15 today.  
 
 
10 The figures for Ireland are for GNP per capita. Those for the rest of the EU are GDP 
per capita. However, for nearly all countries in the EU other than Ireland GDP and GNP 
are very similar in magnitude. 
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Figure 2.1: Relative Standard of Living, Ireland v EU-15, in PPS, EU-
15=100 
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Source: EU Commission: European Economy, and ESRI databank. 
 
As shown in Figure 2.1 there was somewhat steadier progress in terms 
of convergence in productivity levels – GNP per person employed. Ireland 
today has a level of GNP per person employed that is about 5 per cent 
above the average for the EU-15, a significantly smaller gap than for 
income per head. The difference between these two measures reflects the 
very favourable trend in the dependency ratio in Ireland since 1990. This is 
discussed in more detail in Chapter 3. 
 
Figure 2.1 also shows consumption per head for Ireland for the period 
1995-2006. This suggests that Ireland is only today reaching the average 
EU-15 level of consumption. This is a more appropriate measure of 
current standard of living than the income per head measure. The gap 
between this measure and the measure of income reflects the fact that 
Ireland has a much lower endowment of public infrastructure than most of 
the rest of the EU-15. As a result it has to invest much more to catch up, 
leaving less resources available for current consumption, private or public. 
 
The poorer endowment of infrastructure is true of both private 
infrastructure (housing) and public infrastructure (such as transport, 
educational and health infrastructure). The result is that Ireland, to catch 
up, has had an investment to GNP ratio of 30 per cent or more between 
2005 and 2007 and the ratio is likely to remain high for some time to come, 
in spite of the slowdown in the housing sector. The norm for developed 
countries tends to be around 20 per cent. Thus, while income may be 
above average, that advantage is being dedicated to catching up on the 
endowment of infrastructure; hence it is not available for current 
consumption. As discussed in Chapter 4, it will be some time before the 
gap in infrastructure is made good and investment will fall back to a more 
normal relationship to income. There is no simple measure that allows one 
to value the services derived from a good road and public transport system 
but it is clear that it does impact on welfare. What this means is that, if one 
takes into account the benefits which flow to society from having a good 
infrastructure, then the Irish standard of living has probably still not 
attained that of countries such as France and Germany. 
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 The channels through which changes in world economic activity have 
been transmitted to the Irish economy have altered over time. Half a 
century ago the primary channel was through agricultural exports. More 
recently the manufacturing sector has been the conduit through which the 
growth in world trade has impacted on the economy. However, since the 
turn of the century the services sector has grown rapidly in importance as a 
link between domestic economic activity and world trade.  
2.3  
The 
Changing 
Structure of 
the 
Economy  
In the latest version of the HERMES model activity in both the 
manufacturing sector and the tradable market services sector is modelled as 
a function of world growth and Ireland’s share of world output is a 
function of Ireland’s competitiveness on the world market, broadly defined 
(Bradley and Fitz Gerald, 1988 and Bradley, Fitz Gerald and Kearney, 
1993). The research results, described in Appendix 2, indicate that this 
model, which for many years has been used to model Irish manufacturing 
sector output, now applies equally to the rapidly growing trade in services. 
Initially, the key point of contact between the production sector of the Irish 
economy and the outside world was through agricultural exports. In the 
early 1960s agricultural exports accounted for over 40 per cent of all 
exports but only 12 per cent of GNP (Table 2.1). These exports underwent 
limited processing in Ireland and the terms of trade for such exports were 
generally unfavourable.  
 
From the late 1950s onwards there was an increasing consciousness 
among policymakers that future economic prosperity would depend on 
developing a vibrant manufacturing sector to take over gradually from 
agriculture as the driving force of growth. The approach that Ireland 
adopted to opening up its economy belatedly to the globalisation process 
from 1960 onwards was unusual (Honohan and Walsh, 2002). Considerable 
reliance was placed on the attraction of foreign firms to Ireland to help 
modernise the manufacturing sector. A key element in this policy was the 
effective exemption of profits on all export sales from corporation tax. 
 
While the change in the corporate tax regime was made in the late 
1950s, it was really only with the reduction in the protective barriers to 
trade with Ireland’s trading partners that this policy began to bear fruit. The 
first reduction in tariff barriers began in the early 1960s and the process 
culminated in membership of the EU in 1973.11 By 1980 agricultural 
exports still accounted for just over a quarter of exports while industrial 
exports had by then risen to account for almost 60 per cent of the total and 
28 per cent of GNP. 
 
Between 1980 and 2000 the manufacturing sector grew dramatically in 
size so that by 2000 industrial exports accounted for just under three- 
quarters of all exports and amounted to 85 per cent of the value of GNP. 
Over this period the growth in the manufacturing sector was clearly the 
major channel through which the growth in world trade (and output) was 
transmitted to the Irish economy. 
 
 
11 For a few sectors (e.g. motor vehicle assembly) the barriers were not fully phased out till 
the end of the 1970s. Of course the Single European Market in 1992 was very important 
for Ireland in removing non-tariff barriers within the EU. 
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Table 2.1: Exports Share of the Economy, Value, % 
      
 Share of 1960 1980 2000 2007 
      
Agricultural Exports 40.9 26.1 4.3 3.7 
 GNP 12.1 12.2 5.0 3.5 
Industrial Exports 29.4 59.5 73.8 52.9 
 GNP 8.7 27.9 85.2 49.4 
Services Exports 29.8 14.5 21.9 43.4 
 GNP 8.9 6.8 25.3 40.5 
      
 
However, from the late 1990s onwards there has been a dramatic rise in 
the role of the market services sector. By 2000 exports of services already 
accounted for 22 per cent of exports, amounting to 25 per cent of GNP. 
By 2007 this had risen to over 40 per cent of both exports and GNP. 
Clearly, this is now a major channel through which world economic growth 
is transmitted to the Irish economy. As discussed in Chapter 4, this channel 
is likely to continue growing in importance over the coming decade, 
gradually replacing the manufacturing sector as the key channel for the 
transmission of world growth to the economy.  
 
This change in the pattern of exports over time has also been reflected 
in a change in the pattern of output in the economy (Figure 2.2). Twenty-
five years ago the agricultural sector was still a significant contributor to 
output in Ireland accounting for over 10 per cent of GDP (and agricultural 
exports were 12 per cent of GNP). Manufacturing accounted for just under 
a quarter of output, somewhat greater than would be the contribution in 
most of the more developed world economies at that time. However, the 
last quarter century has seen a transformation in the structure of the 
economy. Today, agriculture accounts for only 2 per cent of output and 
manufacturing, which grew rapidly in importance in the 1990s to account 
for a third of output in 2000, had by 2007 fallen back to its position in 
1980, accounting for 22 per cent of GDP.  
Figure 2.2: Share of GDP by Productive Sector 
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It is the business and financial sector,12 which has grown continuously in 
importance as reflected in its share of GDP over the period, so that today it 
accounts for about a third of the output of the economy. Within that 
sector, the financial services sub-sector itself now accounts for 10 per cent 
of total GDP. New data from the Central Statistics Office (CSO) show for 
the first time gross output by the services sector for the years 2002 and 
2003 (the GDP figures above are based on value added – wages and 
profits). While not directly comparable, the ratio of exports of other 
services (excluding tourism) to the gross output of the business and 
financial services sector in 2003 was over 70 per cent, up from 60 per cent 
in 2002. While this exaggerates the share of the output of the sector which 
is exported, as a significant part of services exports comes from other 
sectors, it is still an indication of the globalisation of the sector in recent 
years and its crucial importance as a link between Ireland and the world 
economy. 
 
One surprise in these data is the relatively small share of value added 
accounted for directly by the building and construction sector – 
approximately 10 per cent of GDP. This contrasts with the share of gross 
output of the construction sector, which accounted for just under 20 per 
cent of GDP in 2007. It reflects the fact that there are substantial inputs, 
largely from domestic sources, which are used in the sector, so that the 
footprint of building and construction spreads to many other sectors in the 
economy – especially business and financial services and manufacturing. 
Finally, the production of non-market services (the public sector) 
accounted for 18 per cent of GDP in 2007, up from 13 per cent in 2000, 
but still below its share of 20 per cent in 1980. 
 
Within manufacturing there has also been a major change in structure 
over the period (Figure 2.3). Clothing, which accounted for 17 per cent of 
gross output in 1960 has now effectively disappeared as a sector. Food, 
drink and tobacco, which accounted for just under 50 per cent of gross 
output as late as 1975 now accounts for just 20 per cent. The three sectors 
which have grown very substantially in share are chemicals, including 
pharmaceuticals; paper and publishing, which includes reproduction of 
computer media,13 and machinery and equipment which includes 
computers, instrument engineering etc. 
 
In the case of machinery and equipment, the growth in share was 
particularly rapid between 1975 and 1990. Further growth to 2005 has 
taken it to over 31 per cent of gross output of manufacturing. The growth 
in chemicals has been particularly large since 1990, accounting for 27 per 
cent of gross output by 2005. The rapid growth in the paper and publishing 
sector is even more recent.  By 2005 it accounted for 13 per cent of output, 
the bulk of it being in the reproduction of computer media category. This 
means that the three more “high-tech” sectors now account for over 70 per 
 
12 The Business and Financial sector includes banking and insurance, real estate, computer 
services, R&D, professional services and other market services not included elsewhere. 
Distribution includes retailing and wholesaling. The coverage of Transport and 
Communications is self-explanatory. 
13 The measured output of this manufacturing sector may be affected by changes in the 
classification of firms. For example, as firms move to distributing IT services over the 
internet and as the nature of the services evolve, the firms may be reclassified into the 
Business Services sector. 
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cent of manufacturing output. With food and drink still accounting for 20 
per cent, it means that the rest of manufacturing now makes a very small 
contribution to total output. 
Figure 2.3: Structure of Manufacturing, Percentage of Gross Output 
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Figure 2.4: Share of Manufacturing Output Exported, % 
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An important feature of the manufacturing sector today is the very high 
proportion of its output that is exported (Figure 2.4). With the proportion 
now exceeding 80 per cent, it means that fluctuations in domestic demand 
have a very limited impact on the output of the sector. Also, because such a 
high proportion of the output of the sector is destined for the EU market, 
it is fluctuations in demand within that much wider market that drives day-
to-day fluctuations in the output of the sector in Ireland. This contrasts 
with the market services sector, which still produces the majority of its 
output for the domestic market, though also serving an ever-increasing 
export demand. 
 
The low rate of corporation tax applicable in Ireland has obviously 
attracted firms that are highly profitable to Ireland and facilitated domestic 
firms that also fall into this category. It has also incentivised multinational 
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firms to attribute as much of their profits as legitimately possible to their 
Irish operations. The result has been a high observed rate of profit in 
manufacturing in recent years.  
 
Figure 2.5 shows the operating surplus (profit) rate for the three sub-
sec
 
In 1989 the favourable corporate tax regime applicable to the 
ma
tors of manufacturing since 1980. This figure shows that, while there 
were major differences in profit rate twenty-five years ago, the profit rates 
have tended to converge over time to their current level. Over the course 
of the 1980s the profit rate in the traditional and high-tech sectors tended 
to drift upwards stabilising in the 1990s at between 25 per cent and 30 per 
cent of gross output. The most recent years for which data are available 
suggest some downturn to a rate of around 25 per cent, possibly reflecting 
rapidly rising costs in Ireland and a more competitive external 
environment. For food processing the rate of profit was exceptionally low 
in the 1980s, reflecting the fact that the sector was dominated by farmer-
owned co-operatives that sought to maximise input prices (paid to farmers) 
rather than profits. However, the change in the structure of the sector in 
the 1980s and the 1990s has seen it achieve profit rates of around 20 per 
cent in recent years, the kind of behaviour observed for other 
manufacturing sectors. 
Figure 2.5: Profit Rate, Manufacturing
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nufacturing sector was extended to the International Financial Services 
Centre (IFSC) in Dublin. From 1994 a common low rate of corporation tax 
applying to all other sectors was progressively introduced and by 2003 it 
was fully implemented at 12.5 per cent. This common rate also applies to 
all new firms in the sectors covered by the previous 10 per cent rate. The 
effect was to extend the attraction of Ireland for highly profitable business 
to a much wider range of firms supplying the world market and also to 
extend the range of firms that could benefit from transfer pricing. The 
result has been an increase in the share of profits in value added in the 
financial services sector (Figure 2.6). 
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Figure 2.6: Profit Share of Value Added, Financial Services 
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A substantial share of the profits earned in the Irish economy, especially 
in manufacturing and business and financial services, are the property of 
owners who are resident outside Ireland, in particular, foreign multinational 
firms. However, this also applies to many of the largest firms, such as 
banks, the majority of whose shareholders are resident outside Ireland. The 
profits, whether paid as dividends or retained in the firms are considered 
the income of these foreign residents and deducted from GDP to arrive at 
GNP. The diversification geographically in financial portfolios also means 
that there is a substantial, though smaller inflow of profits into Ireland to 
those residents who own assets abroad.  
 
Profit repatriations from the business and financial sector are now of a 
similar magnitude to those from the manufacturing sector. This has to be 
taken into account in considering the impact of growth in the business and 
financial sector on the wider economy. The latest version of the HERMES 
macro-economic model incorporates such an adjustment. 
 
 The external environment in which the Irish economy operates has 
changed markedly over the last fifteen years. The rise of China, India, and 
more recently Brazil, as major players in world trade has brought about 
changes throughout the world economy. These newly emerging industrial 
economies have a huge potential supply of unskilled and semi-skilled 
labour available to work in manufacturing.  
2.4  
Market 
Services – 
New Driver 
of Growth  
With these emerging industrial powers supplying an ever-increasing 
share of the world’s manufactured goods, the terms of trade in these goods 
have changed. Prices of many traditional manufactured goods have fallen in 
relative terms, shifting the comparative advantage of the more developed 
economies towards higher-technology manufactured goods and traded 
services that require a high-skilled labour input. It is not that China and 
India do not have a substantial and increasing supply of skilled labour. 
Rather it is their continuing relative scarcity in this key input that means 
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that their economies have a comparative advantage in producing less-skill 
intensive manufactured goods.  
 
Developments in information technology and transport have also had 
their effects. These innovations have made goods and services, which had 
previously been non-traded, into very fast-growing areas of trade. In the 
services sector, especially financial services, globalisation and the reduction 
in non-tariff barriers, combined with developments in information 
technology, have produced an integrated financial system spanning most 
developed economies. Some of the most rapidly growing areas, such as 
financial services, use English as their language of communication, which 
confers an advantage on the Irish economy. 
 
In addition to the changing pattern of world supply the pattern of world 
demand has also been changing. As incomes have risen in the developed 
world and the relative price of goods has fallen, demand has shifted 
towards services, especially towards new products and services related to 
the revolution in information technology. These goods and services, the 
production of which requires a major input of skilled labour, are in ever-
increasing demand. 
 
This changing global context means that Ireland’s comparative 
advantage is also shifting. Obviously, the speed with which change takes 
place in Ireland is partially determined by developments in Irish 
competitiveness. However, it is also affected in a more positive way by 
developments in education, R&D, and information technology, which 
develop niches where the Irish economy may find new opportunities. As a 
result of the changes in the global trading environment the baton of 
economic growth is passing from manufacturing to the business and 
financial services sector of the Irish economy. This reflects long-term 
changes in Ireland’s comparative advantage in the global economy. In 
recent years the loss of competitiveness relative to our EU partners has 
taken its toll on Irish manufacturing. This sector has to compete in a global 
market and the specialised advantages of the Irish economy (e.g. the tax 
regime) are increasingly outweighed by the rise in other costs. While some 
parts of this sector are human-capital intensive, it is less dependent on such 
skills than the business and financial sector. The closure of much of lower 
skilled manufacturing, as a result of the loss of competitiveness, is more 
than offsetting the effects of a growth in the most skill-intensive sectors. 
This is reflected in the decline in employment in the sector in recent years 
and also in the changed composition of manufacturing output as reflected 
in Figure 2.3. 
 
As discussed later in Section 2.5, the past investment in human capital 
will continue to add to the productivity of the Irish work force for some 
time to come. In particular, it is paying off in the rapid growth in the 
output of the business and financial services sector. The success of the 
sector relies on the availability of an adequate supply of skilled labour at a 
reasonable price, together with the natural advantage of the English 
language, the flexibility of the labour market, and the low rate of 
corporation tax (see Appendix 2). These characteristics of the economy 
underpin Ireland’s advantage as a source of supply for such services to the 
global market. Under these circumstances it is not surprising that Ireland is 
specialising into the sector, reflecting the relative abundance of this key 
factor of production, skilled labour. The OECD data on revealed 
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comparative advantage indicate that Ireland has a comparative advantage in 
the supply of financial services, computer and IT services and other 
business services.14 
 
Developments in the world economy impact on Ireland through a range 
of different channels. These channels include financial markets, world 
trade, and labour mobility. Here we concentrate on the transmission of 
changes in world activity directly to the Irish economy through trade. 
Domestic competitiveness relative to the rest of the world determines what 
share of world output is produced in Ireland. 
 
The latest version of HERMES has a new sub-model of the business 
and financial sector that reflects the factors driving the sector. As explained 
in Appendix 2, this model first explains exports of services (excluding 
tourism) in terms of the growth in world activity, the rate of corporation 
tax payable by the sector, and the cost of Irish output relative to that of 
competitors (competitiveness). Then the output of the sector is modelled 
as being driven by exports and by domestic demand as well as by Irish 
competitiveness. The model indicates that, while foreign demand 
accounted for less than 10 per cent of the output of the sector a decade 
ago, it now accounts directly for around 30 per cent of output. This model 
also indicates that the move to a common low rate of corporation tax had a 
major impact on the output of the sector over the period 1995-2005. 
However, that effect is now completed and, while underpinning existing 
output, it is not likely to contribute to further growth in the sector. 
 
The sub-model of the manufacturing sector is also described in 
Appendix 2. As with market services, Ireland’s share of world output of 
manufactured goods is a function of Ireland’s competitiveness (Bradley and 
Fitz Gerald, 1988 and Bradley, Fitz Gerald and Kearney, 1993). Thus the 
growth in the sector is driven by the growth in world output and by 
Ireland’s competitiveness as a location for manufacturing. 
 
A third, though much less important channel through which changes in 
world activity impact on the Irish economy is tourism. As with the other 
sectors trading on a world market, tourism exports are sensitive to the 
growth in world activity and to competitiveness. 
 
Thus, there are three main sectors through which the growth in world 
trade directly affects the Irish economy – manufacturing, business and 
financial services and tourism. Using the HERMES model it is possible to 
decompose the effects of the growth in world trade to determine the 
relative importance of these three channels. Table 2.2 shows the impact on 
certain key variables through the three different channels and the combined 
effect of all three. These effects are presented for two cases, one where the 
positive shock to world activity occurs in 1990, before the boom in services 
exports really began, and one where it occurs in 2006, the latest date for 
which we have the necessary published data. Comparing the results from 
these two shocks illustrates the changing importance over time of the 
different channels through which world growth is transmitted to the Irish 
economy. 
 
14 See: http://stats.oecd.org/wbos/Index.aspx?DatasetCode=TIS 
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Table 2.2: Effects of a 1 Per Cent Increase in World Activity Through 
Different Channels 
Stimulus in 2006, effects shown for 2010 
     
Channel: Combined Tourism Manufacturing Business 
Services 
Effect in % points on:     
GNP 1.32 0.16 0.79 0.44 
Manufacturing output 2.51 0.00 2.96 0.00 
Business services 
output 
1.59 0.16 0.32 1.37 
Total employment 0.57 0.09 0.42 0.35 
Business services 
exports 
3.68 0.00 0.00 4.80 
Tourism exports 2.21 2.41 0.00 0.00 
     
Stimulus in 1990, effects shown for 1994 
     
Channel: Combined Tourism Manufacturing Business 
Services 
Effect in % points on:     
GNP 0.85 0.16 0.55 0.10 
Manufacturing output 1.93 0.00 2.20 0.00 
Business services 
output 
0.77 0.17 0.32 0.29 
Total employment 1.94 0.00 2.46 0.00 
Business services 
exports 
0.50 0.15 0.28 0.24 
Tourism exports 0.59 0.09 0.64 0.05 
     
 
In this case the stimulus is assumed to amount to 1 per cent of world 
activity in either 1990 or 2006, sustained indefinitely. The effect on the 
Irish economy is measured for 1994 and 2010, the fifth year of the change, 
allowing time for production to adjust to the increase in demand. The 
combined effect of all three channels is shown in the first column of the 
table. For 2010 they sum to less than the sum of the parts because the rise 
in domestic activity through each of the channels raises the demand for 
labour leading to increased wage rates. To a limited extent this rise in wage 
rates offsets the benefits of the increase in foreign demand for Irish output. 
 
The combined effects (through all channels) of growth in world demand 
on the Irish economy in 1990 were substantially less than they would be 
today. In the case of the shock beginning in 1990, in the fifth year, 1994, 
the effect would have been to raise GNP by 0.85 percentage points above 
what it otherwise would have been, compared to an addition of 1.32 
percentage points in 2010 for a shock beginning in 2006. This substantial 
increase in the impact of world growth on Ireland is due to the changing 
structure of the economy. It is now more integrated into the global 
economy and the internationalisation of business services has contributed 
an important additional link between the Irish economy and the world 
market for traded goods and services. 
 
The results for 2010 suggest that manufacturing is still the most 
important channel through which world demand drives Irish GNP. For a 
stimulus in 2006 manufacturing would have accounted for 57 per cent of 
the ultimate increase in Irish GNP (Table 2.3). However, a significant part 
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of the increase in Irish output would actually occur in business services, 
providing services as an input to domestic manufacturing.  
Table 2.3: Share of GNP Growth from Different Channels 
    
 Tourism Manufacturing Business 
Services 
    
2010 11.5 56.8 31.7 
1994 19.8 67.9 12.3 
    
 
Today, almost one-third of the effect on the Irish economy of an 
increase in world output would be transmitted to GNP directly through the 
business and financial services sector (Table 2.3).15 In this case (and the 
case of tourism exports) there is no real effect on domestic manufacturing 
as such a high proportion of manufacturing output is now exported – it is 
not used elsewhere in the services sector. Finally, the increase in tourism 
exports, as a result of higher world output (driving foreign demand for 
holidays in Ireland), would account for just over 10 per cent of the ultimate 
impact of an increase in world output on Irish GNP.  
 
The results for the 1990 shock are very different from those for the 
2006 shock. In the case of the earlier shock, by 1994, some 68 per cent of 
the effect would have come through manufacturing with only 12 per cent 
through business and financial services. In the earlier period tourism was 
also more important, accounting for 20 per cent of the impact of growth in 
world activity on the Irish economy. What this illustrates is the major 
increase in importance of the business and financial services sector as a 
crucial link between the Irish economy and world growth. The sector, 
which was largely providing for a domestic market in 1990, is now a major 
exporter. The rise in services exports (excluding tourism) has been a very 
recent phenomenon and has taken place at a very rapid pace. This trend is 
likely to continue in the forecast period, as discussed in Chapter 4. 
 
This change has major importance in understanding what drives growth 
in the Irish economy. Until very recently all the emphasis was put on 
attracting manufacturing to Ireland, very often owned by foreign 
multinationals. However, for the future new factories will be less common 
and the major impetus to growth will come from expansion of the business 
and financial services sector. This has implications for a range of policy 
areas, including “industrial policy” and regional policy. In planning for the 
years ahead, while manufacturing will remain important for the foreseeable 
future, the major growth in activity is likely to occur in business and 
financial services. Public policy will need to plan for the infrastructural 
needs of the Irish and foreign firms that will provide this future growth. 
These needs will be rather different from those of traditional 
manufacturing plants. Regional policy will need to take account of the fact 
that business and financial services jobs tend to be concentrated in large 
urban centres. With this sector providing the major growth in employment 
in the future, it emphasises the importance of the National Spatial 
Strategy’s approach of concentrating on a few key “gateways”. 
 
15 All of these results leave out the transmission to Ireland of the effects of changes in 
world output through the financial markets, migration etc.  
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While Ireland clearly has enjoyed a competitive advantage in the 
business and financial services sector in world markets over the last decade, 
this advantage is in no way guaranteed. The HERMES model indicates that 
business services exports and output are very sensitive to Ireland’s 
competitiveness (Appendix 2). This is illustrated in Table 2.4, which shows 
the impact of a one percentage point improvement in Ireland’s 
competitiveness relative to the rest of the world, assumed to begin in 2006, 
and sustained for twenty years. Wages in Ireland are held constant (as are 
import prices). To capture the full long-run effects of competitiveness 
changes the effects on the key variables are shown for 2025. The results 
indicate that the supply response for both tourism and business services 
exports is similar lying in the range 1.29 to 1.35.  
Table 2.4: Effects of a 1 Per Cent Improvement in Competitiveness 
Stimulus in 2006 effects in 2025 
  
 Effect in Percentage Points on: 
  
GNP 0.83 
Manufacturing output 1.08 
Business services output 0.72 
Total employment 0.45 
Business services exports 1.29 
Tourism exports 1.35 
  
 
Manufacturing output shows a supply elasticity of just over unity when 
faced with a one percentage point improvement in competitiveness. When 
the combined effects on the three sectors exposed to international 
competition are taken into account, the effect of the improvement in 
competitiveness on GNP is around 0.85 percentage points by the end of 
the period. 
 
While Ireland is specialising into certain sectors where it has special 
advantages, there are other developed countries with similar advantages. As 
a result, these model results suggest that competitiveness relative to our 
neighbours is very important, not just for manufacturing, but also for 
business services. This conclusion is also broadly consistent with the results 
using a much simpler model of the Irish economy in Bergin and Kearney 
(2007).  
 
The detailed results, not shown here, suggest that the response to 
changes in competitiveness is somewhat slower than to changes in world 
demand. Firms can adjust their output in the short-term in existing plants 
in response to changes in world demand. However, relocating production 
to more competitive locations requires major investment. Such decisions 
on relocation, either to Ireland or from Ireland, are not made on the spur 
of the moment. Once made it generally takes quite a number of years 
before the new production centre is operating at capacity. 
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 The manufacturing sector has seen very high rates of productivity 
increase over a prolonged period. This reflects the heavy weighting of the 
high-tech sub-sector in manufacturing. The nature of the product of this 
sector means that technical innovation is particularly rapid resulting in 
substantial cost reductions each year. Table 2.5 shows the five-year average 
growth in labour productivity for the three sub-sectors of the 
manufacturing sector used in the HERMES model, as well as for market 
services. 
2.5 
Productivity, 
Human 
Capital and 
the Terms of 
Trade 
Table 2.5: Labour Productivity, 5 Year Averages, Per Cent 
       
  
1980- 
85 
1985-
90 
1990-
95 
1995-
00 
2000-
05 
Manufacturing       
 Traditional 5.2 6.0 4.8 4.5 4.8 
 Food Processing 7.4 7.9 5.9 2.9 7.0 
 High-Tech. 14.2 8.3 8.3 14.5 9.3 
 Total 6.9 6.4 5.8 8.3 7.7 
Market services     
 Business & Financial -1.8 6.5 -1.6 6.7 0.3 
 Distribution 2.3 -1.3 -1.0 0.6 2.9 
 
Transport & 
Communications 3.0 6.9 4.0 4.6 3.5 
 Total 1.5 1.7 -0.1 3.0 2.5 
     
 
The exceptionally high rate of productivity increase was not confined to 
what we have here defined as the high-tech sector – chemicals and 
engineering.16 In addition, what is here defined as the “traditional” sector 
includes paper and publishing, which has within it the “reproduction of 
computer media” category, which is properly a high-tech business. The 
high rate of productivity increase owes much to the gradual replacement of 
low productivity firms by firms in niches with much higher productivity 
(Haller, 2007). The result of this transformation is a continuing very high 
rate of productivity increase in manufacturing. This is not just a 
phenomenon of the 1990s but has been sustained over a very long period, 
as shown in Table 2.5, and it has been accompanied by a major change in 
the structure of the sector. 
 
The existence of very high rates of productivity growth in the 
manufacturing sector has, of course, meant that the very high rate of 
growth in output has been accompanied by a moderate, though 
nonetheless significant, increase in employment. However, if the industry 
matures and experiences slower growth in output in the future the 
continuation of such a high rate of productivity increase will involve a 
contraction in the employment of the sector. This appears to have 
happened in the most recent years, with a substantial fall in employment 
since its peak in 2001. 
 
16 Because of problems in availability of suitable national accounts data it is not possible to 
use a more precise definition – for example, pharmaceuticals, computers, instrument 
engineering.  
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This very high rate of productivity increase in the sector internationally 
has meant that the price of the output of the sector has fallen fairly steadily 
in recent years. Today, the price index for the output of the sector is 5 per 
cent below its 2000 level, in spite of an average rise in the GDP deflator 
over that period of around 3.5 per cent a year. With the bulk of 
manufacturing output exported (over 80 per cent), to buy the investment 
and consumption goods that make up the rest of GDP, ever higher 
volumes of manufactured goods have to be produced and exported. Table 
2.5 also shows the measured rate of productivity increase in the market 
services sector and its sub-sectors over the same period. The trend growth 
in productivity is dramatically lower than in the manufacturing sector. The 
one exception is the transport and communications sector.  
 
The latest version of HERMES identifies a change in trend in the 
transport and communications sector in the second half of the 1980s, with 
labour productivity stepping up in gear around that time. This acceleration 
in the rate of productivity increase was due to major structural change – the 
advent of competition in air transport and inter-urban buses, as well as 
major change in the telecommunications sector. Globally the move to 
containerisation and liberalisation have also made for a more efficient 
industry. The result of the accelerated rate of increase in labour 
productivity is that the rate of inflation in the price of output of that sector 
has been substantially moderated, making the tradable sector of the 
economy more competitive and resulting in savings for consumers. 
 
The distribution sector has shown rather slow growth in productivity 
over the same period. Studies of the EU and the US suggest that one of the 
key reasons for higher productivity in the US than in the EU-15 over the 
last decade and a half has been the growth in productivity in the 
distribution sector in the US (van Ark, O’Mahony and Timmer, 2008). The 
limited progress in this sector in Ireland may mean that there is scope for 
more progress in the coming decade in this sector.17 The key sub-sector in 
market services, which is growing rapidly and is increasingly competing on 
a world market, is business and financial services. Table 2.5 suggests a 
rather uneven progress in productivity in that sector over the last twenty-
five years, with an average growth in productivity over the full period of 
only 0.7 per cent a year, lower than for any other sector considered here. In 
spite of the very slow growth in the productivity of the sector, output and 
employment have grown continuously and, as explained earlier, its share of 
GDP has expanded greatly. A very substantial part of the output of the 
sector is now exported and its success in international markets has 
occurred in spite of the slow growth in measured productivity. 
 
While measured labour productivity may have grown slowly in this 
sector, there are many problems in measurement. Unlike in manufacturing, 
where the number of units of output produced each year in a plant is 
generally identifiable, much of the output of the business and financial 
sector is not amenable to such quantification. There are also major 
problems in dealing with improvements in quality of service provided by 
the sector. While methods have been developed to deal with this issue of 
 
17 It may also be due to differences in taste. In the US consumers may prefer to buy their 
goods in large hypermarkets whereas in the EU for some products consumers may prefer 
more individualised products in smaller shops (Fitz Gerald and Knipper, 1990). 
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quality improvement in manufacturing, for example, in the computer 
hardware sector, progress by statistical authorities in the business services 
sector is much slower. What this means is that measured output may 
underestimate the true increase in the volume of output, and hence in 
productivity. 
 
If output and productivity are underestimated this will be manifested in 
a high rate of inflation in the output price of the sector.18 Over the twenty-
five years between 1980 and 2005 the deflator for the GDP arising in the 
business and financial sector rose by on average over 8 per cent a year. For 
all of the services sector, including non-market services, the increase was 
around 6.7 per cent a year and for manufacturing it was under 2 per cent a 
year. The fact that the sector can command a continuing price premium for 
its output could be due to a number of factors, including a continuing 
unforeseen increase in demand, a trend rise in the price of one of its key 
inputs, namely skilled labour, and technical change, resulting in quality 
improvements not captured in the price indices. A problem in measuring 
the “true” price would be consistent with an underestimate of output. Even 
if the output of the business and financial sector is not underestimated, its 
success in dramatically increasing its exports in a global market indicates 
that, to date, it has remained competitive in spite of a rapid rise in prices. 
This is reflected in the OECD measures of revealed comparative 
advantage.  
Figure 2.7: Index of Level of Education of Work Force, by Sector, 2002 
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The sector is very human capital intensive – the work force has a high 
average level of education. Figure 2.7 shows an index of the average level 
of education of the work force by sector from the 2002 Census.19 The two 
categories relevant to the business and financial sector are highlighted in 
 
18 The output deflator for the sector is obtained by dividing the value of output by the 
measure of volume. 
19 The index treats someone with primary education alone as having an index of unity. The 
weights reflect the relative returns, in terms of earnings, to each level of education where 
the returns are measured relative to the income of those with primary education alone. 
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the figure. In a world where goods and services with a high human capital 
content are experiencing a rapid growth in demand, producers face a 
demand curve that is not very price elastic. 
 
As the sector increasingly becomes the engine of growth in the 
economy, taking over from manufacturing, the measured productivity 
increase for the economy as a whole will tend to fall. However, as discussed 
below this may exaggerate the slowdown in the purchasing power of Irish 
incomes. 
 
The effect of the high rate of productivity increase in manufacturing has 
been that the price of exports from the sector has risen very slowly over 
time (reflecting the low rate of inflation in output prices). The goods and 
services that Ireland imports tend to be less high-tech and their prices have 
risen more rapidly than export prices over time. Thus, as shown in Figure 
2.8, the terms of trade have moved against Ireland fairly consistently since 
the late 1980s. Each year, in order to buy even the same volume of imports 
as the previous year, a larger volume of high-tech exports has to be sold 
because of the change in the relative prices. This means that the rate of 
growth in GDP and GNP, driven by the growth in manufacturing, 
exaggerates the true growth in living standards in Ireland. As explained 
above, Gross National Disposable Income (GNDI) is a more appropriate 
welfare measure as it takes account of the change in purchasing power due 
to fluctuations in the terms of trade. 
Figure 2.8: Terms of Trade, Ireland 
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However, as services exports increase in importance in the economy 
there is likely to be a reversal in the trend deterioration in the terms of 
trade. In the next decade the very rapid growth in the export of services 
will come to dominate Irish exports (see Chapter 4). Assuming that the 
past trend for the price of exports of services to rise relative to that of 
merchandise goods continues (Figure 2.9), as services exports come to 
dominate total exports the result will be a reversal of the trend 
deterioration in the terms of trade. This will be reflected in GNDI growing 
more rapidly than GNP. Of course if the problem is an underestimation of 
the output of the business and financial sector then measured GNP would 
grow more rapidly and the terms of trade would not improve. Either way 
GNDI will be the appropriate measure of the improvement in welfare. 
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Figure 2.9: Relative Price of Services and Merchandise Exports, Ratio 
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Two other European countries where a substantial proportion of total 
exports is accounted for by business and financial services, are the UK and 
Switzerland. As shown in Figure 2.10, since the mid-1980s they have both 
experienced a significant improvement in their terms of trade, whereas for 
the Euro Area there was relatively little change over the same period. It is 
likely that the experience of these two countries, the UK and Switzerland, 
will be a more appropriate guide to Ireland’s position over the coming 
decade as, like them, Ireland becomes ever more reliant on exports of 
services. 
Figure 2.10: Terms of Trade, UK, Switzerland, Ireland and Euro Area, 
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r id growth in productivity in Ireland than in its neighbours over the 
coming ten or fifteen years. That is the differential effect of investment in 
education.  
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Over the last twenty years there has been major investment in education 
in Ireland. While free second-level education was first introduced in 1967, 
the substantial rise in participation only really began in the 1980s, especially 
in the participation rate at third level. The upgrading of the education 
system in Ireland has occurred much later than in many of Ireland’s 
northern European neighbours. For example, in the UK the 1944 Education 
Act presaged a major increase in educational participation in post-war years. 
Similar developments occurred in the late 1940s and the 1950s in countries 
such as Germany, Sweden and the Netherlands. 
 
As a result, the productivity enhancing effects of investment in 
education was felt much earlier in countries such as Germany and the 
Netherlands than in Ireland. For Germany the major benefit of its post-war 
investment in education occurred in the 1970s (Koman and Marin, 1997). 
One way of measuring the change in the investment in human capital in a 
range of countries since the 1950s is to compare the average educational 
attainment of the population in each country aged 25-29 years with that of 
the population aged 55-59 years. Figure 2.11 shows the ratio of the human 
capital index for the two cohorts across a range of countries.20 This shows 
that there has been little additional upgrading of human capital over the last 
thirty years in countries such as Germany, Denmark and the Netherlands. 
Thus the impact of rising educational attainment on these economies has 
already been fully accounted for. It is those countries that have invested 
more recently that have not yet fully reaped the benefits of this investment. 
This goes some way to explain the superior growth performance of Ireland, 
Spain and Portugal in recent years. 
Figure 2.11: Investment in Human Capital, 2002 
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Figure 2.12 shows the average annual growth in the human capital index 
for Ireland for five-year periods since 1970. It shows that the biggest 
 
20 For details on methodology see Fitz Gerald (2006). This index weights those with each of four 
levels of education (completed) by the estimated returns to the individual from that level of 
education. Primary education has a weighting of one. The weights for Ireland are taken from Fitz 
Gerald, McCarthy, Morgenroth and O’Connell (2003). Primary education has a weight of 1, Junior 
Certificate, 1.11, Leaving Certificate 1.27 and Third Level 1.68. 
26 MEDIUM-TERM REVIEW 2008-2015 
impact on the growth in productivity, and hence in the economy, was 
between 1990 and 2005. However, it will still be significant, though 
slowing, for the next twenty years. This reflects the fact that the upgrading 
of the educational system is relatively recent in Ireland. While this growth 
in the index does not necessarily translate into a similar increase in 
productivity, it does provide a useful guide to the potential long-term 
effects of the investment in education and training.21 
Figure 2.12: Growth in Human Capital Index 
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The increase in the human capital of the population can affect the 
economy in a number of different ways. Participation rates are higher for 
those with good education, reflecting their superior productivity and 
earning power. This is particularly true for women. Also those with better 
levels of education are much less likely to experience unemployment. Thus 
increases in human capital will affect participation rates positively and 
unemployment rates negatively.  Finally, increases in human capital will 
positively affect the productivity of individuals.22 (In a market economy 
with a flexible labour market the earnings of individuals will reflect their 
marginal product.) 
 
Recent research by Bergin and Kearney (2007) examines the impact of 
the increase in human capital on the Irish economy in recent decades. Their 
research indicates that the rise in human capital played a pivotal role in 
increasing output and productivity, slowing the growth in wage dispersion 
between high-skilled and low-skilled workers, and in boosting employment. 
They find that had Ireland failed to invest in human capital over the twenty 
year period examined in the paper, GNP per capita would have been over 
20 percentage points lower than it actually was. In their numerical 
simulations the growth in output per head is decomposed into the 
contributions from employment, participation and productivity. The results 
suggest that, with unemployed resources, the biggest benefit to the Irish 
economy in the 1990s from human capital accumulation was in terms of 
employment. It turned those who had poor employment prospects because 
 
21 The quality of education is clearly very important. This makes international comparisons 
difficult but it also poses problems when comparing trends within a country over long 
periods. 
22 Obviously higher levels of educational participation reduces labour force participation in 
the younger age groups. 
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of their limited education into individuals with a good education sought 
after by employers.  
 
With the economy now at (or close to) full-employment the biggest 
benefit in the future is likely to come from rising labour force participation. 
However, they did not model in detail the potential productivity enhancing 
effects of investment in human capital. Previous work by Durkan, 
Fitzgerald and Harmon (1999) suggested that the productivity enhancing 
effects would be substantial. 
 
Finally, there is some micro-economic evidence which suggests 
additional human capital effects from the mobility of the Irish labour force 
in the past. Barrett and O’Connell (2001) show that those Irish who 
worked abroad and returned could expect to earn substantially more (c. 10 
per cent) as a result of the increase in their human capital from their more 
varied work experience. With around 30 per cent of all those in Ireland 
with third level education (and over 20 per cent of the adult population of 
working age) being returned emigrants this would suggest quite a 
substantial long-term impact. However, further studies will be needed to 
fully identify both the private returns to labour mobility, and the related 
experience gained, and also the likely social returns. However, on the basis 
of the evidence to date it would suggest that for at least another decade 
Ireland will continue to experience a potential advantage relative to many 
of its EU competitors, in terms of higher labour productivity arising from 
human capital effects. 
 
 For two centuries there has been free movement of labour between the 
United Kingdom and Ireland. In addition, over much of that period, Irish 
labour also had access to other attractive labour markets, such as that of 
the United States. The result of this free movement was extensive 
emigration from Ireland over a very long period. This free flow of labour 
out of Ireland made it part of a much larger British Isles labour market so 
that the supply of labour was affected by factors in that wider market. This 
had implications for the economy as a whole and, in particular, it affected 
wage formation in Ireland (O’Rourke, 1995). 
2.6  
The Labour 
Market 
 
Figure 2.13 shows the pattern of net emigration over the last half 
century. For most of this long period the free movement of labour 
generally involved emigration from Ireland. While there was always some 
return of former emigrants, until the 1970s these flows were swamped by 
the movement outwards, giving rise to substantial net emigration (Fahey, 
Fitz Gerald and Maître, 1998). Over most of this period there was very 
little inflow of foreign citizens into Ireland. The first sign of a change in 
pattern occurred in the 1970s. This change was partly due to the 
disturbances in Northern Ireland, which led to some movement of 
population south of the border. In addition, for the first time, there was a 
significant flow of returning emigrants who had left in the 1950s or the 
1960s. 
 
With the advent of difficult economic conditions in the 1980s, 
associated with low growth and rising tax rates, there was a return to net 
emigration. The highest level of net emigration was experienced in 1989. 
With the rapid growth in the economy since 1994 there was again a reversal 
in the flow of labour. Initially, there was a major return of emigrants, 
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primarily those who had left in the 1980s. This resulted in substantial net 
immigration over the second-half of the 1990s. However, for the first time 
there was also significant immigration of non-Irish citizens. With the 
enlargement of the EU in 2004 creating a much larger pool of labour, there 
was a further step up in net immigration into Ireland, with the bulk of the 
net inflow being foreign citizens rather than returning emigrants. 
Figure 2.13: Net Immigration into Ireland, 000s 
 
 
Going back to the 1960s, the behaviour of net migration has been 
explained using a model where the flow of net emigrants is driven by 
differences in the unemployment rates in the origin (Ireland) and 
destination (UK) labour markets (a specification based on Harris and 
Todaro, 1970). This model explaining migration behaviour has been re-
estimated on quite a number of occasions (Walsh, 1968, Keenan, 1981, 
Honohan, 1984 and 1992 and Bradley et al., 1993). With each successive re-
estimation it proved robust, continuing to explain migration behaviour over 
a long period.  
 
As shown in Appendix 2, the flow of migration was explained by the 
difference between the expected returns to living in Ireland relative to the 
UK. This is a function of the expected real after tax wage rate and of the 
probability of being unemployed/employed in the two countries. As 
indicated in the Appendix, this specification implies an infinitely elastic 
supply of labour in the long run; provided the gap between the 
circumstances in the two labour markets continues unchanged the net flow 
of migrants will continue indefinitely. If the relative attractiveness of the 
Irish labour market remains unchanged, in today’s circumstances this 
would mean that an infinite inflow of immigrants would continue to come. 
Such an inflow would only be choked off if the rise in the supply of labour 
affected domestic wage rates or unemployment rates, or else if there was a 
change in the labour market circumstances in the countries of origin.  
 
This approach was realistic in the 1950s through to the early 1990s, 
when the bulk of migrants were going from Ireland to the UK or vice versa. 
Up to the mid-1980s they were also largely unskilled and more likely to 
suffer from spells of unemployment than skilled workers, hence the 
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importance of differential rates of unemployment. However, over the 
course of the 1980s the educational attainment of the emigrants changed 
dramatically (Fahey, Fitz Gerald and Maître, 1998). With the shift towards 
emigration of skilled labour the difference in the real after tax wage rate in 
the origin and the receiving labour markets could be expected to be more 
important. 
 
In more recent times the move to immigration of foreigners (generally 
skilled, Barrett and McCarthy, 2007), rather than returning emigrants, could 
be expected to change the factors driving the movement of labour. While 
in the late 1990s many of these immigrants came from the UK, in recent 
years their origin has shifted, with many of these immigrants coming from 
the new EU member states. This could be expected to change the factors 
affecting the international movement of labour (e.g. substituting Polish 
wage rates for UK wage rates). One would expect that, with a change in the 
alternative labour market to Ireland (in this case the origin of the 
movement of labour), different variables would appear in any model 
explaining migration.  
 
In addition, the cost of moving from the new origin countries to Ireland 
is likely to be different than it was for those coming from the UK or for 
returning emigrants. While a century ago an important element of the cost 
of moving was the cost of transport, today the major cost will be the loss 
of contact with family, friends and networks. Also the information 
requirements needed to live and work successfully in a new location are 
significant.23 While modern technology can ease the transition, language 
obstacles remain severe. Obviously, these factors will constitute costs for 
foreigners coming to Ireland while, for Irish people returning, they will 
constitute benefits. Hence, the shift in the composition of migrants will 
affect the cost of moving and migration behaviour. 
 
Having reliably explained migration behaviour over three or four 
decades, this change in behaviour has caused the old model of migration to 
breakdown, as illustrated in Figure 2.14. This figure shows the estimates of 
migration from the traditional migration equation when it was estimated 
over different time periods (to 1996, to 2006 and the actual net emigration, 
NMA). When estimated up to 1996 the model massively underestimates 
immigration in subsequent years. When estimated over the full period it 
still underestimates migration in the most recent years by a substantial 
amount, while providing a much worse fit for the period to 1996. 
Underlying the instability of this equation is the change in the factors 
driving migration and labour supply since the mid-1990s.  
 
As discussed above, the traditional model of migration implies an 
infinite elasticity of labour supply in the long run. However, a number of 
factors have changed this elasticity of labour supply: 
 
 
 
 
 
23 For example, how you access the property market; how can you establish a credit 
reputation.  
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Figure 2.14: Estimates of Immigration with Different Models 
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1. The fact that the origin of the immigrants has changed should 
result in a change in the alternative labour market related variables 
(unemployment rate or real after tax wage rates) that should appear 
in the model. In practise this did not prove feasible.24 However, the 
UK variables may still be relevant if the foreign immigrants are 
choosing between the Irish and the UK labour markets. This is not 
implausible in the case of immigrants from the new member states 
as the inflow into the UK from these countries has been even larger 
than that into Ireland in absolute terms (Barrell, Fitz Gerald and 
Riley, 2007). 
 
 
2. The Irish labour market is much smaller than that of the UK and 
large inflows result in rising costs of living because the stock of 
infrastructure, both private and public, is fixed in the short run. 
Duffy, Fitz Gerald and Kearney (2006) show that the bigger the 
inflow of people to be housed, the bigger the demand for housing 
and the higher the cost of accommodation. (This is reflected in 
Chapters 4 and 5 in the discussion of the impact of migration on 
demand for housing in the forecast period.) This increase in 
demand affects the cost of living in Ireland, adversely affecting the 
country’s attractiveness for foreign labour, tending to moderate the 
inflow. In addition, Barrell, Fitz Gerald and Riley (2007) show that, 
because the stock of public infrastructure (e.g. public transport) is 
fixed in the short term, increases in the population and labour 
supply result in a decline in labour productivity (because of the 
rising congestion costs that such a limitation on public 
infrastructure implies).  
 
 
 
24 The rapidly shifting origin of the immigrants combined with the wide range of 
countries of origin means that it is not possible to identify suitable variables for 
home country wage rates or unemployment to use in an annual time series 
model. 
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For forty years between 1926 and 1966 Irish wage rates ranged around 
50 and 60 per cent of those in the UK (Figure 2.15). This was in spite of 
very substantial movement of labour from Ireland to the UK. However, 
from the mid-1960s onwards the wage rate in Ireland converged rapidly on 
that in the UK stabilising at just under 90 per cent of the UK rate between 
1970 and 2005. Curtis and Fitz Gerald (1996) and Fitz Gerald (1999) 
modelled the reduced form of the labour market using a wage equation 
which took account of the fact that UK labour costs affected both the 
demand and the supply of labour in Ireland. This also suggested that the 
fluctuations around the long-term trend, manifested in Figure 2.15, were 
partly due to fluctuations in the bilateral exchange rate. 
Figure 2.15: Irish Labour Costs Relative to UK 
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 While this model satisfactorily explained the behaviour of wage rates up 
to the mid-1990s, when periodically re-estimated with more recent data it 
has suggested changes in underlying behaviour. It is a reduced form model 
of the labour market and the implied labour supply elasticity can be derived 
from the estimation results. As shown in Table 2.6, when estimated with 
data that ended in 1990 or 1994, before significant net immigration was 
observed, it implied a very high elasticity of labour supply. However, as 
more recent data are added the implied supply elasticity has fallen. This is 
fully consistent with the results shown above for the migration equation. 
This evidence confirms that the supply of labour is no longer infinitely 
elastic. Instead the labour supply curve slopes upwards with significant 
implications for labour market behaviour. As additional data are added the 
measured elasticity of supply falls. In the HERMES model there is a 
structural model of labour supply (Appendix 2) which provides an 
independent and more robust estimate of the elasticity of labour supply and 
that is also shown for comparison in Table 2.6. 
 
Figure 2.16 provides a stylised model illustrating the implications of the 
change in the shape of the supply curve for the economy. In the past the 
labour supply curve (Ls1) was horizontal with an infinite elasticity of labour 
supply in the long run through migration. Under these circumstances, if the 
labour demand curve shifted outwards from Ld1 to Ld2, for example due to 
expansionary fiscal policy, employment would rise from L0 to L1, with no 
change in the wage rate W0.   However, as  supply becomes  more inelastic,  
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Table 2.6: Estimation of Wage Rate Equation, Implied Labour Supply 
Elasticity 
   
 Estimation Period Labour Supply Elasticity 
Curtis and Fitz Gerald (1996) 1962-90 3.62 
Fitz Gerald (1999)                               1980-94 4.4 
Fitz Gerald and Hore (2002) 1983-98 2.67 
Model re-estimated using latest data 1974-2005 2.23 
HERMES 2008 structural model  0.66 
   
 
with the supply curve shifting upwards to Ls2 or even Ls3, the outward shift 
in the demand for labour to Ld2 leads to a rise in wage rates to W1 or even 
to W2.25 As a result, total employment only rises to L2 or L3. This means 
that rising domestic demand for labour, with no change in the supply 
curve, will see rising wage rates. Until the early 1990s, with a very elastic 
supply, shocks to domestic demand, for example, from an expansionary 
fiscal policy or a building boom, just resulted in an inflow of labour. 
However, today such a stimulus would have significant inflationary effects. 
The rise in wage rates that would occur would tend to crowd out the 
tradable sector of the economy, which has to compete on global markets. 
Figure 2.16: Response to Labour Demand Shifts with Changes in Slope of 
Labour Supply Curve 
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A second implication of this change in labour market behaviour is 
illustrated in Figure 2.17. When the elasticity of labour supply was infinite 
(S0) any change in the tax on labour affected wage rates directly – all of the 
incidence of an increase in labour taxes fell on employers, as did all the 
benefits of tax cuts. For example, if a tax was imposed which shifted the 
 
25 Without enlargement of the EU the supply curve would have been even more inelastic. 
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wage rate from W0 to W1 then, with an infinitely elastic supply curve, the 
supply curve would be shifted up to S1. With a fixed demand curve, D, 
employees would still get W0 but employment would fall from L0 to L1. 
Employers would pay the cost of labour including all the tax, W1. Under 
these circumstances, the trade-off agreed in the first partnership agreement 
in 1987, involving lower taxes on labour in return for wage moderation, 
reflected the realities of the labour market at the time. Even without a 
partnership agreement the labour market would eventually have delivered 
such an improvement in competitiveness in return for a reduction in taxes 
on labour.  
Figure 2.17: Incidence of Taxation with Changes in Slope of Labour 
Supply Curve 
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However, since the late 1990s, with the change in the shape of the 
supply curve of labour (Figure 2.17) to S2, the incidence of labour taxation 
is changed. With the same increase in tax the supply curve is then shifted to 
S3. The new wage rate is set where the supply curve S3 intersects with the 
demand curve D – at a wage rate of W2. The increase in wage rates from 
W0 to W2 is less than the increase in labour taxes – from W0 to W1. This 
means that some of the incidence of the tax falls on employees – the after 
tax wage falls. As a result, the fall in employment to L2 is less than it would 
have been in the past with an infinite elasticity of labour supply. 
 
This has very significant implications for the operation of fiscal policy. 
For example, this means that the potentially positive effects on 
employment of the introduction of a carbon tax, with the revenue used to 
cut taxes on labour, are not as positive as they would have been in the past 
(Fitz Gerald and McCoy, 1992). Today some of the reduction in the tax on 
labour would accrue to employees whereas in the past the vast bulk would 
have gone to employers and into generating additional employment. 
(Nonetheless, the HERMES model indicates that for realistic levels of 
carbon tax, with the revenue recycled through lower labour taxes, there 
would be a positive effect on competitiveness, output and employment.) 
 
While all the evidence points to a change in the response of labour 
supply in the Irish economy, the fact that it has occurred so recently makes 
it difficult to estimate just how inelastic it actually is using the reduced form 
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wage equation. This problem arises from the short data sample – it is 
essentially a decade since there was a significant change in migration 
behaviour in the mid-1990s. However, using a structural model of 
migration and labour supply the HERMES model does produce an 
independent estimate of the elasticity of labour supply.  
 
Appendix 2 discusses the approach that has been taken in the latest 
version of the HERMES model used in preparing our forecasts. This 
model takes account of both the responsiveness of labour supply through 
migration and the responsiveness of labour force participation to changes 
in wage rates. While in the 1990s female labour force participation was very 
responsive to wage rate changes, the percentage change in labour supply 
for a given percentage change in wages today is lower because such a high 
proportion of the female population of working age is already in the labour 
force. When combined, these factors result in a long-run elasticity of labour 
supply with respect to domestic wage rates of 0.66 per cent. While this 
elasticity is less than the infinite elasticity of labour supply of the past, it is 
still quite elastic by international standards, reflecting the continuing 
openness of the Irish labour market.26 Also it is considered more robust 
than the elasticity estimated from the reduced form model, shown in Table 
2.6. 
 
In the HERMES model the demand for labour in each of seven sectors 
of the economy is modelled as a component of a factor demand system for 
each of those sectors. (The demand for labour in agriculture and non-
market services is treated as exogenous.) When taken together these 
equations suggest a long-run elasticity of labour demand of -0.4 per cent. 
While the elasticity of labour supply has fallen compared to the 1980s and 
the early 1990s, the model and recent experience also suggests that labour 
supply in the short term is actually more responsive to changing labour 
market circumstances than in the past  
 
The slowdown in the influx of new immigrants (as reflected in the PPS 
numbers) has been combined with a fairly similar pattern of outflow of 
short-stay immigrants. The result has been a substantial reduction in net 
immigration and a corresponding major slowdown in the increase in labour 
supply. In the past where those losing their jobs were Irish they would have 
taken some time searching for domestic jobs before leaving. The foreigners 
in the labour force seem to be much more responsive to changes in labour 
market circumstances, especially unemployment. Barrett and McCarthy 
(2007) indicate that immigrants had a lower propensity to depend on 
welfare payments than domestic residents. With job opportunities 
elsewhere, in both the UK and in the booming economies of the New 
Member States, foreigners are responding as much to the pull of these job 
opportunities outside Ireland as to the loss of opportunities in Ireland. 
 
 
26 While the HERMES model assumes that labour is homogeneous, this is obviously an 
oversimplification. As discussed earlier very significant differences exist in the productivity 
of labour depending on educational attainment. Also there will be more job-specific 
human capital that makes labour less mobile between sectors. Bergin and Kearney (2007) 
estimate a model with two kinds of labour, those with at least a Leaving Certificate and 
those without one. The results of this specialised model are used to inform the forecasts 
presented in Chapter 4. 
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The changes in the labour market discussed in this section have major 
policy implications:  
The incidence of labour taxes is changed. This means that the kind of 
trade-offs between wage rates and labour taxes which were exploited by 
governments in the late 1980s and early 1990s will no longer be as effective 
in improving competitiveness and increasing employment. It also means 
that, should it become necessary to increase rates of labour tax by a small 
amount at some date in the future, for such limited changes the negative 
competitiveness effects would be smaller in magnitude than they would 
have been in the 1980s or early 1990s. 
 
While the Irish labour market has long been unusual in the apparent 
absence of a Philips curve involving a trade-off between unemployment 
and inflation, things are changing. This change in behaviour indicates that 
crowding out27 of the domestic tradable sector by fiscal policy is potentially 
important. (This concern about potential crowding out was discussed in 
Morgenroth and Fitz Gerald, 2006, in the context of the appropriate size of 
the National Development Plan.) It means that wage rates are affected by 
fiscal policy and that in the future an unduly expansive budgetary position 
would have negative long-term consequences for competitiveness, output 
and employment. It also reflects the fact that by not using fiscal policy to 
moderate the housing boom in recent years, significant damage was done 
to the competitiveness of the tradable sector.  
 
While the evidence suggests that labour supply is now less responsive in 
the long run to changes in wage rates, the opposite is true in the short run. 
Many of the foreign workers in Ireland are only here for a short time 
anyway.28 A reduction in net immigration is rapidly achieved as the inflow 
falls with news of deteriorating labour market conditions, while the outflow 
continues at the previous rate. This rapid adjustment to changing labour 
market circumstances appears to be happening already with those losing 
jobs in building and construction. This short run responsiveness of labour 
supply has facilitated the adjustment of the economy in 2007 and 2008 to 
lower levels of activity, without having as adverse an effect on 
unemployment as had been anticipated in the last Review. 
 
 One of the stories that has come to prominence over the past decade is 
how the housing sector has grown in size and importance for the Irish 
economy. This sub-sector is an important component of the ESRI macro 
model (Appendix 2).29 New house prices are modelled based on the level of 
per capita income, per capita housing stock, the percentage of the 
population in the main household formation age group 25 to 34 years, and 
the user cost of housing. A dummy variable is also included for 2003, 
which suggests that house prices were higher than the model would 
2.7  
The Housing 
Market 
 
27 Crowding out means that the expansion of one sector in the economy raises overall 
prices and wages, hence reducing the competitiveness and output of other sectors. 
28 See the analysis by the CSO of the pattern of employment of those workers from the 
New Member States (NMS) with PPS numbers CSO: 2008, Foreign Nationals: PPSN 
Allocations and Employment  2002-2006. 
29 Based on work by Murphy (2005). The ESRI housing model is described in Duffy 
(2002). Extensive research has also been carried out by the Central Bank, see inter alia 
McQuinn (2004), McQuinn and O’Reilly (2007) and Addison-Smyth, McQuinn and 
O'Reilly (2008). 
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normally have predicted by around 10 per cent in 2005.30 This was followed 
by nominal growth in house prices of around 13 per cent in 2006. The 
recent slowdown in the property market will have removed some of the 
overvaluation.  
 
The coefficient for the change in income suggests quite a rapid pass 
through of short-run changes to prices. Per capita real income is also highly 
significant with an elasticity greater than one. Thus rising standards of 
living have a strong effect in increasing the demand for housing, leading to 
a more than proportionate increase in new house prices. This is consistent 
with the results of Miles and Pillonca (2007). Their analysis finds that Irish 
house prices rose by 173 per cent between 1997 and 2006. Of this increase 
108 percentage points was accounted for by increases in real income per 
capita.  
 
A key driver of any housing market is demographic influences and in 
this regard the experience of Ireland is in contrast to that of many other 
European countries. The 2006 Census recorded the population at 4.2 
million, up by 8.2 per cent in the four years since the previous Census, and 
nearly a third of the population was aged between 25 and 44 years, the key 
household formation age groups. Combined with changes in population it 
is also the rate of household formation that is an important influence on 
housing demand. Household formation patterns are driven by older people 
living longer and living alone, couples separating or divorcing, young, single 
people leaving the family home and living independently, and single parent 
families. Between 1997 and 2006 the number of households rose by 25 per 
cent, to nearly 1.5 million. At the same time as the population has been 
growing there is also a decline in the average size of households. While it is 
the case that housing supply has risen substantially in recent years, the 
stock of dwellings per 1,000 population in Ireland is still below that of 
many other European countries. The housing stock per capita variable can 
be considered as capturing a “scarcity” effect – given a rapid growth in the 
population and the inevitably slower growth in the stock of houses, the 
consequent housing scarcity quickly puts upward pressure on house prices. 
In addition to this scarcity effect, changing demographics, which increase 
the proportion of the population in the house-buying age group, has put 
upward pressure on house prices. The average household size has 
decreased from 3.2 persons in 1997 to 2.9 persons in 2006. Although the 
number of persons per household in Ireland has been declining, it also 
remains above European levels and some further decline is anticipated. 
 
Analysis of the 2006 Census shows that headship rates (the proportion of 
each age group who are heads of households) increases with age in the 25-
39 year age group. For example, a much higher proportion of those who 
are aged 30-35 are in independent households than is the case for 25-29 
year olds. As the bulge in the population moves up through the age bands 
over time the number of households also tends to increase. Data from the 
UK Census shows that Irish headship rates are lower than those in the UK 
 
30 This is in keeping with the approach of Murphy (2005). Murphy includes dummy 
variables for 1997 and 2003 that “pick-up the combined effects of financial liberalisation, 
policy interventions since 1998 and speculative frenzy effects.” His results are similar to 
the number reported above. 
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at comparable ages. If Irish headship rates were to rise towards UK levels 
this would represent an increase in this source of demand for dwellings. 
 
One of the main contributions to the growth in population in recent 
years has come from the high level of immigration to Ireland. Following 
years of emigration there is now a sustained net inflow of people into the 
country. The net inflow of people has increased substantially in recent years 
as migrants are attracted to the Irish economic success story and 
movement between countries became easier with the entry into the EU of 
the New Member States (NMS) in 2004. The net inflow reached 67,300 in 
2007 down from 71,800 in 2006. Some two-thirds of the net inflow in 2007 
were nationals of the 10 new EU member states. From a property market 
perspective, the majority of immigrants are in the key household formation 
age groups between 25 and 44 years old. In the year to April 2006, 53.7 per 
cent of immigrants were aged between 25-44 years.  
 
Duffy (2007), shows that, while there are significant differences in 
tenure between Irish and foreigners of the same age, there is not a major 
difference in headship rates. As a result, the housing demand forecasts 
from the Medium-Term Review are based on the assumption of identical 
headship rates for both Irish and foreigners.  
 
The supply of new houses is also modelled. The results from this 
equation show that short-run changes in house prices have a significant 
effect in boosting housing completions. In the long run completions are 
particularly influenced by the mark-up of house prices over costs. This 
mark-up, or profitability measure, indicates that if house prices increase 
relative to the cost of building then profitability rises and this increases the 
rate of house completions. The level of housing completions in Ireland in 
recent years reached record levels and has far exceeded the supply response 
in other European countries. 
Figure 2.18: Housing Completions, Ireland, 1970-2007 
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However, at the same time as this supply response occurred there has 
also been a large increase in the proportion of dwellings classified as 
holiday homes or second dwellings. The total stock of permanent houses at 
the time of the Census was 1.77 million. Of these approximately 175,000 
units were vacant houses, a further 41,600 were vacant flats and 49,800 
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were holiday homes. Based on these estimates the vacancy rate stands at 
around 15 per cent of the housing stock, a very high figure. Because of 
their location away from the major centres of employment growth, many of 
these vacant dwellings may not be useful in meeting future housing needs. 
Like many asset markets the housing market can experience peaks and 
troughs. A major policy challenge is how to deal with such volatility. 
Intervention is complicated by the fact that policies need to take account of 
both the owner-occupant and rental sectors of the market. Traditionally 
one of the main policy instruments for housing market control has been 
interest rate adjustment.  
Figure 2.19: Housing Completions, Per 1,000 Population 
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As a regional economy within EMU Ireland no longer has independent 
control of interest rates as a control mechanism for the Irish housing 
market. Indeed, Faust, Rogers and Wright (2001) suggest that interest rates 
in Ireland would probably have risen to 10 per cent or more in the late 
1990s if Ireland had not been a member of EMU.31 In the absence of 
independent interest rates, the burden of managing fluctuations falls to 
fiscal policy. Traditionally, fiscal policy in Ireland has been supportive of 
homeownership. For example, the OECD (2008a) identifies Ireland’s 
housing tax system as “one of the most favourable in the OECD.” It 
recommends that the tax breaks favouring homeownership, such as 
mortgage interest relief should be reduced and ultimately phased out to be 
replaced by a property tax.32 This recommendation is in line with that of 
the Commission on Taxation, which reported in the early 1980s.  
 
The need to manage the housing market using fiscal policy was 
identified in Fitz Gerald (2001). The British Treasury, in considering what 
the UK would have to do if it joined EMU also recognised the need for a 
more active management of the housing market using fiscal policy (HM 
Treasury, 2003). Current circumstances in Ireland mean that this is not an 
issue. Housing demand and prices are falling and there is little that policy 
can do to manage this process. However, over the coming decade when the 
 
31 For a discussion of the experience of EMU in Ireland that deals with such issues as 
monetary policy and the housing market see Fitz Gerald (2006). 
32 The IMF (2007) have also suggested that the area of property taxation be modernised. 
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housing market recovers the need to prevent a future bubble could require 
a more active fiscal policy stance.  
 
 The analysis set out in this chapter has important implications for the 
medium-term forecast for the economy set out in later chapters. First, a key 
driver of growth in the future is likely to be the business and financial 
services sector. Policy will need to consider how best the needs of this 
sector can be met through structural policies. What are likely to be the 
infrastructure needs of the sector in the future? What kind of R&D policy 
can best support the sector? What are likely to be the human capital needs 
of the sector? 
2.8 
Conclusions 
 
There have been major changes in how the labour market operates. In 
the long run the supply of labour is likely to be less responsive to wages 
than it was in the past. This means that the incidence of taxation will be 
less on business and more on the labour force compared to the past. It also 
means that the impact on employment will be lower than in the 1980s and 
the early 1990s. The change in labour market behaviour means that fiscal 
policy will have an enhanced role in managing domestic inflationary 
pressures, Inappropriate fiscal policy in the future could crowd out the 
tradable sector by harming competitiveness causing lasting damage to the 
productive potential of the economy. 
 
While it is unlikely to be an issue for some time to come, it would be 
appropriate to consider today, in a dispassionate way, how the housing 
sector can be managed in the future to avoid unnecessary disruption from 
possible excessive inflation in house prices. 
3. BACKGROUND 
ECONOMIC 
ENVIRONMENT AND 
ASSUMPTIONS 
This chapter begins by outlining our assumptions for the external 
environment. Developments in the world economy impact on Ireland 
through a wide range of channels. Obviously, for a country where trade in 
goods and services amounts to one- and three-quarters times the value of 
GNP, what happens to world trade is of vital importance. With monetary 
policy determined externally and a very big exposure to exchange rate 
fluctuations what happens on financial markets is also crucial. 
Developments in labour markets elsewhere in the EU have for many years 
been important as drivers of labour mobility and migration. To understand 
the varied impact of all these different external variables it is necessary to 
develop a detailed forecast for the world economy, especially the regions of 
that economy that impact most directly on Ireland. 
3.1 
Introduction 
 
Since the publication of the last Medium-Term Review, the global 
economic outlook has deteriorated over the near term, with an increased 
risk of a prolonged setback to the world economy as a result of the 
continuing turbulence in financial markets. However, while the short-term 
situation will be difficult, the international outlook for the medium term 
remains broadly favourable. 
 
In this chapter we present medium-term forecasts for the three major 
economic blocs that drive the Irish economy: the US, the Euro Area and 
the UK and then we draw out the implications of this environment for the 
Irish economy. In preparing the forecasts we have used a number of 
different sources (especially the National Institute Economic Review, January 
2008 and the World Economic Outlook of the IMF, January and April 2008). 
We used the National Institute of Economic and Social Research (NIESR) 
January 2008 forecast as an input to the medium-term forecast for the 
major  world economies.  This  forecast  was  modified  to  take account of  
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additional information available to us from a range of different sources.33 
In carrying out these modifications and in examining alternative 
assumptions we have used the NIESR Global Econometric Model 
(NiGEM).34 
 
The changing demographic structure of the economy also plays a key 
role in determining the future productive capacity of the economy. In 
Section 3.3 we present our demographic projections out to 2025. The 
favourable demographic factors that made the boom of the late 1990s 
possible, especially the growth in high-skilled labour supply, will continue 
to have a positive impact on Ireland’s potential growth rate, but at a more 
modest rate than before. The growth in labour supply could average over 
2.5 per cent a year to the end of the decade before slowing to around 1 per 
cent per year over the longer term. In terms of the composition of labour 
supply, we anticipate that the availability of low-skilled labour from 
domestic sources will fall and the lion's share of the increase in the labour 
force will be among those with a third level education. 
 
Finally, Section 3.4 presents our underlying assumptions on the public 
finances. This section examines the likely structure of the public sector 
over the next twenty years, in the context of the current infrastructural 
deficit and the likely ageing of the population beyond 2025.  
 
 As discussed in Chapter 2, the structure of the world economy is 
changing rapidly as globalisation brings rapid economic development to 
key centres of world population, such as China, India and Brazil. These 
newly developing economies have an abundant supply of unskilled or semi-
skilled labour. Their comparative advantage is thus in manufacturing 
sectors which have a high unskilled or semi-skilled labour content. The 
advent of these economies as major locations for the production of 
manufactured goods is, in turn, changing the comparative advantage of the 
other major economic regions in the world. These changes are taking place 
rapidly. 
3.2  
External 
Environment 
 
For Ireland the three main regions that are currently of direct 
importance are the US, the EU and the UK. While these three regions are 
today dominant, over the coming fifteen or twenty years the new regions of 
the world economy will develop in importance as markets for the goods 
and, especially, the services produced in Ireland. With economic 
development some will also emerge as new competitors. Thus while 
competitiveness today is measured relative to our current trading partners, 
new competitors will emerge by the end of the forecast period. 
 
 
 
 
33 We adjusted the NIESR January 2008 forecast to take account of the fact that short-
term growth prospects for the US had deteriorated since the beginning of the year. These 
adjustments were partly informed by the IMF January forecasts. We use the International 
Energy Agency forecast of the oil price. This translates into the nominal price of oil, in 
terms of dollars per barrel, $70.5 in 2007 to $73.9 in 2012. Thereafter, the oil price is 
expected to rise to $90.5 by 2020 and $110.3 in 2025. 
34 We are very grateful to Ray Barrell and Dawn Holland of NIESR for their assistance in 
using the NiGEM model. The forecast itself remains the sole responsibility of the authors. 
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UNITED STATES 
Short-term growth prospects in the United States are weak and there are 
fears that the current turbulence in financial markets could push the US 
further into recession.35 However, in our Benchmark forecast this downturn 
in activity is expected to be short lived, and a rebound in economic activity 
is expected in 2010. Thereafter, annual growth is expected to remain in the 
region of 2 to 2.5 per cent.  
 
Since mid-2007, the US economy has been affected by financial 
problems, initially in the sub-prime mortgage lending market, which have 
now spread to other areas of the economy. This has involved an increase in 
the inter-bank rate spread over the central bank rate because lending banks 
are uncertain about the exposure of borrowing banks to risky assets. This 
uncertainty has stemmed, at least initially, from the scale of defaults in the 
US sub-prime mortgage market. The assets associated with these mortgages 
have been stripped and split so that it is not always clear to outsiders who is 
liable to make losses. The rise in inter-bank rates reflects short-term 
liquidity problems, as banks cannot easily borrow to cover the fluctuations 
in their assets and liabilities flows. As the problem intensified, global 
financial markets became more volatile. As exposures become clear, these 
liquidity problems may be relatively short lived, and our Benchmark forecast 
is based on this assumption.  
 
The Federal Reserve has intervened aggressively and cut its target rate 
by 3 percentage points over the past twelve months with the target rate 
currently standing at 2.0 per cent. Despite this intervention, inter-bank 
rates have risen and the supply of credit has been tightened. The correction 
in the US housing market is continuing, with house prices remaining flat or 
falling in 2007, depending on the measure used, and housing starts data 
showing a dramatic fall in the early part of this year. The length of the 
slowdown in the US depends crucially on future developments in both the 
housing and financial markets. The most recent IMF report argues that the 
US economy is usually quick to respond to downturns in activity and that 
recessions are typically followed by vigorous recoveries, as sharp 
adjustments generally resolve imbalances and the effects of expansionary 
fiscal and monetary policies take hold. We expect further easing in 
monetary and fiscal policy in the near term in an attempt to contain the 
current slowdown. Our Benchmark forecast is based on the assumption that 
the credit squeeze, currently evident in the international economy, will be 
short lived. The possibility that the credit squeeze could be more prolonged 
constitutes a significant downside risk to our Benchmark forecast and we 
consider this scenario in Chapter 6.  
 
Medium-term growth prospects are more favourable. Real GDP growth 
in the US is forecast to average 2.4 per cent between 2010 and 2015 before 
moderating to average around 2 per cent per annum out to 2025 (Table 
3.1). The inflation rate, as measured by the consumer expenditure deflator, 
is expected to average 2.8 per cent between 2010 and 2020. On the basis of 
our exchange rate assumptions, and the forecast recovery in activity at the 
 
35 Technically our Benchmark forecast assumes that the US is in recession this year – output 
falls in two consecutive quarters. 
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beginning of the next decade, we expect official interest rates to increase 
gradually over the medium term. 
Table 3.1: Forecasts for the US Economy 
           
  2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
 Per Cent 
Real GDP Growth  2.2 1.5 1.9 3.7 3.0 2.4 2.2 2.1 2.1 
Inflation*  2.5 3.3 1.7 0.7 2.1 2.7 2.9 3.0 3.0 
Short-term interest Rate+  5.3 3.0 0.9 1.5 3.1 4.3 4.8 5.1 5.3 
Exchange Rate ($ per €)  1.37 1.51 1.50 1.45 1.43 1.42 1.41 1.41 1.41 
Fiscal Deficit (as a % of GDP)  -3.0 -4.0 -3.9 -3.0 -2.9 -2.6 -2.4 -2.2 -2.1 
        
  1995-2000 2000-2005 2005-2010 2010-2015 2015-2020 2020-2025 
 Annual Average Per Cent Change 
Real GDP Growth  4.1 2.3 2.4 2.4 2.0 2.1 
 Annual Average 
Inflation*  1.8 2.2 2.2 2.8 2.8 2.5 
Short-term interest Rate+  5.7 3.0 3.2 4.0 5.4 5.3 
Exchange Rate ($ per €)  1.13 1.04 1.38 1.42 1.41 1.42 
Fiscal Deficit (as a % of GDP)  -0.5 -2.6 -3.4 -2.5 -2.1 -2.2 
        
*Consumer Expenditure Deflator. 
+ 3 month inter-bank rate. 
 
In previous Medium-Term Reviews, we have focused on the sustainability 
of the large and increasing current account deficit in the US and the effects 
that a gradual or sudden adjustment in the US economy could have on 
Ireland. The US current account deficit had deteriorated considerably since 
the late 1990s and in 2006 the deficit stood at 6.2 per cent of GDP (see 
Figure 3.1). The unprecedented magnitude of the deficit and the growing 
net indebtedness of the US fuelled concerns about its sustainability and 
fears that a correction had to come at some point.36 The recent slowdown 
in the US housing market, the depreciation of the dollar and the fallout 
from what is happening in the financial markets have led to some 
improvement in the current account position of the US and we expect to 
see some further improvement in the short term. However, with the 
expected recovery in the US around 2010, pressure on the current account 
could return. 
EURO AREA 
Growth in the Euro Area is expected to slow in the short term in the face 
of the effects of a strong currency and turmoil in international financial 
markets. Much of the slowdown will be seen in weaker export volume 
growth in the Euro Area. Demand from the US and UK, which accounted 
for around 30 per cent of extra-Euro Area exports in 2007, is expected to 
slacken in the short term so trade with other non-Euro Area countries and 
intra-Euro Area trade are expected to make a larger contribution to export 
growth in the short term.  The euro  has  appreciated  strongly  against  the  
 
36 See, for example, Obstfeld and Rogoff (2005) and Blanchard, Giovazzi and Sa (2005) 
and IMF World Economic Outlook, September 2005. 
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Figure 3.1: US Current Account Deficit 
 
 
currencies of its main trading partners and this contributed to losses in 
export market shares for many of the Euro Area economies, with the 
notable exception of Germany, which has been gaining export market 
share in recent years. Figure 3.2 shows the effective (trade-weighted) 
exchange rate for the Euro Area and also for the US and the UK. From the 
graph we can see that the Euro Area effective exchange rate has risen by 
over 5 per cent in the past two years. In addition to the effects on 
competitiveness of a strong currency, the slowdown in the US and UK is 
likely to further dampen external demand in the Euro Area. 
Figure 3.2: Effective Exchange Rates, 2000=100 
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However, we anticipate that the slowdown will be short lived and the 
outlook for activity in the medium term is more positive. The public 
finances of the Euro Area are in a reasonably healthy position. The fiscal 
deficit of the Euro Area peaked at over 3 per cent of Euro Area GDP in 
2003 and has been coming down steadily since then with the overall fiscal 
deficit standing at 0.8 per cent of GDP in 2007. This leaves national 
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governments with the option of adopting more expansionary fiscal policies 
in the short term to help contain any slowdown in activity, while remaining 
within the guidelines of the Stability and Growth Pact.  
a Economy Table 3.2: Forecasts for the Euro Are
           
  2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
 Per Cent 
Real GDP Grow  th  2.7 1.8 2.0 2.2 2.2 2.1 2.0 2.0 2.0 
Inflation*  1.9 2.1 1.6 1.6 1.8 1.8 2.0 2.1 2.1 
Short-term interest Rate+  4.3 4.5 4.0 3.9 4.3 4.7 5.0 5.1 5.2 
Exchange Rate ($ per €)  1.37 1.51 1.50 1.45 1.43 1.42 1.41 1.41 1.41 
Fiscal Deficit (as a % of GDP)  -0.8 -1.0 -0.9 -0.9 -1.0 -0.9 -1.0 -1.1 -1.2 
        
  
1995- 
2000 
2000- 
2005 
2005- 
2010 
2010- 
2015 
2015- 
2020 
2020- 
2025 
 A Aver er C angnnual age P ent Ch e 
Real GDP Grow  th  2.7 1.4 2.3 2.1 2.1 1.9 
 Annu erageal Av  
Inflation*  1.8 2.1 1.9 2.0 2.4 2.9 
Short-term interest Rate+  4.6 3.1 3.6 4.7 5.3 5.3 
Exchange Rate ($ per €)  1.13 1.04 1.38 1.42 1.41 1.42 
Fiscal Deficit (as a % of GDP)  -2.6 -2.1 -1.3 -1.0 -1.3 -1.4 
        
*Consumer Expenditure Deflator. 
The European Central Bank (ECB) had been gradually increasing 
int
espite the slowdown expected in the short term, we anticipate a 
reb
UNITED KINGDOM 
The UK economy continues to be an important trading partner for the 
+ 3 month inter-bank rate. 
 
erest rates since the end of 2005, in line with the improved economic 
conditions in the Euro Area and rising inflationary pressures, with the main 
refi rate currently standing at 4 per cent. Despite mounting short term 
inflationary pressures, we anticipate that the ECB will loosen monetary 
policy over the short-term in an attempt to reduce fears of a credit crunch, 
increase liquidity in credit markets and to encourage investment growth 
which has been hampered by rising borrowing costs. Over the medium 
term, we expect interest rates to rise gradually and to average 4.9 per cent 
between 2010 and 2015 and 5.3 per cent between 2015 and 2025. However, 
for companies and households some of this rise in official interest rates will 
be offset by a fall in risk premia. 
 
D
ound in activity beginning in 2009 and our forecast is for growth in the 
Euro Area to average 2.1 per cent between 2010 and 2020 and a somewhat 
more modest rate of 1.9 per cent between 2020 and 2025.  
Irish economy, although the share of Irish exports going to the UK has 
declined. Over the past number of years, the UK economy has performed 
well, with annual growth averaging 2.5 per cent between 2000 and 2005. 
Growth is expected to moderate somewhat in the short term, due to the 
slowdown in the housing market and turmoil in the financial markets. 
However, a pick-up in activity is expected in 2009 and we expect growth to 
average 2.7 per cent between 2010 and 2015. Growth over the next 
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number of years will be aided by the gradual weakening of sterling against 
the euro and, in the medium term, we expect that sterling will stabilise at a 
rate of £0.77 per euro. 
onomy Table 3.3: Forecasts for the UK Ec
           
  2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
 Per Cent 
Real GDP Growth  3.1 1.8 2.2 2.7 2.7 2.7 2.6 2.6 2.7 
Inflation*  2.5 2.9 2.0 2.2 2.3 2.4 2.9 3.0 2.6 
Short-term interest Rate+  6.0 5.2 4.2 4.6 4.8 4.9 5.0 5.1 5.2 
Exchange Rate (Stg. per €)  0.68 0.76 0.76 0.77 0.77 0.77 0.77 0.77 0.77 
Fiscal Deficit (as a % of GDP)  -3.1 -2.9 -2.3 -2.0 -1.7 -1.4 -1.1 -1.0 -1.0 
        
  1995-2000 2000-2005 2005-2010 2010-2015 2015-2020 2020-2025 
 Annual Average Per Cent Change 
Real GDP Growth  3.2 2.5 2.6 2.7 2.8 2.6 
 Annual Average 
Inflation*  2.2 2.0 2.4 2.7 3.0 3.4 
Short-term interest Rate+  6.4 4.7 4.9 4.9 5.3 5.3 
Exchange Rate (Stg per €)  0.71 0.65 0.72 0.77 0.77 0.77 
Fiscal Deficit (as a % of GDP)  -1.5 -1.5 -2.7 -1.4 -1.1 -1.1 
        
*Consumer Expenditure Deflator. 
UK inflation, as measured by the consumer expenditure deflator, is 
exp
CONTEXT FOR IRELAND 
In the short term the Irish economy faces an uncertain international 
With growth in our main trading partners forecast to remain relatively 
mu
+ 3 month inter-bank rate. 
 
ected to average 2.7 per cent between 2010 and 2015. In response to 
current difficulties, The Monetary Policy Committee (MPC) of the Bank of 
England may cut interest rates in the short run, although we expect interest 
rates to gradually rise over the medium to longer term.  
environment. The risk of a marked slowdown to the world economy has 
risen as a result of the developments in the financial markets. Growth in 
the US, UK and Euro Area is expected to slow considerably in the short 
term. Our Benchmark forecast assumes that recent turbulence in financial 
markets is short-lived and there will be a rebound in activity in the 
international economy around 2010 with growth rates returning to close to 
potential. In Chapter 6, we consider the effects on the Irish economy of a 
longer and more pronounced financial crisis.  
 
ted in the short term, the trading environment for Ireland will 
deteriorate. Our forecast for the dollar/euro exchange rate incorporates a 
depreciation of the euro in the near term and we expect the exchange rate 
to average around $1.50 per euro for the next two years. Thereafter, the 
exchange rate is forecast to fall slightly and to stabilise at around $1.41 per 
euro over the forecast horizon. At the same time, sterling is expected to 
depreciate over the short term but even out at rates of around £0.77 per 
euro over the medium term. Ireland has a greater than average exposure to 
  BACKGROUND ECONOMIC ENVIRONMENT AND ASSUMPTIONS 47 
non-Euro Area trade and so is likely to experience continued price 
competitiveness pressures over the medium term. 
 
Interest rates in Ireland are determined externally by the ECB and will, 
therefore, reflect the situation in the Euro Area rather than domestic 
conditions. This effectively removes monetary policy as a mechanism for 
stabilising the Irish economy if the Irish business cycle is different from 
that of the larger Euro Area economies. The forecast recovery in the Euro 
Area will see interest rates gradually rise in the next decade. 
 
We have not described our forecast for the rest of the world, most 
notably China and India. These economies are likely to continue growing 
rapidly, accounting for an increasing share of foreign trade and global 
growth. It is in the medium to long term that they will rise in importance as 
markets and potential competitors for goods and services. 
 
Overall, the international context for Ireland will be difficult in the short 
term, but it is set to improve in the next decade. Provided the domestic 
productive base can remain competitive, the international environment for 
Ireland contained within this Review is broadly favourable. 
 
 One of the key drivers of the transformation of the Irish economy in the 
last decade was the expanding labour force. The labour market was affected 
by a series of factors that dramatically increased the supply of labour. These 
factors, which included a very favourable demographic profile, rising 
female labour force participation rates, and a dramatic increase in net 
immigration, accounted for around half of the growth in GNP per capita 
between 1995 and 2000. The factors that will determine the potential 
supply of labour over the medium term are a key element in determining 
the potential growth rate of the economy.  
3.3  
Demographic 
Structure and 
Labour 
Supply 
BIRTH RATE 
Following the post-Second World War baby boom, the birth rate remained 
uniquely high in Ireland until 1980 while it fell much earlier elsewhere in 
Europe. Since 1980, the birth rate had been declining rapidly. While there 
has been a small increase in the birth rate since the mid-1990s, we expect it 
to stabilise at its current level over the medium term. The falling birth rate 
since the 1980s means that there is, and there will continue to be, a large 
decline in the natural increase in the labour force. This is in contrast to the 
effect that the high birth rates of the 1960s and 1970s had on labour 
supply. 
 
The Total Fertility Replacement (TFR)37 rate is currently at 1.9 in Ireland 
and we project the overall rate unchanged over the forecast horizon.38 
However, we incorporate different patterns of fertility for women 
according to their age.  The birth rate for women under the age of 35 years 
has been declining in recent years and there has been an increase in the 
birth rate for women over the age of 35 years. We expect this pattern to 
 
37 This measure represents the number of children that a representative woman will have 
over her lifetime. 
38 This is the same as assumption F1 in the latest CSO Population and Labour Force Projections. 
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continue in the short term and then to stabilise. The fact that women are 
having children later in life has implications for female labour force 
participation and may partially explain why participation rates for younger 
Irish women are high in comparison to the OECD average.   
Figure 3.3: Birth Rate 
 
MIGRATION 
Migration has long played a key role in driving changes in the population 
structure and the labour force in Ireland. Migration flows tend to be quite 
volatile (Figure 3.4) and are sensitive to economic conditions, both 
domestically and in the source countries for immigrants or the destination 
countries for emigrants.  In the latter part of the 1990s, strong economic 
growth and a tighter labour market encouraged large inflows into the 
country.  Initially many of them were returning Irish whereas in more 
recent years foreign nationals make up around 80 per cent of gross inflows.  
Figure 3.4: Net Immigration 
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Barrett, Bergin and Duffy (2006) examined the characteristics of 
immigrants who had arrived in the ten years up to 2003 and compared 
them to Irish nationals. They find that immigrants into Ireland have high 
levels of education – over 40 per cent of immigrants have degrees 
compared to 16.7 per cent of Irish nationals.  Although immigrants into 
Ireland have higher levels of education relative to the native population, the 
research shows that these skills are not being fully employed.39  
 
As growth in the economy slows, Ireland will become less attractive for 
immigrants in the future. We anticipate that the effects of EU enlargement 
had a once off effect on the EU and Irish labour markets and that, once 
the pent up pressures have been accommodated, the ongoing movement of 
population within the EU will be more limited. We expect continued net 
immigration over the forecast horizon but at a much reduced pace 
compared to what we have seen so far this decade. Our projection is for 
net immigration to slow to around 10,000 per annum by 2010 before rising 
to around 15,000 per annum from 2015 on.40 The magnitude of the inflow 
depends on the growth trajectory of the economy. However, there is some 
uncertainty about the likely evolution of migration. As mentioned above, in 
recent years the bulk of immigrants are foreigners and the sensitivity and 
speed of response of these flows to changes in Ireland’s relative standard of 
living may be different to that of the immigrants of the late 1990s – the 
returning Irish.  
POPULATION STRUCTURE 
Ireland’s demographic structure is somewhat unusual in comparison to 
other EU countries. The high birth rate until the 1980s means that there is 
now a large cohort of people of working age (Figure 3.5). Today the 25-29 
cohort is much larger than any other and the cohort of teenagers is much 
smaller. In addition, the high level of emigration in Ireland up to the 1960s 
means that many of the people born in Ireland who are now in their sixties 
and seventies emigrated, reducing the numbers in the older cohorts of the 
population, thereby reducing the old age dependency ratio. However, by 
2025 the structure of the population will look rather different as the current 
population ages. Today, the average age of the population is 35.2, a year 
older than it was in 1999. By 2020 the average age will have risen to 37.7 
and by 2025 it will be 39.1. Over the time horizon covered by this Review 
the population structure remains broadly favourable; however, the process 
of population ageing becomes more apparent as we look farther out. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
39 Barrett et al. (2006) document how the distribution of immigrants and natives across 
occupations is similar, despite the large difference in educational attainment between the 
two groups.  This under-utilisation persists even after controlling for characteristics such 
as age and education. 
40 Our migration projections assume an unchanged policy with free movement of 
population within the EU and restrictions on immigration of unskilled labour into Ireland 
(and the EU) from outside the EU. 
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Figure 3.5: Population Structure, 2008 
Figure 3.6: Population Structure, 2025 
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The economic dependency ratio is defined here as the ratio of those 
who are not working in the population, including children and pensioners, 
to those who are working. This measure is not only affected by the 
changing age structure of the population but also by other changes, such as 
employment rates and the age that people start work and retire. The 
economic dependency ratio can be used as a measure of a country’s 
capacity to produce the resources needed to maintain the population’s 
living standards. Generally speaking, the lower the dependency ratio the 
more money individual workers have available to spend out of their own 
income. In the 1970s and 1980s the Irish economic dependency rate was 
well above the average for the EU-15. A combination of the high levels of 
emigration in the 1950s (reducing the number of older people in the 
country today), the fall in the birth rate and a rising employment rate in the 
1990s led to a sharp decline in the dependency rate in Ireland in the 1990s 
(Figure 3.7). This led to convergence with the EU-15 dependency ratio 
around 2004. Over the forecast horizon, we expect the Irish dependency 
rate to stabilise at just below 1.2, remaining below the European average. 
The dependency rate for the EU-15 countries is expected to deteriorate in 
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the next few years, as the process of population ageing is more prevalent in 
other EU countries. This presents the Irish economy with an opportunity 
to prepare for the longer-term problem of population ageing, which will 
have an increasing impact on the demographic structure of the country and 
on labour supply from the 2020s on. Other studies have shown that there 
will be significant age-related pressures on the public finances after 2025. 41 
Figure 3.7: Economic Dependency Ratio 
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LABOUR SUPPLY 
The three key elements that determine labour supply are the natural 
Figure 3.8 decomposes the growth in labour supply attributable to each 
of 
 
increase in the population – the difference between the numbers retiring 
and the numbers of young people entering the labour market; the change in 
participation rates in the labour force, driven primarily by changes in 
female participation rates and the continued rising educational attainment 
of the population; and migration. Rising educational attainment increases 
the supply of labour for those over 25 years. Their potential earnings are 
enhanced by increased education and, hence, their participation rate is 
higher. This is particularly important in driving rising female labour force 
participation. However, for those under 25 years it reduces participation as 
young adults remain longer in the educational system. 
 
these factors. Looking forward, growth in labour supply is expected to 
be significantly lower than over the past 15 years, with annual average 
growth of just under 1 per cent expected over the medium term. 
 
 
 
 
 
41 See Barrett, A., A. Bergin and Y. McCarthy (2007) and Barrett, A. and A. Bergin (2006). 
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Figure 3.8: Decomposition of the Growth in Labour Supply 
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The high birth rate in the past meant that the contribution to labour 
su
ounting for over 1 percentage point of labour supply growth in the 
1995-2000 and 2000-2005 periods. The fall in the birth rate since the 1980s 
means that the contribution from the natural increase in the population to 
labour supply growth is more limited (and declining) since 2000. 
 
The changing educational attainment of the population is 
F
luence the economy through several distinct channels: it has a positive 
effect on participation in the labour market; it can reduce the probability of 
becoming unemployed and it can increase the productivity of workers. 
Over the ten year period 1997 to 2007, we can see the rise in the 
educational attainment of the population due to the increasing participation 
rates in education, in particular in third level education. We expect there 
will be a continued upgrading of the human capital of the population over 
the medium term and this will have a positive impact on participation rates 
as those with higher levels of education are more likely to participate in the 
labour market.42 This effect is much more marked for women. 
 
The impact of the changing educational attainment of the po
ontinued strong increase in the supply of high-skilled labour (those with 
at least Leaving Certificate education) while the supply of less skilled labour 
(those with Junior Certificate education or less) will continue to fall.  
 
42 The effect of increased participation in third level education can increase the age of 
labour market entry so we could see decline in participation rates for those aged 15-19 
years. 
43 This projection of high and low-skilled labour implicitly assumes that migrants have the 
same educational distribution as nationals. 
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Figure 3.9: Population by Educational Attainment, Percentage of Total 
Figure 3.10: Supply of High-Skilled and Low-Skilled Labour 
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In the 1980s Ireland’s female participation rates were among the lowest 
in the EU. However, a combination of changing cultural factors, rising 
educational attainment and more favourable labour market conditions led 
to a dramatic increase in participation rates in the 1990s. Figure 3.11 shows 
the current female participation rates by age for Ireland and the EU and 
our projections for the rates in Ireland in 2015. Although participation rates 
in Ireland for women under 35 years are comparable to the EU average, 
participation rates are significantly lower for older women. In projecting 
female participation rates, we have assumed only limited increases in the 
education specific participation rates for women under the age of 35, 
because of the high rates already achieved. However, as those with high 
participation rates in the younger age groups age we anticipate significant 
increases among older age groups in later years. Overall, further increases 
in female participation rates will continue to be an important source of 
labour supply growth, although making less of a contribution than in the 
past. 
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Figure 3.11: Female Labour Force Participation: Ireland and the EU 
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 In preparing our Benchmark forecast we have assumed a broadly “neutral” 
fiscal policy stance on the income side of the government accounts, with 
essentially indexation of tax rates and bands. This would represent a 
tightening of fiscal policy relative to the experience since 2000.  
3.4 
The Public 
Finances 
 
Our Benchmark forecast suggests that beyond 2020 the public finances 
could move into strong surplus if such a neutral fiscal policy were adopted. 
These numbers imply that the government could be a net saver by 2025. 
However, it is important to remember that by 2025 the fiscal gains from a 
falling dependency ratio will be eroding and the government will be facing 
an increased demand for expenditure on pensions. Therefore, it seems 
prudent to build up such savings once the massive infrastructural 
investment programme currently underway begins to wind down beyond 
2020. These savings can help fund the demand for pensions, which will 
begin to burgeon as the population ages beyond 2025.44 
 
On the capital expenditure side we have applied the increase in 
expenditure published in Budget 200845 for the years 2008-2012. These 
numbers include spending under the NDP and Transport 21. As can be 
seen from Figure 3.12, the current and planned level of capital expenditure 
is historically very high, and should reach a peak of 7 per cent of GNP in 
the period 2005-2010. Between 2012 and 2020 we assume that this high 
level of capital expenditure will be maintained, with growth averaging 2.4 
per cent per annum out to 2020. This level of public investment is urgently 
required to tackle the deficit in public infrastructure in Ireland. Beyond 
2020 we assume that this high level of investment will have served to 
bridge the infrastructural deficit so that government capital expenditure will 
fall in real terms, with its share in total GNP falling to more typical levels.  
 
44 Barrett, A. and A. Bergin (2006).  
45 Table 1: Multi-Annual Capital Investment Framework 2008-2012. 
  BACKGROUND ECONOMIC ENVIRONMENT AND ASSUMPTIONS 55 
Figure 3.12: Government Capital Expenditure/GNP Ratio 
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On the current expenditure side we have assumed that the increase in 
the volume of expenditure by public authorities on goods and services 
remains below the rate of growth of GNP – around 2.5 per cent a year. 
This will still allow for a significant volume increase in publicly provided 
services. We assume there will be a steady increase in public sector 
employment over the forecast period relating to these improved services. 
Rates of personal transfers are assumed to be fully indexed to average wage 
rates. Adjustments are made for the changing demographic balance and for 
the forecast change in unemployment. Finally, national debt interest 
payments will gradually disappear over the coming decade, as the national 
debt is eventually repaid. (Here we net off the government’s financial assets 
in the National Pension Reserve Fund.) 
 
In relation to tax rates, the average income tax rate is assumed to 
increase marginally in 2010-2012 to help fund the widening deficit currently 
arising, thereafter it is held constant. Finally, we have assumed that a 
carbon tax is introduced beginning in 2010; this is priced initially at €20 per 
tonne of carbon dioxide in 2010 rising steadily to reach €83 per tonne in 
nominal terms in 2025. We assume a similar tax is introduced elsewhere in 
the EU limiting the negative competitiveness effects. This assumed rate of 
tax is similar to the forecast price of tradable emissions permits for carbon, 
which we have assumed will be auctioned from 2013 onwards. This would 
mean that the price per tonne of carbon will be similar for all economic 
agents across the EU, ensuring that the reduction in EU carbon emissions 
is achieved at least cost. The implications of this carbon tax for the 
macroeconomy are discussed in Chapter 4 and the implications for carbon 
emissions in Chapter 5. 
 
  
4. THE BENCHMARK 
FORECAST 
 In this chapter we set out in detail the Benchmark forecast for the Irish 
economy to 2015, together with indicative forecasts out to 2025. Our 
analysis suggests that the very rapid growth rates recorded over the past ten 
years will not be repeated in the coming decades. Nevertheless, we expect 
that the Irish economy has the potential to grow strongly in the next 
decade, and should continue to exceed the EU-15 average growth rate out 
to 2020.  We expect that the current slowdown in the economy will persist 
into 2009, leading to a significant increase in the unemployment rate. 
Thereafter, as described in detail in Chapter 3, our International Forecast 
expects an improvement in world economic conditions. If this happens, 
then the Irish economy has the potential to grow at an average rate of 3.5 
per cent out to 2020, slowing to 3 per cent thereafter. This is underpinned 
by a rate of productivity growth46 averaging up to 2.5 per cent in the next 
decade, with labour force growth adding a further 0.9 per cent per annum 
and increases in the employment rate adding 0.3 per cent per annum in the 
years 2010-2015, slowing to 0.2 per cent in the latter half of the decade.47 
Beyond 2020 we expect productivity growth to slow to approximately 2 per 
cent per annum, with further labour force growth and increases in the 
employment rate adding respectively 0.8 per cent and 0.1 per cent per 
annum to the overall growth rate. 
4.1 
Introduction 
 
The Benchmark forecast is discussed in depth in Sections 4.2 through to 
4.6. Our forecast data are based on the National Income and Expenditure 
(NIE) 2006 national accounts, together with the Spring Quarterly Economic 
Commentary forecasts for 2008 and 2009. The ESRI’s medium-term 
macroeconomic model HERMES was used to produce the detailed 
forecasts of the economy for the years 2010-2025. In preparing these 
forecasts we use the demographic assumptions, public finance assumptions 
and assumptions on world economic conditions discussed in Chapter 3.  
 
Section 4.2 provides a summary of our forecasts for the key 
macroeconomic aggregates together with an overview of the factors 
underpinning the forecast growth profile. Section 4.3 looks at the crucial 
supply side of the economy, the driving force behind the growth process. 
Given the supply side, we then move on to look at incomes, expenditure 
and prices in Section 4.4, clearly of importance in terms of the likely future 
 
46Measured as GNP per worker. This measure is explored more fully in Section 4.2. 
47Throughout the Review employment numbers quoted are on a principal economic status 
(PES) basis. 
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implications of growth for living standards. Section 4.5 then considers the 
labour market with forecasts for employment and unemployment. Section 
4.6 discusses the balance of payments, the public finances and savings. The 
likely implications of our forecast for the housing market are analysed in 
Section 4.7. Finally, the track record of previous editions of the Review is 
reviewed in Appendix 1. 
 
 Table 4.1 shows some key figures from the Benchmark forecast. More 
detailed tables are available in Appendix 3. Following two years of relatively 
low growth in 2008 and 2009, we expect that growth will recover in 2010. 
This is predicated on an assumption that the world economy, and hence 
world demand for Irish exports, will have recovered from the current 
slowdown by 2010. Nevertheless, our forecast figures indicate that average 
growth rates will moderate from those recorded in recent years. For the 
years 2010-2015 we expect GNP growth of 3.8 per cent, slowing to 3.5 per 
cent in the second half of the decade and to 3.0 per cent in the years 2020-
2025. This pattern is consistent with growth in the potential output of the 
economy being around 3.5 per cent a year over the coming decade, falling 
to around 3 per cent a year after 2020. It is probable that this growth will 
be partly fuelled by strong growth in the population, so that GNP per 
capita will grow a full percentage point less than aggregate GNP in those 
years. The increasing importance of services exports in total exports, 
discussed below, should see a terms of trade gain from 2014 onwards so 
that GNDI per head is expected to average 2.6 per cent a year between 
2015-2025. 
4.2  
Overview 
 
Given the slowdown in the house-building sector, currently ongoing, we 
expect the investment to GNP ratio to fall from current levels over the 
forecast horizon. In the years 2005-2010 it is expected to average 28.1 per 
cent, this is expected to fall steadily over the forecast period. In the years 
2010-2020 it is expected to remain relatively high by international standards 
due to the extensive programme of government investment under the 
NDP in those years. Beyond 2020 it is forecast to fall to 21 per cent of 
GNP. And notably, despite the current slowdown in house-building, our 
estimate of the demographic factors underpinning the rate of household 
formation suggests that the demand for housing in Ireland over the 
medium term will remain relatively strong, with almost 48,000 housing 
units per year required in the period 2010-2020, falling to 45,000 beyond 
2020. 
 
The slowdown in the economy in the years 2008 and 2009 leads to a rise 
in unemployment and the unemployment rate. Numbers unemployed are 
forecast to peak in 2011, and beyond that the labour market should 
gradually clear. After 2015 the unemployment rate is expected to average 
4.5 per cent of the labour force. Over the forecast period net immigration 
flows are expected to slow significantly from the exceptionally high levels 
of recent years, averaging 11,000 per annum in the period 2010-2015, rising 
to 15,000 per annum beyond that. The strong performance of the labour 
market from 2015 onwards should lead to a gradual rise in the real wage 
out to 2025. 
 
A consequence of our Benchmark forecast is that beyond 2020 the public 
finances move into strong surplus. With the general government running a 
surplus from 2014 onwards, this means that the government becomes a net 
58 MEDIUM-TERM REVIEW 2008-2015 
saver by 2022. Beyond 2022 the general government continues to 
accumulate net savings. These savings include the provision for pensions 
and other age-related expenditures that await the economy beyond 2025 
when age-related fiscal pressures will begin to rise (Barrett and Bergin, 
2005). 
Table 4.1: Benchmark Forecast, Growth in Major Aggregates 
          
 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
 % Growth Rate 
GDP 4.9 1.8 3.1 4.6 3.7 3.7 3.6 3.5 3.5 
GNP 4.5 1.6 2.9 5.1 3.7 3.9 3.8 3.6 3.7 
GNP per head 2.1 0.2 1.7 3.9 2.5 2.8 2.7 2.5 2.4 
GNDI per head 0.6 -0.9 1.0 2.1 1.4 2.2 2.6 2.7 2.8 
Investment/GNP ratio 29.5 27.1 26.5 26.7 25.0 25.0 24.7 24.1 23.5 
Consumption deflator 3.5 2.3 1.7 2.7 2.7 2.7 2.9 3.0 2.9 
Employment % change 3.7 0.0 1.1 1.0 1.0 1.2 1.2 1.3 1.3 
Real after tax wage 0.9 2.1 1.9 0.0 1.1 0.9 1.3 1.4 1.6 
 % of GNP 
Balance of Payments surplus -5.4 -4.9 -4.8 -5.6 -3.7 -3.0 -2.3 -1.4 -0.6 
Net Government Debt 20.7 20.0 19.2 21.0 22.4 23.3 23.5 22.7 21.1 
General Government Balance 0.6 -1.4 -2.4 -1.4 -1.2 -0.9 -0.5 0.4 1.2 
 % of Labour Force (ILO basis) 
Unemployment Rate 4.5 5.9 6.2 6.6 6.9 6.7 6.2 5.7 5.3 
 In Thousands 
Net immigration 67 20 11 10 10 10 10 10 15 
House completions 78 50 45 47 48 48 48 49 49 
          
FIVE-YEAR AVERAGES 1985- 1990- 1995- 2000- 2005- 2010- 2015- 2020-  
 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015 2020 2025  
 Average Annual % Growth 
GDP 3.3 4.4 9.4 5.3 4.0 3.6 3.3 2.7  
GNP 2.8 4.2 8.6 4.4 4.1 3.8 3.5 3.0  
GNP per head 3.0 3.7 7.5 2.6 2.4 2.6 2.4 2.1  
GNDI per head 3.3 2.9 7.2 2.2 0.9 2.3 2.6 2.6  
Investment/GNP ratio 18.9 18.5 24.8 27.8 28.1 24.5 22.7 21.0  
Consumption deflator 3.5 3.0 3.4 3.3 2.4 2.8 3.2 3.5  
Employment % change 1.0 1.9 5.0 3.2 2.0 1.2 1.1 0.9  
Real after tax wage 1.4 1.4 2.2 3.0 1.4 1.3 1.6 2.5  
 % of GNP 
Balance of Payments surplus -1.8 2.0 1.7 -0.8 -5.1 -2.2 1.0 3.9  
Net Government Debt 113.0 91.4 53.6 26.0 20.6 22.6 12.6 -5.5  
General Government Balance -4.1 -2.8 2.4 0.7 -0.2 -0.2 2.9 4.6  
% of Labour Force (ILO basis)  
Unemployment Rate 11.4 9.6 8.0 4.2 5.5 6.2 4.8 4.3  
 In Thousands 
Net immigration -31.9 -0.3 17.6 38.4 36.1 11.0 15.0 15.0  
House completions 22.0 24.2 42.2 67.4 62.6 48.3 47.6 45.5  
          
 
The Irish economy began a remarkably rapid period of convergence 
with its EU partners in 1990, as discussed in Chapter 2. Between 1995 and 
2006 the Irish economy doubled in size as measured by GNP. This growth 
performance led to full convergence between Ireland and the EU average48 
 
48The EU average here refers to the EU-15 member states. 
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in terms of GNP per capita by 2005, as shown in Figure 4.1. In our 
Benchmark forecast we expect output growth rates to continue to exceed the 
EU average out to 2020 so that GNP per capita, which for the thirty years 
between 1970 and 1990 hovered around 60 per cent of the EU average, is 
expected to come close to 120 per cent of the EU average in the period 
2020-2025. 
Figure 4.1: GNP Per Head Relative to EU Average49
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The picture is broadly similar when measured as GNP per worker, 
national productivity broadly defined (see Figure 4.1). However the rate of 
convergence is not so pronounced, as Irish productivity levels were closer 
to the EU average in the period 1970-1990 and have grown at a slower 
pace than total GNP since then. The difference between productivity 
growth and total growth is the rate of economic dependency. As discussed 
in Chapter 3, there has been a sustained and steady decline in the Irish 
economic dependency rate since the mid-1980s, driven by rising 
employment, rising participation rates and a fall in youth dependency. 
These demographic gains are likely to plateau by 2010 so that further 
growth in GNP per head will be largely driven by productivity growth.  
 
This can be seen more clearly in Figure 4.2 which decomposes the 
growth in GNP per capita (the solid line) into productivity (the  grey bar in 
the graph) and economic dependency, where the latter is further 
decomposed into employment, participation and age dependency.  As can 
be seen from this graph, over half the growth in GNP per capita between 
1985 and 2005 was due to the reduction in the rate of economic 
dependency. Beyond 2010 this demographic advantage is largely spent: 
while there are some further limited increases in labour force participation 
and employment rates, these are offset by an increase in the age 
dependency rate. Over the forecast period the rate of economic 
dependency remains low, as discussed in Chapter 3, but it stops actually 
contributing to growth. 
 
 
 
49GDP and employment forecasts from NIESR, population forecasts from Eurostat. 
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Figure 4.2: Decomposition of GNP Per Capita Growth Rate 
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The ending of the demographic dividend (when a very high proportion 
of the population are in the working age groups) means that over our 
forecast horizon GNP per capita growth will be equal to the rate of 
productivity growth. However,  we expect growth in total GNP to be over 
one percentage point higher than productivity growth (see Figure 4.5 
below). This is largely because labour supply growth is expected to add 
approximately 0.9 per cent to the annual growth rate in total GNP over the 
forecast period 2010-2025. This growth in labour supply, shown in Figure 
4.3, is due to increases in the population of working age (natural increase), 
together with further increases in the rate of female labour participation 
and continued net immigration. The graph separately identifies the 
estimated contribution of rising educational levels50 on the growth in the 
labour force: this “education” effect is driven by a rise in female 
participation rates associated with rising education levels.  
Figure 4.3: Decomposition of Growth in Labour Supply 
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Our Benchmark forecast expects a recovery in the average rate of 
productivity growth in the period 2010-2020 relative to the current decade. 
 
50These are estimated in the ESRI demographic model. 
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While this may seem surprising given that we expect the economy to move 
from higher productivity manufacturing activity to lower productivity 
services, this is in fact consistent with an economy gradually moving to 
lower rates of productivity growth. This is due to two separate effects: 
 
• First there is a compositional effect attributable to productivity 
rates in the building sector. Between 1995 and 2010 the building 
sector recorded negative measured productivity growth which, 
given its growing importance in those years, served to reduce the 
overall productivity growth rate. Table 4.2 calculates the growth in 
GDP per worker excluding the building sector. The building sector 
knocked over 0.6 per cent from annual productivity growth in the 
period 2000-2005 and an estimated 0.4 per cent per annum in the 
period 2005-2010. Over the forecast period we expect productivity 
levels in the building sector to improve in the aftermath of the 
decline in the house-building sector. As can be seen from the table 
this increases the overall productivity growth rate in the industrial 
sector (which here includes building and construction).  
 
• Second there is an effect due to measures of output. Using GDP at 
factor cost, which is the measure consistent with sectoral output 
figures, the Benchmark forecast productivity growth rates are 
consistent with a maturing economy, with productivity growth 
falling from 2.4 per cent per annum in the first half of the next 
decade to 2.2 per cent in the latter half, and to 1.7 per cent in the 
period 2020-2025. However, over the forecast period the gap 
between GDP and GNP narrows so that productivity growth as 
measured using GNP per worker (Figure 4.2) is higher.  
Table 4.2: Value Added Per Worker: Average Annual Growth Rates 
            
 70-75 75-80 80-85 85-90 90-95 95-00 00-05 05-10 10-15 15-20 20-25
Industry of which: 1.4 4.6 7.4 5.6 5.8 5.6 2.5 2.2 3.7 4.3 4.2 
 Building 1.2 4.2 4.6 1.9 1.8 -3.2 -2.3 -2.8 0.8 1.9 1.0 
Market Services 3.5 2.7 1.5 1.7 -0.1 3.0 2.5 2.8 2.5 1.8 1.5 
GDP at Factor Cost 4.3 3.8 3.2 2.6 2.3 4.1 2.2 2.0 2.4 2.2 1.7 
GDP at Factor Cost 
  Excluding Building 4.5 3.7 3.2 2.7 2.3 4.8 2.8 2.4 2.4 2.1 1.7 
GNP 3.6 3.1 1.4 1.8 2.3 3.5 1.2 2.0 2.5 2.4 2.1 
            
 
Underlying our forecast is a marked shift in the composition of the 
economy towards market services. Figure 4.4 shows the shares of 
agriculture, industry and market services in value added. The move from 
manufacturing to market services as the engine of growth is the central 
story at the heart of this Benchmark forecast. We expect market services to 
account for over 60 per cent of value added by 2025, continuing a trend 
that began in the late 1990s. Since the end of the 1990s exports of services 
have begun to play an increasingly important role in the growth of the 
services sector as discussed in Chapter 2. As is typical of economies which 
have reached a high level of real income, the Irish economy is currently in 
the process of transition from a specialisation in low-cost manufacturing 
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activities towards a specialisation into niche areas of high-tech 
manufacturing and high value-added internationally traded services.51  
Figure 4.4: Value-Added Shares by Broad Economic Sector 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
As discussed in Chapter 2 services exports have become more 
important in total exports and we expect that trend to continue. One 
consequence of this is that over the forecast horizon there is likely to be an 
improvement in the terms of trade, since services exports prices tend to 
exceed import prices and the price of manufactured exports. Our forecasts 
suggest that by 2014 the trend deterioration in the terms of trade recorded 
since the mid-1980s will end and, thereafter, the growing dominance of 
services exports in total exports will ensure terms of trade gains out to 
2025. This is reflected in GNDI growing more rapidly than GNP as shown 
in Figure 4.5. 
Figure 4.5: Growth in GDP and GNDI, Annual Averages 
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51In some cases firms may be reclassified from manufacturing to services. 
  THE BENCHMARK FORECAST 63 
 The determination of the economy’s potential growth path and the real 
income and living standards of its citizens is dependent on the 
development of the supply side of the economy. The supply side of the 
economy consists of both the tradable and non-tradable sectors. The 
tradable sectors of the economy refer to those sectors exposed to the 
competitive world trading environment. The remaining sectors of the 
economy (utilities, building, some of market services, public services) make 
up the non-traded sector. Given the extreme openness of the Irish 
economy, the tradable sector represents the main source of sustainable 
growth for the economy. As discussed in Chapter 2, output in the tradable 
sector is determined by two factors: the state of the world economy and the 
level of Irish cost competitiveness relative to its trading partners. 
Therefore, for any given level of world demand, it is critical to the level of 
output produced by the tradable sector that Ireland maintain its 
competitiveness on world markets. Any loss of competitiveness will result 
in Ireland losing market share and will give rise to a slower growth rate 
relative to the rest of the world. Ireland’s cost competitiveness is also 
affected by developments in the non-tradable sector. Output in the non-
tradable sector is driven mainly by domestic demand. However, prices and 
wages in the non-tradable sector affect the cost of production in the 
able sector. The manufacturing sector is a large consumer of services 
ports during the 1990s. 
s a result the knock-on effects of the recent rise in global food prices for 
the
4.3 
The Supply 
Side  
trad
inputs some of which are sourced from the non-tradable sector, though 
many of them are imported. If prices rise in the services sector and these 
services are used as inputs in the tradable sector, then a loss of 
competitiveness may accrue to the tradable sector.  
 
As discussed in Chapter 2, a significant change to the latest version of 
the HERMES model used to produce this Review concerns the way in 
which the business and financial services sector is modelled. Previously, 
this sector (and most of the market services sector) was included in the 
non-tradable sector and was, therefore, assumed not to be exposed to 
international trade. Changes in the world economy and Ireland’s 
international cost competitiveness affected primarily the tradable 
manufacturing sector. In the light of the growing share of exports from the 
business and financial services sector in total exports, the modelling of this 
sector has now changed so that the output of the sector is treated as 
tradable and hence driven by world activity and competitiveness. This 
change means that, unlike in the past, changes in world growth and 
Ireland’s international competitiveness affect the Irish economy through 
both the manufacturing and the business and financial services sectors. 
 
As detailed in Chapter 2, the supply side of the Irish economy continues 
to experience significant structural change. Mirroring a pattern experienced 
in many developed countries, the agriculture sector, once the backbone of 
the economy, diminished dramatically in importance from the 1970s to be 
replaced by manufacturing as the main source of ex
A
 Irish economy are likely to be small. Most recently, the services sector 
has emerged as the key driver of growth in the Irish economy, with services 
exports set to account for 60 per cent of total exports by 2015.  
 
While undergoing this significant structural change, the supply side of 
the economy continued to perform strongly up to the turn of the century. 
A sharp slowdown in 2001 and 2002 was followed by a recovery in the 
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2005 to 2007 period. We anticipate a substantial slowdown in economic 
activity for 2008 and 2009, due both to a slowdown in the international 
economy and the current slowdown in the pace of house completions. 
Based on a recovery in international activity  we expect a leaner Irish 
economy to rebound at the end of the decade with GNP growth of 3.8 per 
cent forecast for the years 2010 to 2015. 
hange in Output, GDP at Factor Cost at Constant 2004 Prices Table 4.3: Percentage C
           
 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
Agriculture -6.8 -10.0 1.0 1.0 2.1 0.4 0.0 0.5 0.8 0.8 
Industry 4.5 3.9 -0.9 1.7 5.2 2.4 2.9 2.4 2.0 2.0 
 Manufacturing 3.9 5.7 2.6 2.9 4.8 3.3 2.7 2.5 2.5 2.6 
 Utilities 12.6 7.5 4.0 3.6 11.0 4.5 4.3 1.9 1.6 1.2 
 Building 5.3 -1.6 -12.3 -2.7 5.6 -1.6 3.5 1.9 0.0 0.0 
           
Market Services 6.6 6.4 3.6 4.8 5.0 5.8 5.1 5.0 4.9 4.8 
 Distribution 4.3 5.0 2.0 1.9 2.6 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 
 Transport & Communications 5.2 5.0 2.0 2.0 2.9 3.4 3.7 3.9 4.0 4.1 
 Business and financial 7.7 7.2 4.4 6.2 6.0 7.1 6.1 5.9 5.7 5.5 
           
Non-Market Services 7.0 4.2 2.9 2.9 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 
 Health & Education 8.1 4.7 3.4 3.4 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 
 Public Administration 3.0 2.5 1.0 1.0 1.9 1.9 1.9 1.9 1.9 1.9 
GDP at Factor Cost 5.4 4.8 1.9 3.4 5.0 3.9 3.8 3.6 3.4 3.4 
Taxes on Expenditure 6.5 5.5 1.5 1.4 2.3 2.0 2.8 3.5 3.8 4.0 
Subsidies -4.1 3.0 3.0 3.0 2.0 0.6 0.6 1.1 1.2 1.3 
GDP at Market Prices 5.8 4.9 1.8 3.1 4.6 3.7 3.7 3.6 3.5 3.5 
Net Factor Income 1.7 6.9 2.7 4.4 2.3 3.7 2.3 2.4 2.7 2.7 
GNP at Market Prices 6.6 4.5 1.6 2.9 5.1 3.7 3.9 3.8 3.6 3.7 
           
Five year annual verages a
1990-
1995 
1995-
2000 
2000-
2005 
2005-
2010 
2010-
2015 
2015-
2020 
2020-
2025 
Agriculture -1.3 2.2 2.8 -2.7 0.5 0.6 0.6 
Industry 7.6 12.0 5.1 2.9 2.3 2.5 1.6 
 Manufacturing 9.4 12.2 4.8 3.9 2.7 2.7 1.8 
 Utilities 5.0 15.9 10.8 7.7 2.7 0.5 -0.4 
 Building 3.6 10.9 5.4 -1.4 0.8 1.9 1.0 
        
Market Services 3.1 9.7 6.0 5.3 5.1 4.3 3.3 
 Distribution 0.2 11.4 3.1 3.2 2.5 2.5 2.5 
 ransport & Communications T 6.4 10.5 6.7 3.4 3.8 4.0 3.6 
 usiness and financial B 3.8 8.9 7.0 6.3 6.0 4.8 3.5 
        
Non-Market Services 2.4 4.0 5.3 3.8 2.0 1.5 2.0 
 ealth & Education H 3.3 4.7 6.1 4.3 2.0 1.5 2.0 
 Public Administration 0.4 1.8 2.6 1.9 1.9 1.4 1.9 
GDP at Factor Cost 4.2 9.3 5.5 4.1 3.6 3.2 2.6 
Taxes on Expenditure 2.5 8.6 4.3 3.4 3.2 3.4 3.6 
Subsidies -6.0 0.9 2.8 1.3 1.0 1.0 0.9 
GDP at Market Prices 4.4 9.4 5.3 4.0 3.6 3.3 2.7 
Net Factor Income 6.2 16.1 11.1 3.6 2.8 2.2 1.0 
GNP at Market Prices 4.2 8.6 4.4 4.1 3.8 3.5 3.0 
        
INDUSTRY 
The ESRI ma cono es tinct betw he tr le 
and non-tradable parts of the industrial sector. The tradable sector consists 
of manufacturing industry, which in turn is comprised of the traditional, 
food processing and high-technology industries. The non-tradable sector is 
croe mic model mak a dis ion een t adab
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NUFACTU G 
The rapid growth of the manufacturing sector in the 1990s owed much of 
success to the large inflow of foreign direct investment (FDI) 
particularly from the United States. For the period 1995 to 2005, the sector 
xperienced a ge an l out growth of 12 per cen uch he 
dramatic increase in output and employment in t anu ring or 
was accounted for by the exceptional growth of the high-technology sector. 
Fuelled by significant productivity gains and high levels of investment, 
annual average output in the high-  by over 21 
per cent in the period 1995 to 2000. The traditional and food processing 
rded annual average output growth for the same period of 
 divergence between the 
growth paths of output and employment, with employment growing at a 
 output. This trend was indicative of a high rate of 
tiveness have 
rowth in the 
manufacturing sector. For the period 2000 to 2005, annual average output 
growth in the high-tech sector fell back to 5.9 per cent. We expect this 
downward trend to continue with annual average output growth of 4.6 per 
e bu g and utilities industries. While the graphs and tables 
ncen d on  forecasts out to 2015 ven the natural 
MA RIN
its 
e vera nua put t. M of t
he m factu  sect
technology sector increased
industries reco
3.2 and 5 per cent respectively.  
 
Since the beginning of this decade the manufacturing sector has 
experienced a significantly slower pace of growth with annual average 
growth of 3.3 per cent expected for the period 2008 to 2012. We also 
estimate that the rate of decrease in employment in the sector will 
accelerate to an annual average of -2.4 per cent for the years 2010 to 2015 
and -3.7 per cent for the period 2015-2020. For much of the 1990s the 
manufacturing sector was characterised by a
much slower rate than
labour saving technical progress in the manufacturing sector. 
Figure 4.6: Output and Employment in the High-Tech Sector 
 
The global downturn experienced by the high-tech sector in the 2001-
2002 period brought the era of double digit output growth in the 
manufacturing sector to an abrupt end. Furthermore, the appreciation of 
the euro and the negative effect of Ireland’s loss of competi
all served to place significant downward pressure on output g
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cent forecast for the period 2008 to 2012. For the period 2010 to 2015, 
growth in the high-tech sector is estimated to fall back further to 3.2 per 
cent. The unprecedented growth in the high-tech sector in the mid-1990s 
was driven by rapid growth in investment and productivity and both of 
these are expected to moderate over the course of the next decade. It is 
anticipated that investment by high-technology industries will increase by 
an annual average of 3.4 per cent for the period 2005 to 2010 and by 4.6 
per cent for the period 2010 to 2015. This follows annual average 
investment growth of 13.2 per cent for the period 1995 to 2000. 
Productivity growth is also expected to ease significantly, having reached 
almost 15 per cent per annum for the period 1995 to 2000. It is expected 
that productivity will grow by an annual average of 4.0 per cent for 2005 to 
2010 and 5.4 per cent for 2010 to 2015.  
 
As with output, employment in the high-tech sector peaked towards the 
end of the last decade with annual av rage employment growth of 6.1 per 
cen
eciation of the 
euro, which have had a negative effect on the manufacturing sector as a 
 are 
expected to contribute to the ongoing decline in employment in that sector. 
In addition, the rise of low cost manufacturing in Eastern Europe as well as 
e
t recorded for the period 1995 to 2000. This trend of robust 
employment growth was reversed in the years 2000 to 2005, which saw a 
small contraction in the numbers employed in the sector. Despite a slight 
recovery in this sector in 2006 and 2007, its medium-term employment 
prospects remain weak. Employment is forecast to remain flat during the 
period 2005 to 2010 with a more pronounced contraction of -2.2 per cent 
in annual average employment in the sector expected for the period 2010 
to 2015. Because of it accounts for so large a share of manufacturing 
employment this contraction in high-tech employment will be the main 
cause of the anticipated contraction of employment in the total 
manufacturing sector over the first half of the next decade.  
Figure 4.7: Output and Employment in the Traditional Manufacturing 
Sector  
 
Output growth in the traditional manufacturing industries performed 
solidly during the 1990s although their rate of expansion was dwarfed by 
the exceptional growth of the high-tech sector. Factors such as the erosion 
of Ireland’s international cost competitiveness and the appr
whole, have been particularly detrimental to the traditional sector and
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in China and India means that the future prospects for the traditional 
manufacturing sector in Ireland remain weak. The one exception will be the 
paper and publishing sector, which includes the reproduction of computer 
media. Output growth in the traditional sector will remain sluggish at 1.3 
per cent for the period 2005 to 2010 and 2 per cent for 2010 to 2015. 
Employment in the traditional sector has contracted since the early 1980s 
and we estimate that the rate of decline will accelerate over the course of 
the next decade. The numbers employed in the sector are forecast to fall by 
17,000 between 2005 and 2010 with a further fall in employment of 12,000 
in the sector by 2015. 
Figure 4.8: Output and Employment in the Food Processing Sector 
 
 
 
 
 industry where the operations of Irish multinational 
ustry. 
1990s  will be repeated. Annual avera
period is expected to decline to 3.2 per cent from 5.5 per cent in the years 
2000 to 2005 due in part to the contra tion in output recorded in the sector 
in 2005. It is forecast that output growth in the sector will weaken further 
in the period 2010 to 2015 to an annu  average rate of just 2 per cent. 
 
Productivity growth in the food processing sector is expected to 
continue to decline from the heights recorded in the 1995 to 2000 period.52 
nnual average productivity growth of 3.4 per cent is estimated for the 
ctor for the 2005 to 2010 period with higher productivity growth of 4.2 
er cent forecast for 2010 to 2015. Ongoing productivity growth, allied to 
wer output growth, is expected to reduce employment in the sector 
rther. Employment levels are forecast to contract by an annual average 
 
T
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The dependence of the food processing business on the agricultural 
sector for a large, though declining, share of its inputs means that the 
fortunes of the two sectors have long been intertwined. Significant 
rationalisation and restructuring in the food processing sector from the 
1980s gave rise to strong output growth in the sector during the 1995 to 
2000 period. In the mid-1990s the Irish food processing industry benefited 
from a strong competitive position relative to its EU trading partners, 
particularly in the dairy
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companies gave rise to improved efficiency in the ind
Notwithstanding the recent rise in global food prices, it is unlikely that the 
strong output growth recorded by the food processing sector in the mid 
ge output growth in the 2005 to 2010 
c
al
A
se
p
lo
fu
52 he high rate of productivity increase in the 1990s owed much to the restructuring of 
the sector moving from farmer owned co-ops to private limited companies.  
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rate of 2.2 per cent in the period 2010 to 2015. As a result we estimate that 
44,000 people will be employed in the sector by 2015. 
AGRICULTURE 
The well documented path of Ireland’s economic development, involving 
first a shift from agriculture to manufacturing and then from 
manufacturing to services, is one that is common to many developed 
countries. The decline of the agricultural sector is illustrated by its ever-
shrinking share of Ireland’s GNP and employment. In the early 1980s, 
farming accounted for around 9 per cent of GNP and employed 209,000 
people. By 2006, agriculture comprised less than 3 per cent of GNP and 
employment had fallen to 111,000.  
Figure 4.9: Output and Employment in Agriculture 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
t. We forecast positive growth in value 
ver the period 2005 to 
d, average value added 
cent per annum. The trend of falling 
employment in the agricultural sector is forecast to continue over the 
medium term with employment contracting by an annual average of around 
2.5 per cent for the remainder of the forecast period. 
 
 The recent buoyancy of world commodity prices has given rise to 
speculation of a possible revival in Ire
outlined, over the forecast horizon agriculture’s overall contribution to the 
Irish economy is expected to decline further, a trend that is unlikely to be 
reversed despite this recent increase in global food prices. Nonetheless, 
certain sectors remain well placed to take advantage of higher food prices. 
In particular, Ireland enjoys a comparative advantage in milk production 
arising from its grass-based system. The consolidation currently underway 
in the dairy sector, likely to be expedi ed by expected future reform of the 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The prospects for output and employment in the agricultural sector 
remain weak, though the increased attention to environmental policy could 
see some shift in the focus of outpu
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added to resume in 2010, following a contraction o
2010.53 From 2010 to the end of the forecast perio
will grow very slowly at less than 1 per 
land’s agricultural sector. However, as 
t
53We are grateful to Teagasc for their assistance in preparing our forecasts. However, the 
authors remain responsible for the final numbers. 
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milk quota regime, should allow for the emergence of an efficient 
internationally competitive dairy industry in Ireland. The extent to which 
recent price developments are structu l rather than transitory in nature will 
de
Th
growth accompanied by rising 
is
t Plan (NDP). Capacity 
d labour shortages in the building sector resulted in excess 
apidly increasing prices. The price deflator for gross output in 
down. Output growth will remain flat for the period 2010 to 2015 before 
r housing and investment in 
ra
termine whether there is a sustainable future for other sectors such as 
beef and grain, which after successive CAP reforms are increasingly 
exposed to the competitive world trading environment. Also the move 
towards growing energy crops could see some change in the pattern of 
output in the period to 2025. Higher output prices should see a 
continuation of the recent trend of lower output volumes but higher output 
in value terms over the forecast horizon. 
 
In the medium term, income support will increasingly be linked towards 
the remuneration of farmers for the multifunctional benefits of agriculture. 
ese include the provision of public goods, such as the preservation of 
the countryside, the maintenance of rural communities, the preservation of 
biodiversity and the production of biomass and other sources of renewable 
energy. Diversification into these areas is likely to represent an important 
source of income for farmers in the years ahead. 
BUILDING 
Here we consider the growth in GDP arising in the building and 
construction sector. This differs significantly from the gross output of the 
sector which is frequently discussed in terms of its share in GNP. The 
difference, of course, lies in the large amount of inputs used in the sector 
many of which are sourced in Ireland. An outstanding feature of Ireland’s 
recent economic experience has been the exceptional growth in output and 
employment in the building sector. For the period 1995 to 2000, output in 
the sector grew by an annual average of almost 13 per cent. While output 
growth moderated significantly to 7.1 per cent during the period 2000 to 
2005, this rate of growth still exceeded that recorded in many other sectors 
of the economy. A number of factors combined to fuel this rapid growth in 
he building sector. Strong economic t
d posable income, in addition to a strong demographic profile and high 
levels of inward migration, caused the demand for new housing to soar. At 
the same time the expansion in the services and industrial sectors increased 
the demand for commercial and industrial properties.  
 
Another contributory factor to the boom in the building sector was the 
high level of investment in roads and public transport undertaken by 
government under the National Developmen
constraints an
demand and r
the building sector rose by an annual average of 10.7 per cent for the years 
1995 to 2000 and by 7.5 per cent for 2000 to 2005. 
 
We anticipate that as overall economic growth retreats from the high 
levels achieved in the last decade and as the level of house building returns 
to more sustainable levels, output growth in the building sector will ease 
over the forecast horizon. We forecast a small contraction in annual 
average output for the years 2005 to 2010 as the level of demand in the 
residential sector normalises and activity in the commercial market slows 
rising to an annual average of almost 2 per cent for the period 2015 to 2020 
as a result of continued demand fo
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infrastructure. Beyond 2020 the level of government capital investment is 
expected to fall with the completion of major projects under the NDP and 
Transport 21. 
 
The labour intensive nature of the building sector has meant a strong 
correlation between output and employment trends in the sector. The 
exceptional output growth during the period 1995 to 2000 was translated 
into annual employment growth averaging over 14 per cent for the same 
eriod. By 2007, there were 278,000 people employed in the building 
sec
nge in the composition 
of the output of the sector towards non-housing construction where 
pro
ion of the commercial sector.  
 
 
falling output growth, we expect a sharp reduction in the numbers 
p
tor, 181,000 more than in 1997. In line with the contraction in output 
forecast for the years 2005 to 2010, employment growth is also expected to 
remain flat, growing by 1.5 per cent per annum as the high rates of 
employment growth recorded in 2005 and 2006 is offset by weaker growth 
for the remainder of the decade. As discussed earlier in this chapter, 
productivity in the sector was negative over the period since 1995. This is 
likely to change in the post-2010 period with the cha
ductivity growth is higher. 
UTILITIES 
Growth in the utilities sector (electricity, gas and water supply) is driven by 
the demand for energy in the rest of the economy (see Chapter 5) and 
hence tends to be linked closely to the growth path of other sectors of the 
economy. We forecast that output growth in utilities will slow down 
significantly over the forecast horizon as growth in the economy and the 
commercial sector eases. Annual average growth will measure 5.5 per cent 
in the period 2005 to 2010 before falling back to just over 1 per cent for 
the remainder of the forecast horizon. Output growth in the utilities sector 
will continue to rely on the expans
Figure 4.10: Output and Employment in the Utilities Sector 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
It is anticipated that strong output growth in the utilities sector for the  
period 2005 to 2010 will be matched by only a slight increase in 
employment of over 1 per cent. As a result of ongoing restructuring and 
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employed in the utilities sector over the forecast horizon. The pace of 
reduction in utilities sector employment is expected to accelerate over the 
MARKET  SERVICES 
Market services are split three ways f the ESRI 
HERMES model: distribution (w  retail), transport and 
communications and business and financial services (professional, financial, 
personal). In the past the output of this sector was considered non-tradable 
and was determined solely by a weighted measure of final domestic 
demand. However, due to deregulation and technological advancements, 
large parts of this sector have been creasingly exposed to international 
competition.  
 
The market services sector has experienced robust growth since the 
mid-1990s  with demand for exports from the sector now a key driver of 
growth in the Irish economy. Outpu growth in market services averaged 
6.0 per cent between 2000 and 2005. We expect this strong rate of output 
growth to continue over the medium term, averaging 4.9 per cent over the 
years 2008 to 2012 before easing slightly for the rest of the forecast 
horizon. Given the labour intensive nature of the market services sector, 
the strong growth in output has been accompanied by a corresponding 
gro
e three market services sectors are 
 levels of immigration. These factors have changed the 
o
medium term. 
 in the current version o
holesale and
in
t 
wth in employment. Employment growth will average 2.4 per cent for 
the period 2005 to 2010 before falling back slightly over the remainder of 
the forecast horizon. By 2015, we estimate that there will be over 1 million 
people at work in the market services sector, representing over 50 per cent 
of total employment, thereby making it the dominant sector of the 
economy.54 We expect the numbers at work in the sector to increase 
further out to the end of the forecast period as Ireland shifts definitively 
towards a service driven economy. Th
now examined in turn. 
DISTRIBUTION 
The level of domestic demand in the economy, in particular the level of 
consumption, determines output in the distribution sector. The key driver 
of personal consumption is the level of disposable income. The 
demographic profile of the population also influences output growth in the 
distribution sector. As well as rising disposable incomes, Ireland has 
experienced increased labour force participation, falling dependency rates 
nd increaseda
c nsumption pattern of the population leading to a change in the demand 
for different types of goods and services, many of which tend to have 
higher margins and demand more specialised customer service thereby 
providing opportunities for increased employment. Technological advances 
has increased the efficiency of operations in the distribution sector and 
reduced the number of wholesalers while the supply of output from the 
sector has also changed due primarily to the growth in internet shopping.  
 
 
 
54In this respect, Ireland will be following a path common to most countries at our stage 
of development.   
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Figure 4.11: Value Added and Employment Growth, Distribution 
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Following exceptional double-digit average growth over the period 1995 
to 2000, growth in the distribution sector slowed for the years 2000 to 
2005. A further moderation to an annual growth rate of 2.3 per cent for the 
eriod 2008 to 2012 is expected after the strong annual growth of almost 5p  
er cent recorded for the years 2005-2007. In line with the predicted 
velling off in economic growth after 2010, we expect growth in the 
e of the 
forecast horizon. The numbers employed in the distribution sector reached 
 
for fu
levels of investment in this sector being maintained out as far as the middle 
p
le
distribution sector to stabalise at 2.5 per cent over the cours
266,000 in 2005 and we anticipate that the numbers employed in the sector 
will continue to rise over the forecast horizon, although at a slower pace 
than in recent years. Annual average employment growth of 1.9 per cent is 
expected for the period 2010 to 2015 and will remain flat for the rest of the 
forecast period.  
TRANSPORT AND COMMUNICATIONS 
As with distribution, output growth in the transport and communications 
sector is primarily driven by domestic demand. Despite regulatory reform 
in the sector, a significant degree of government intervention remains, 
especially in the transport area.  The process of liberalisation has resulted in 
a step upwards in the rate of growth in labour productivity and an
increasingly competitive environment in this sector, which has fuelled 
higher output and employment growth after years of stagnation. The scope 
rther regulatory reform, a continuing high level of government 
investment and the development of new technologies means that there 
remains potential for further growth in this sector.  
 
The extremely high growth rates recorded during the years 1995 to 2000 
are unlikely to be repeated over the forecast horizon. Nonetheless, we 
forecast strong output growth in the sector. As a result of the strong 
growth rates recorded for the 2005 to 2007 period, we anticipate that 
annual growth will average 3.9 per cent for the period 2005 to 2010 and 3.8 
per cent for 2010 to 2015. We expect that programmes such as the 
National Development Plan and Transport 21 will contribute to the high 
of the next decade. Lower investment in the capital stock after that period 
will see output growth easing to 3.6 per cent for the final years of the 
forecast period. 
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Figure 4.12: Value Added and Employment Growth, Transport and 
Communications 
Average Annual % Change
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
1995-2000 2000-2005 2005-2010 2010-2015 2015-2020 2020-2025
Value Added Employment
 
Further rationalisation in the transport and communications sector 
means that employment is forecast to show very little growth over the 
forecast horizon. Employment growth is expected to remain almost flat for 
the years 2005 to 2010 only growing at an annual average rate of just 0.5 
per cent. Growth is forecast to remain equally sluggish for the remainder of 
the forecast period, growing by an annual average rate of 0.3 per cent over 
the last five years of the forecast. 
BUSINESS AND FINANCIAL SERVICES 
This sector comprises both personal and professional services as well as the 
urants, 
anking, 
insurance, legal services, consultancy and other professions. The sector also 
 
 
financial sector. Personal services consist of hotels, pubs, resta
motor repairs, hairdressers etc., while professional services include b
includes IT services and research and development. A prominent theme in 
this Review is the expectation that business and financial services will 
account for a growing share of Ireland’s economic growth in the coming 
years. While in the past this sector was treated as non-tradable with output 
driven directly by domestic demand, this is no longer the case, as today the 
sector is exposed to competitive pressures from outside Ireland. The 
business and financial services sector is now responsible for a significant 
part of the growing exports of services from the economy. As discussed in 
detail in Chapter 2, this development has necessitated a change in the way 
in which the business and financial services sector is modelled, with output 
from the sector now treated as tradable and, therefore, determined by 
world activity and competitiveness. 
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Figure 4.13: Output and Employment in the Business and Financial 
Services Sector 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Annual output growth in the this sector averaged almost 7 per cent over 
e years 2000 to 2005 and we expect this rate of growth to moderate only 
arginally out to the middle of the next decade. Despite lower output 
rowth in this sector in the next decade, Ireland will continue to experience 
sing living standards due to the improvement in the terms of trade arising 
om the anticipated increase in the price of services. Growth for the 
eriod 2015 to 2020 is forecast to average 4.8 per cent, with slightly slower 
rowth of 3.5 per cent expected for the remainder of the forecast period. 
hese growth rates mean that the business and financial services sector will 
The sect ccount or an ever-increasing share of total 
 
mployment in the market services 
sector. We expect modest annual average growth in employment in the 
business and financial services sector over the forecast horizon of around 
3.5 per cent per annum. By 2025 we estimate that employment in the sector 
alone will have reached 754,000, representing over 30 per cent of total 
employment in the economy and al ost twice the number employed in 
industry.  
NON-MARKET SERVICES  
The non-market services sector is modelled under two separate headings: 
health and education, and public administration and defence. Due to the 
public good characteristics of these se vices, their provision is generally the 
responsibility of government. The output of the non-market services sector 
is d
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be the fastest growing sector of the economy in terms of value added.  
 
or is forecast to a f
employment in the economy. By 2007 there were 228,000 more people 
working in the sector than in 1995, with employment in the sector
accounting for 53 per cent of total e
m
r
etermined by the government’s demand for public services. This in turn 
is determined by the country’s demographic profile and the budgetary 
position.  
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Figure 4.14: Output and Employment in the Non-Market Services Sector 
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The non-market services sector experienced rapid value-added output 
growth in the 2000 to 2005 period in excess of 5 per cent. We expect this 
rate of growth to ease over the forecast horizon due to budgetary 
considerations, averaging 2 per cent annually for the years 2010 to 2015 
and 1.5 per cent for the next five years. The level of investment in the 
ector unds er the NDP is expected to grow by around 2 per cent per annum 
owing from a rate of over 12 per cent for the years 2005 to 2010 when 
e NDP was being ramped up. Output growth in the health and education 
ctor is expected to remain slightly higher than in public administration 
nd defence.  
 
The exceptionally rapid growth in current expenditure over the last 
, 
education and public administration. Employment in these sectors grew by 
T4.4  
sl
th
se
a
decade was manifested in rapid growth in the numbers employed in health
an annual average of 5.3 per cent over the years 2000 to 2005. By 2007 
there were 476,000 people employed in these sectors, 208,000 more than in 
1995. As the growth in current public spending slows to more sustainable 
levels over the next decade, we expect employment growth in the non-
market services sector to ease over the forecast horizon. As Lane (2007) 
has argued, more efficient delivery of public services could allow for a 
reduction in the growth of the public sector payroll,  easing labour cost 
pressures in the private sector, contributing to an improvement in 
competitiveness and a rebalancing of the economy toward the export 
sector. Annual average employment growth is estimated to measure 2.0 per 
cent over the period 2010 to 2015. By the end of the forecast period, it is 
expected that non-market services will account for around 28 per cent of 
total employment.  
 
 
Income, 
Expenditure 
and Prices 
he period 2000 to 2005 saw some recovery in agricultural incomes, 
which grew by an annual average of 3.4 per cent, having fallen in the 
previous 5-year period. As has already been outlined, employment in the 
agricultural sector is expected to continue its decline over the forecast 
period.  It seems likely that income growth in this sector will be much more 
moderate in the current period, averaging just 0.3 per cent per annum 
between 2005 and 2010. Income growth is expected to improve between 
2010 and 2015 to an annual average of 3.9 per cent. 
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In contrast to the volatility in agricultural incomes, non-agricultural 
incomes have grown rapidly over the past number of years. Between 2000 
and 2005 this growth averaged 9.8 per cent per annum, reflecting strong 
em
growth in personal taxes is expected to stabilise at 
round 7.3 per cent over the period 2005 to 2015. This compares with 
ual growth of 11 per cent between 1995 and 2000. Again the figure for 
ONSUMPTION 
ub
n 2005 and 2010, before slowing to 
an
ployment growth. It is likely that employment growth will be slower in 
the future. Thus, growth in non-agricultural incomes over the next decade 
will be more moderate, albeit still reasonably strong. In the current period, 
2005-2010, income growth of 6.5 per cent per annum is expected, boosted 
in part by strong growth in 2006 and 2007. Some moderation to an annual 
average growth of 5.8 per cent is forecast between 2010 and 2015. 
 
The start of the decade saw strong growth in transfer incomes, 
averaging 12.9 per cent a year between 2000 and 2005 (some of which was 
due to special compensation schemes). Low unemployment levels, a young 
population reducing the dependency ratio and low interest rates 
contributed to a slower growth rate of 6.9 per cent per annum between 
2005 and 2010. A further moderation to an annual average of 5.8 per cent 
is anticipated between 2010 and 2015. 
 
Annual average 
a
ann
2005 to 2010 is underpinned by strong growth in 2006 and 2007. Although 
growth in personal incomes will be slower than in the past disposable 
income will continue to grow quite strongly over the forecast period. Since 
2003 growth in personal consumption has exceeded that of personal 
incomes, leading to a decline in the personal savings rate. This trend is 
expected to end with the savings rate remaining relatively stable over the 
forecast period. 
C
The late 1990s was a period of rapid economic growth, which was also 
reflected in strong growth in personal consumption, averaging 7.9 per cent 
per annum between 1995 and 2000. Growth continued between 2000 and 
2005 at an annual average of 4.8 per cent. The increases were in part being 
driven by income growth and employment creation as well as low interest 
rates and rising house prices. Many of these factors continued to support 
personal consumption growth in the early part of the current five-year 
period and so annual growth of 4.2 per cent is expected between 2005 and 
010. However, support from these drivers has diminished recently and a 2
s stantial improvement is not anticipated over the forecast period. Thus, 
personal consumption growth is expected to moderate to an annual average 
of 3.1 per cent between 2010 and 2015. 
 
Public consumption, current government spending on goods and 
services, grew by an annual average of 4.7 per cent between 2000 and 2005. 
We expect growth in public consumption to remain broadly stable at an 
annual average of 4.8 per cent betwee
 average growth rate of 2.6 per cent a year between 2010 and 2015. 
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Table 4.4: Personal Income and Personal Expenditure, Percentage Change 
           
 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
Agricultural Incomes -5.7 2.0 2.0 2.0 1.3 5.9 4.5 3.5 2.8 2.8 
Non-Average Wage Income 9.8 9.0 4.0 4.7 5.2 5.6 5.5 5.7 6.0 6.1 
           
Transfer Income -0.5 15.4 7.0 7.5 5.5 6.5 5.9 5.6 5.5 5.7 
Other Personal Income 8.3 4.3 8.3 3.5 -3.9 13.0 11.9 11.7 11.3 10.9 
 Non-Ag. Profits etc. 5.0 4.6 2.9 5.5 1.6 5.7 6.2 6.7 6.9 7.1 
 National Debt Interest 7.8 -14.0 16.0 11.5 5.8 11.8 16.4 9.6 10.7 6.7 
 Net Factor Income -0.8 5.8 4.7 6.2 2.8 4.9 4.0 4.5 5.0 5.0 
 Other Private Income 10.1 1.6 1.4 5.7 0.9 6.9 8.9 8.8 8.7 8.8 
Personal Income 7.2 9.1 5.1 4.9 3.8 6.7 6.5 6.5 6.7 6.7 
Taxes on Personal Income 9.2 10.6 3.5 4.1 9.4 8.5 8.2 6.4 6.7 6.8 
Personal Disposable Income 6.7 8.8 5.5 5.1 2.5 6.3 6.0 6.6 6.7 6.7 
Personal Consumption 7.9 10.2 5.3 5.0 5.4 4.8 5.4 6.3 6.7 6.9 
Personal Savings -6.1 -9.8 7.6 7.7 -40.2 46.1 17.3 10.6 6.0 3.2 
% of disposable income           
Tax ratio (% pers. Income) 19.4 19.6 19.3 19.2 20.2 20.5 20.9 20.8 20.9 20.9 
Savings ratio (% pers. Income) 7.3 6.1 6.2 6.3 3.7 5.1 5.6 5.8 5.8 5.6 
 
 Average Growth Rates     
 1995- 2000- 2005- 2010- 2015- 2020-     
 2000 2005 2010 2015 2020 2025     
Agricultural Incomes -0.8 3.4 0.3 3.9 3.2 3.2     
Non-Ag. Wage Income 12.0 9.8 6.5 5.8 6.1 6.8     
             
Transfer Income 6.7 12.9 6.8 5.8 6.1 6.7     
Other Personal come  In 11.9 3.9 4.0 11.7 9.1 7.3     
  Non-Ag. Profits etc. 18.9 7.8 3.9 6.5 6.8 6.2     
  National Debt Interest -6.3 -4.8 4.9 11.0 -4.7 -181.9     
  Net Factor Income 20.3 10.7 3.7 4.7 4.8 4.4     
  Other Private Income 14.5 4.8 3.9 8.5 7.7 6.5     
Personal Income 10.4 9.0 6.0 6.6 6.6 6.8     
T xes on Personal Incoa me 11.0 7.4 7.3 7.3 6.6 5.3     
Personal Disposable Income 10.2 9.4 5.7 6.5 6.5 7.2     
Personal Consumption 11.6 8.2 6.8 6.0 6.4 7.0     
Personal Savings -10.8 32.4 -10.1 15.7 8.1 9.3     
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Table 4.5: Expenditure on GNP, Constant 1995 Prices, Percentage Change 
           
 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
Personal Consumption 5.7 6.5 3.0 3.2 2.7 2.0 2.6 3.3 3.6 3.9 
Public Consumption 5.3 5.0 4.0 3.5 6.1 3.0 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 
Fixed Investment 2.9 1.9 -6.9 -0.3 5.9 -3.3 3.1 2.4 1.2 1.2 
 Building 5.5 -1.3 -11.9 -2.6 5.6 -1.6 3.5 1.9 0.0 0.0 
 Machinery -5.2 13.0 8.0 5.2 6.8 -7.1 2.4 3.6 3.9 4.0 
Total Exports 4.4 6.6 5.4 5.7 6.6 6.2 6.3 5.8 5.5 5.3 
Total Imports 4.3 6.1 4.0 5.2 6.7 3.4 5.9 5.6 5.3 5.2 
Gross Domestic Product 5.8 4.9 1.8 3.1 4.6 3.7 3.7 3.6 3.5 3.5 
Net Factor Income 1.7 6.9 2.7 4.4 2.3 3.7 2.3 2.4 2.7 2.7 
G t ross National Produc 6.6 4.5 1.6 2.9 5.1 3.7 3.9 3.8 3.6 3.7 
GNDI 4.2 2.9 0.5 2.2 3.3 2.6 3.4 3.7 3.8 4.0 
           
 Av e G  Rates erag rowth     
 
1995-
2000 
2000-
2005 
2005-
2010 
2010-
2015
2015-
2020
2020-
2025     
Personal Consumption 7.9 4.8 4.2 3.1 3.2 3.4     
Public Consumption 5.7 4.7 4.8 2.6 2.6 2.4     
Fixed Investment 13.5 6.0 0.6 0.9 2.4 1.5     
  Building 12.8 7.1 -1.2 0.8 1.9 1.0     
  Machinery 15.1 3.0 5.4 1.3 3.6 2.5     
Total Exports 17.7 5.3 5.8 5.8 4.7 4.1     
Total Imports 18.1 4.8 5.2 5.1 4.7 4.5     
Gross Domestic Product 9.4 5.3 4.0 3.6 3.3 2.7     
Net Factor Income 16.1 11.1 3.6 2.8 2.2 1.0     
Gross National Product 8.6 4.4 4.1 3.8 3.5 3.0     
GNDI 8.3 4.0 2.6 3.5 3.7 3.6     
           
INVESTMENT 
Having grow y n a e 13 r cent between 1995 and 
2005, growth in the volu f all investment slowed to 6 per cent per 
annum betw  2 an 00 n p umber of years the main 
growth driver of overall investment h e id l c truction. As is 
outlined in Housing n th h , t um  o e s 
completed increased su e 
volume of h  c le s g  b  a al ag  10 e t 
per annum b ee 00 d 2 . T sl ow  th ou m et 
as resulted  su n ec in p n ls so a
is forecast t cl y an a e 8.5  c be n 5 
and 2010. Much of this expected decline occurs between 2007 and 2009. 
The slowdown in housing investment means that investment in machinery 
and equipment is forecast to be stronger than building investment over the 
forecast period. However, the slower pace of economic growth will result 
in growth in investment being lower than experienced during the boom of 
the late 1990s. Investment in building is expected to contract by l 
average of 1 er t i e c nt ea r d as e ho sing market 
adjusts. A return to moderate growth of 0.8 per cent per annum is forecast 
n b an a nual
me o
 verag
over
 of .5 pe
een 000 d 2 5. I the ast n
as be n res entia ons
the  sectio  of is c apter he n ber f dw lling
bstantially to nearly 90,000 units in 2006. Th
ouse omp tion rew y an nnu aver e of .2 p r cen
etw n 20  an 005 he owd n in e h sing ark
h in a bsta tial d line  com letio leve and  the ctivity 
o de ine b  an nual verag  of  per ent twee  200
 an annua
.2 p  cen n th urre  5-y r pe io th u
  THE BENCHMARK FORECAST 79 
% of Total Investment, Current Prices
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015
Housing Other building Machinery & Equipment
during the period 2010 t 01 d rt improve ent  an nnual 
average of r  b en 5 2 55 n con rast t  the rrent 
decline in building, invest t achinery and equipment is estimated to 
an annual average of 1.3 per cent is forecast for the period 2010 to 2015 
before an u  w  3 r  a  etween 2015 and 2020. 
Figure 4.15: se s  Pe t of a vestment 
 23 per cent 
between 2015 and 2020 (Figure 4.16). 
EXTERNAL TRADE 
Having grown at a very strong pace in the late 1990s, the annual average 
growth rate for the volume of total exports declined to 5.3 per cent 
between 2000 and 2005 (Figure 4.17). Much of this slowdown in growth 
reflects the changing nature of the Irish economy and the weak 
international environment. Between 2005 and 2010 exports are expected to 
grow by an annual average of 5.7 per cent. A moderate increase in the 
growth rate for exports to 5.8 per cent per annum is forecast for the period 
2010-15. Economic growth in the main international markets is forecast to 
improve between 2010 and 2015. 
 
o 2 5 an a fu her m to  a
1.9 pe cent etwe  201 and 020.  I t o cu
men in m
grow at 5.4 per cent per annum between 2005 and 2010. A moderation to 
pturn in gro th to .6 pe cent  year b
 Sub ctor as a rcen age  Tot l In
 
The impact of the decline in the volume of housing investment is 
forecast to reduce the growth in overall investment to 0.6 per cent per 
annum between 2005 and 2010. However, Ireland continues to experience 
infrastructure constraints and so the proportion of investment accounted 
for by other building is forecast to increase. The changing contribution of 
the different subsectors to overall investment will take place against a 
backdrop of a moderate decline in the share of GNP accounted for by 
investment. As a percentage of GNP investment rose from 17.3 per cent in 
1993 to 31 per cent in 2005. The average investment to GNP ratio between 
2000 and 2005 was 28 per cent and is likely to attain the same figure 
between 2005 and 2010. While some moderation is expected, this ratio is 
expected to average 24 per cent between 2010 and 2015 and
55The model generated annual figures for 2010 to 2012 are much too uneven and should 
probably be smoothed. 
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Figure 4.16: Investment as a Share of GNP 
Table: 4.6. Foreign 
 
Trade, Constant 2004 Prices, Percentage Change 
           
 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
EXPORTS           
 Agriculture 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 -3.6 0.0 -0.2 -0.2 -0.4 -0.6 
 Industry 0.7 3.4 2.4 2.5 5.3 3.6 2.8 2.6 2.6 2.7 
           
Merchandise 0.9 3.5 2.6 2.6 4.8 3.4 2.6 2.5 2.5 2.5 
 Tourism 8.0 5.3 5.6 6.1 -8.5 0.6 3.9 5.1 5.5 5.7 
 Other Services 10.7 12.0 9.8 10.3 10.3 10.1 10.9 9.5 8.7 8.0 
Services 10.5 11.5 9.5 10.0 9.1 9.6 10.5 9.3 8.6 7.9 
Exports - Total Goods and 
 Services 4.4 6.6 5.4 5.7 6.6 6.2 6.3 5.8 5.5 5.3 
           
IMPORTS           
Imports - Total Goods and 
Services 4.3 6.1 4.0 5.2 6.7 3.4 5.9 5.6 5.3 5.2 
           
 Average Growth Rates     
  1995-   2000-   2005-   2010-   2015-   2020-     
 2000 2005 2010 2015 2020 2025     
EXPORTS           
 Agriculture 0.8 1.3 3.3 -0.3 -1.0 -2.1     
 Industry 16.7 2.7 2.8 2.9 2.8 1.7     
           
Merchandise 15.2 2.6 2.9 2.7 2.6 1.6     
 Tourism 7.6 2.7 3.1 4.2 6.2 6.1     
 Other Services 30.7 12.3 10.6 9.4 6.5 5.8     
Services 26.2 11.3 10.1 9.2 6.4 5.8     
Exports - Total Goods and 
Services 17.7 5.3 5.8 5.8 4.7 4.1     
           
IMPORTS           
Imports - Total Goods and 
Services 18.1 4.8 5.2 5.1 4.7 4.5     
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Reflecting the changing structure of the Irish economy, outlined in 
Chapter 2, the main driver of export growth over the forecast period is 
expected to be service exports. Exports of services are forecast to grow by 
an annual average of 10.1 per cent between 2005 and 2010 and by 9.2 per 
cent in the period 2010-15. These growth rates mainly reflect the 
performance of non-tourism services exports, which are forecast to 
increase by 10.6 per cent per annum between 2005 and 2010 and by 9.5 per 
cent between 2010 and 2015. In contrast exports by the tourism sector are 
forecast to grow at more modest rates. Over the period 2005-10 tourism 
exports are forecast to increase by an annual average of 3.1 per cent.  
 
Our forecasts suggest that the volume of import growth will move in 
line with growth in the overall economy and export volumes. Following a 
period of very strong growth in the late 1990s when import growth 
averaged 18.1 per cent per annum growth was more subdued between 2000 
and 2005 when the annual average rate declined to a more moderate 4.8 per 
cent. While substantially lower than e previous 5-year period it reflects 
more moderate growth in output. A slight rebound in import activity is 
erage 5.2 per cent a year. 
Grow  in import v lume is for ast to emai
2010 
betwe 5
ro
NET FACTOR CO  
In contrast to many other European ntri  bstantia difference can 
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been narrower than was previously the case. Between 2000 and 2005 it is 
estimated that net factor flows had a negative effect on GNP, reducing the 
growth rate by 1.9 percentage points per  annum (Table 4.7). In the current 
period the reduction is estimated at 0.7 percentage points, with a further 
fall in the impact to an annual average of 0.5 percentage points between 
2010 and 2015. On the basis of these forecasts the ratio of GNP to GDP is 
expected to average 85 per cent between 2005 and 2010. Some narrowing 
of the gap is anticipated over the forecast period with the ratio moving to 
86.5 per cent by 2015.  
Table 4.7: Contribution of Net Factor Flows to GNP Growth, Percentage 
Points of GNP 
       
 
1995-
2000 
2000-
2005 
2005-
2010 
2010-
2015 
2015-
2020 
2020-
2025 
National Debt Interest 0.2 0.0 0.0 -0.1 0.1 0.1 
Profits etc. Outflows -2.6 -1.0 -1.3 -0.6 -0.6 3.9 
Other Factor Income 0.5 -0.8 0.6 0.2 0.1 -0.6 
Net Factor Income -1.9 -1.9 -0.7 -0.5 -0.4 -0.2 
       
GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT 
The start of the decade saw a continuation of the strong growth rates 
experienced by the Irish economy in the late 1990s. However, more 
difficult conditions in the external environment resulted in annual average 
growth slowing to 4.4 per cent per annum between 2000 and 2005. 
Between 2005 and 2010 a further moderation in the economic growth rate 
is forecast, to an annual average of 4.1 per cent. In line with the move 
towards a more pace of expansion for a mature economy, growth is 
expected to average 3.8 per cent per annum between 2010 and 2015 and 
3.5 per cent a year between 2015 and 2020. 
GROSS NATIONAL DISPOSABLE INCOME 
Gross National Disposable Income (GNDI) provides a more complete 
indication of living standards, by adjusting GNP to take account of net 
transfers from abroad and changes in the terms of trade. As is shown in 
Figure 4.18, growth in GNDI is expected to average 2.6 per cent per 
annum between 2005 and 2010 compared with growth rates of around 4 
per cent for GDP and GNP. The difference results primarily from adverse 
movements in the terms of trade. However, for the remainder of the 
 net contributor to the EU and the 
terms of trade adjustment will not have as substantial an impact and so 
growth rates of the three measures of activity and living standards will 
gether than is the case at present. 
 
 
forecast period the move to becoming a
move much more closely to
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Table 4.8: Prices an ge Ch  
ure 4.18: GDP, GNP and GNDI Growth 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
d Wages, Percenta ange
           
 2006 2007 20 80 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
Personal Consumption 2.1 3.5 2.3 1.7 2.7 2.7 2.7 2.9 3.0 2.9 
Public Consumption 3.6 6.2 5.3 4.8 -1.0 2.8 2.7 2.8 3.0 3.1 
Fixed Investment 6.5 0.0 2.2 2.9 -0.2 2.2 2.7 2.9 3.0 2.9 
 Building 7.2 1.2 3.2 3.7 -1.3 2.6 3.2 3.3 3.5 3.4 
 Machinery 2.1 -1.5 1.5 1.5 1.4 1.6 1.8 1.9 1.9 1.9 
Total Exports 1.4 -0.2 0.8 1.0 0.4 1.1 1.6 2.0 2.2 2.3 
Imports-Energy 21.3 2.0 9.4 -9.6 -1.1 0.9 2.5 3.4 3.2 3.2 
Imports-Non-Energy 3.5 1.2 1.7 1.5 1.9 1.9 1.9 1.9 1.9 1.9 
Agri. Output gross -6.8 -10.0 1.0 1.0 2.1 0.4 0.0 0.5 0.8 0.8 
Manu. Output gross 3.9 5.7 2.6 2.9 4.8 3.3 2.7 2.5 2.5 2.6 
Average annual earnings % change       
Non agricultural 4.8 4.8 4.0 3.5 4.0 4.3 4.1 4.2 4.5 4.6 
           
 Average Growth Rates     
 
1995-
2000 
 2000-
2005
2005-
2010
2010-
2015
 2015-
2020
2020-
2025     
Personal Consumption 3.4 3.3 2.4 2.8 3.2 3.5     
Public Consumption 4.7 6.8 3.7 2.9 3.2 4.0     
Fixed Investment 7.4 5.1 2.3 2.7 3.1 3.4     
 Building 10.7 7.5 2.7 3.2 3.5 3.6     
 Machinery 1.9 -0.3 1.0 1.8 2.3 2.7     
Total Exports 2.4 -0.2 0.7 1.8 2.6 3.3     
Imports-Energy 8.8 3.7 3.9 2.6 3.2 3.0     
Imports-Non-Energy 2.3 -0.1 2.0 1.9 2.4 2.8     
Agri. Output gross 2.2 2.8 -2.7 0.5 0.6 0.6     
Manu. Output gross 12.2 4.8 3.9 2.7 2.7 1.8     
Average annual earnings % change       
Non agricultural 5.9 6.0 4.2 4.3 4.8 5.7     
           
Annual Average % Change
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PRICES AND WAGES 
s a small open economy Irish price movements are the result of both 
domestic and external forces. Despite the strength of economic activity 
sures within the Irish economy 
remained low with the change in prices averaging 3.3 per cent per annum. 
However, it should be noted that the edium-Term Review forecasts inflation 
based on the consumer expenditure deflator rather than using the more 
commonly cited consumer price in ex. The appreciation of the euro 
against both the dollar and sterling, as well as competition from low cost 
economies, is likely to ensure that goods inflation will remain low. 
However, service sector inflation seems likely to be higher over the forecast 
period, although more moderate th  the rates experienced in the late 
1990s. Our Benchmark forecast is for personal consumption price growth to 
average 2.4 per cent per annum in the  
of a return to stronger growth between 2010 and 2015 we anticipate that 
the personal consumption deflator will increase at an annual average of 2.8 
per cent. We forecast that the deflator for government consumption will 
increase more rapidly than consumer prices, averaging 3.7 per cent between 
2005 and 2010. Thereafter, it is forecast that the growth rate for the 
government price deflator will move in line with the deflator for personal 
consumption.  
he Irish labour market experienced strong 
employment growth and low unemployment levels. One consequence was 
that non-agricultural wage rates rose by an annual average of nearly 6 per 
cent. With slower growth in the economy and an increase in the 
unemployment rate we estimate that the growth in non-agricultural wages 
will average 4.2 per cent per annum in the period 2005-10 and will grow by 
4.3 per cent a year between 2010 and 2015. How growth in wages in real 
terms, adjusted for inflation, compares to productivity growth will be 
important for Ireland’s competitiveness as a small open economy. 
Productivity growth in terms of GNP per person employed at 1.2 per 
annum between 2000 and 2005 was lower than growth in real wages, which 
increased by 2.4 per cent. This situation is reversed in the current period 
and over the period 2010-15 productivity growth is forecast to average 2.5 
per cent and growth in real wages is forecast to be 1.6 per cent. 
 
 The Irish labour market has undergone a significant transformation over 
the past 15 years. During that time, the economy moved from 
unemployment rates in excess of 12 per cent to virtually full employment, 
the size of the labour force increased by almost 50 per cent to over 2 
million for the first time and the economy experienced significant flows of 
inward migration after decades of emigration. This rapid employment 
growth, combined with high levels of productivity growth, underpinned the 
strong rates of economic growth recorded since the mid-1990s. 
 
The transformation of Ireland’s labour market gained considerable 
momentum during the years 1995 to 2000. During this period, annual 
employment growth averaged 5 per cent with the result that total 
employment grew by 342,000 to reach 1,590,000 by 2000. While slowing 
slightly, this impressive employment performance was largely maintained 
for the period 2000 to 2005, with annual employment growth averaging 3.2 
per cent for the period. We expect employment growth to moderate over 
4.5 
A
between 2000 and 2005 inflationary pres
M
d
an
 current period, 2005-10. On the back
 
Between 2000 and 2005 t
The Labour 
Market 
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the forecast horizon. In line with the anticipated lower level of overall 
economic activity, annual employment growth is expected to average 2.8 
per cent fo  d 8 0 l g y t 
rowth exp ce r ye 20 o 7 le . T ra f 
employmen w  f as d e er era  1 er t 
for the period 2010 to 2015 and around 1 per cen  
the forecast.
oyment and the L u ce rce ge ng
r the perio  200  to 2 12 fo lowin  the robust emplo men
g erien d fo the ars 05 t 200 (Tab 4.9) he te o
t gro th is orec t to eclin furth , av ging .2 p  cen
t for the last ten years of
 
Table 4.9: Empl abo r For , Pe nta  Cha e 
           
 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
Agriculture 0.9 -0.5 -0.5 -0.5 -2.7 -2.7 -2.7 -2.7 -2.7 -2.7
Industry 2.6 3.9 -3.5 -1.2 1.4 -1.1 -1.3 -1.4 -1.3 -1.4
 Traditional Manufacturing -1.4 -4.1 -3.3 -3.8 -8.0 -3.8 -3.8 -4.0 -2.7 -2.9
 Food Processing 2.3 2.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 -2.1 -2.1 -2.1 -2.2 -2.2
 High Technology -2.8 2.3 0.0 0.0 9.6 -1.2 -1.9 -2.2 -2.6 -2.9
           
 Manufacturing -1.5 0.2 -1.1 -1.2 2.6 -2.1 -2.4 -2.7 -2.6 -2.8
 Utilities -13.0 23.8 0.0 0.0 -1.4 -3.8 -3.6 -3.4 -3.6 -3.6
 Building 8.1 7.0 -6.0 -1.3 0.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
           
Market Services 4.7 4.5 0.6 1.7 0.6 2.3 2.6 2.7 2.7 2.7
 Distribution 6.2 1.6 1.0 1.0 -4.5 0.9 2.1 2.2 2.2 2.1
 Transport & Communications 2.7 1.3 0.0 0.0 -1.4 -0.3 0.2 0.4 0.5 0.5
 Business and Financial 4.2 7.3 0.5 2.6 4.3 3.8 3.5 3.5 3.5 3.5
Non-Market Services 7.5 3.3 2.9 2.9 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0
 Health & Education 6.7 4.7 3.4 3.4 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0
 Public Administration 9.9 -1.0 1.4 1.4 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0
Total 4.5 3.7 0.0 1.1 1.0 1.0 1.2 1.2 1.3 1.3
Labour Force 4.5 3.7 1.9 1.6 1.5 1.3 0.9 0.7 0.7 0.8
           
Unemployment rate ILO 4.3 4.5 5.9 6.2 6.6 6.9 6.7 6.2 5.7 5.3
Net Immigration (000) -71.8 -67.3 -20.3 -11.2 -10.0 -10.0 -10.0 -10.0 -10.0 -15.0
           
 
the economy since the mid-1990s  has 
 
The high level of job creation in 
rectified Ireland’s chronic unemployment problem. The numbers 
unemployed fell by 105,000 between 1995 and 2000 to leave the 
unemployment rate standing at 4.3 per cent in 2000. Since 2000, the 
economy has largely maintained this position of full employment, while at 
the same time experiencing record levels of inward migration. Due to the 
rapid slowdown in the construction sector, only partly compensated for by 
increased employment in the services sector, we expect the unemployment 
rate to increase for the remainder of the current decade, reaching 6.9 per 
cent by 2011. As economic growth recovers in 2010 and the economy 
develops along a more sustainable growth path, we anticipate that the 
unemployment rate will fall gradually from 2012 to average 4.3 per cent 
annually for the last five years of the forecast. 
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Table 4.10: Employment and The Labour Force, Percentage Change 
        
Five Year Annual Averages 
1990-
1995 
1995-
2000 
2000-
2005 
2005-
2010 
2010-
2015 
2015-
2020 
2020-
2025 
Agriculture -3.3 -2.7 -2.4 -0.7 -2.7 -2.7 -2.7 
Industry 1.7 6.0 2.6 0.6 -1.3 -1.8 -2.5 
 Traditional Manufacturing -0.2 0.0 -2.1 -4.1 -3.5 -3.6 -5.9 
 Food Processing 3.8 1.1 0.4 0.9 -2.1 -2.4 -2.7 
 High Technology 2.8 6.1 -0.6 1.7 -2.2 -4.3 -7.5 
        
 Manufacturing 1.7 2.9 -1.0 -0.2 -2.5 -3.7 -6.1 
 Utilities 1.6 -2.5 2.3 1.2 -3.6 -3.7 -4.2 
 Building 1.8 14.6 7.9 1.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 
        
Market Services 3.2 6.4 3.4 2.4 2.6 2.5 1.8 
 Distribution 1.8 4.4 2.8 1.0 1.9 1.7 1.5 
 Transport & Communications 2.2 5.6 3.0 0.5 0.2 0.5 0.3 
 Other Market Services 4.9 8.3 3.9 3.8 3.6 3.2 2.1 
        
Non-Market Services 3.3 4.3 5.3 3.7 2.0 1.5 2.0 
 Health & Education 3.7 5.1 5.3 4.0 2.0 1.5 2.0 
 Public Administration 2.3 2.1 5.1 2.7 2.0 1.5 2.0 
Total 1.9 5.0 3.2 2.0 1.2 1.1 0.9 
Labour Force 1.9 3.4 3.0 2.6 0.9 0.9 0.8 
        
Unemployment Rate ILO 9.6 8.0 4.2 5.5 6.2 4.8 4.3 
        
 
The expected development in overall employment growth and the 
unemployment rate over the forecast horizon mask significant changes 
which are forecast in the composition of employment, driven by the 
changing structure of the Irish economy. The sectors of the economy that 
have experienced rapid output growth, including building, high-tech 
manufacturing and the services sector, fuelled the rapid levels of 
employment growth witnessed over the last decade. Table 4.9 summarises 
the details of our employment forecasts. Total employment is predicted to 
increase by 165,000 between 2008 and 2015. Of this increase in 
employment, 85 per cent will be in the services sector which will increase 
its share of total employment in the economy to 46 per cent by 2015. 
Previous Reviews have drawn attention to the unsustainable nature of the 
growth in employment recorded in the construction sector since the mid- 
1990s. As the residential market reverts to a sustainable level of house 
ent in the sector slows, we 
expect construction sector employment to contract by 17,000 between 
2007 and 2009 and to remain flat thereafter. 
 Overall, employment in the industrial sector is expected to decline over 
reca o . The high- o  r,  ne  
employment w n t late 90  e te e e  s t 
contraction e bers at work between 2008 and 2015 as the industry 
matures, and t economi s. 
We expect re b at k e it l 
manufacturing and food processing sectors to continue over the forecast 
horizon. It im d th mb at k es o rs l 
building and the level of government investm
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be 50 per cent lower than their 2007 levels by the end
period. The long established trend of shrinking employment in the 
agriculture sector is also  continue. Th  
re a xp ed dec  b ,0 n me  term from 
,000 in 2 to 000 in 2015.  
 
It is clear, therefore, that the Irish economy will not be relying on the 
ce mp me ro in  y ah . 
ead, as ed rlie he rk erv  s r b e  
dominant sector of the economy in s em me Em ym t 
growth in the market services sector is expected to continue to outperform 
that achieved in ot r sec rs o the e onom  ove the f recas horiz n. 
ma hat employment growth in 
business a n l ic i r s i  
ser
inment 
 
Thus one of mpo  con ence  the to a ices n 
economy will be the incr mand for skilled labour. Figure 4.19 
shows the forecast chan n th el of educational attainment of the 
labour force. Th opo  of t bour ce w rim uca is 
expected to continue its gradual decline and at just 4.9 per cent by 
2021. In contrast, the nu  Leaving Certificate and third level 
qualifications are expected to increase over the forecast period. By 2021, 41 
per cent of the labour force will hold a third level qualification, up from 18 
n 1991
  of the forecast 
 forecast to e numbers employed in
agricultu re e ect to line y 17 00 i the dium
110 007  93,
industrial sector as the s
Inst
our of e loy nt g wth  the ears ead
not  ea r, t ma et s ices ecto will ecom  the
term of ploy nt. plo en
 he to f c y r o t o
Within the market services sector, we esti te t
nd fi ancia  serv es w ll be highe  than in di tribut on or
transport and communications. Employment in the business and financial 
vices sector alone is expected to reach 579,000 by 2015, 65,000 more 
than will be employed in industry.  Employment growth in the non-market 
services sector is expected to remain steady at around 2 per cent over the 
forecast horizon. By 2015, 26 per cent of total employment will be in the 
non-market services sector.  
 
By 2015, the market services and non-market services sectors combined 
will account for 72 per cent of total employment. These activities are 
human capital intensive and require a high-skilled labour force. In contrast, 
as the numbers employed in agriculture, traditional manufacturing, food 
processing and building decline over the forecast horizon, the level of low-
skilled employment is expected to fall. 
Figure 4.19: Labour Force by Educational Atta
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Since the late 1990s, robust economic growth and high wage rates have 
tion to lab forc wth how Figu .3. T ajor f 
level of educational attai nt t the e po tion rrett l., 
2006). The effect of this immigration has been to ease labour shortages in 
ess dema d  un ed l r w  ed  wa d sp n 
etween skilled and unskilled labour and helped lower unemployment 
(B
 to average 4.8 per cent per 
annum between 2005 and 2010 before improving to an annual average of 
2.6
4.6  
attracted significant inward migration to Ireland. The importance of 
migra
this immigration has been high skilled with immigrants having a higher 
our e gro  is s n in re 4 he m ity o
nme han nativ pula  (Ba et a
key sectors of the economy and dampen wage inflation. This resulted in 
exc n  for skill abou hich r uced ge i ersio
b
arrett, Fitz Gerald, and Nolan, 2002). The current slowdown in the 
economy is expected to reduce net immigration over the medium term. 
Predicated on a recovery in economic activity from the beginning of the 
next decade, a resumption of the skilled immigration of the type received to 
date will be important in ensuring that the forecast demand for skilled 
labour in Ireland’s services driven economy is satisfied.  
 
 
THE BALANCE OF PAYMENTS 
The strength of the Irish economy resulted in the current account of the 
balance of payments averaging a surplus equivalent to 1.9 per cent of GNP 
between 1995 and 2000. However, this surplus was reversed in 2000 and 
for much of the period 2000-2005 the Irish economy recorded a deficit, 
albeit small, on the current account. However, the deficit increased 
substantially in 2005 reflecting a sharp decline in other factor income. The 
deficit on the current account is expected
 per cent between 2010 and 2015 (Figure 4.20). 
Figure 4.20: Balance of Payments Current Account as a Percentage of 
GNP 
 
 
 
 
 
 
PUBLIC FINANCES 
The surplus experienced by the Irish public finances was much lower in the 
first half of this decade than was the case in the latter half of the 1990s. 
The current period has seen the public finances move back into deficit, 
albeit to a much smaller extent than in the 1980s. Our projections for the 
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public finances are broadly positive. On the back of slower economic 
gro
ore visible. The general government 
deficit is forecast to be 2 per cent of GDP in 2009. With a recovery in the 
 However, it is also 
assumed that fiscal policy is tightened in 2010 in order to eliminate this 
deficit under normal growth conditions. This would still leave a small 
deficit out to 2014 with the public finances moving into increasing surplus 
thereafter.  
 
As part of the tightening of fiscal policy in 2010, it is assumed that a 
carbon tax is introduced impacting those sectors of the economy not 
affected by emissions trading (See Box 4.1). In addition, it is assumed that 
the revenue from auctioning all permits accrues to the government from 
2013 onwards. The rate of carbon tax is discussed in Chapter 5. By 2013 
the revenue from this source would amount to 0.6 per cent of GNP. It is 
assumed that changes in taxation on personal income between now and 
2011 will raise the proportion of personal income paid in taxation by 1.5 
percentage points by 2011. On the expenditure side it is assumed that the 
rate of growth in employment in the public sector is cut from around 3 per 
cen
ral investment is 
ompleted by 2020, five years after the date assumed in the last Medium-
erm Review. Under the assumptions set out above, as shown in Figure 4.22, 
government expenditure as a share of GNP is assumed to peak in 2010 and 
fall slowly thereafter. However, the decline is moderate reflecting an 
increased public preference for public consumption, especially in the area 
of health. Some of the costs of the provision of public services will be met 
wth and reduced activity levels in the housing market we forecast a 
widening of the deficit between 2010 and 2015, moving from an annual 
average of 0.2 per cent of GNP between 2005 and 2010 to an average of 
0.3 per cent of GDP in the period 2010-15.  On the basis of these annual 
averages the decline appears modest but on an annual basis the impact of 
the slowdown in economic activity is m
economy in 2010 the pressures would ease somewhat.
t in 2009 to 2 per cent in the years to 2015 (and to 1.5 per cent to 2020). 
The average growth in public employment in the 2005-2010 period is 
forecast at 3.7 per cent. This represents a substantial tightening in the 
stance of public policy reflecting the forecast slower trend growth in output 
in the next decade. 
Figure 4.21: Government Budget Balance, as a Percentage of GDP 
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Box 4.1: The Macroeconomic Effects of the Carbon Tax 
disposal of waste, water charges etc. rising to 1 per cent of GNP in 2012.  
Figure 4.22: Government Expenditure and Taxation as a Percentage of 
GNP 
Previous studies have shown that, for realistic levels of carbon tax, where 
the bulk of the revenue is recycled through a reduction in taxes on labour, 
the impact on GNP is mildly favourable (Fitz Gerald and McCoy, 1992 and 
Fitz Gerald, Hore and Kearney, 2002). Even with the changed behaviour 
of the labour market and its effects on the incidence of taxation, we still 
find that the carbon tax (cum revenue recycling) assumed in the Benchmark 
forecast would be likely to marginally increase the rate of growth in the 
medium term. 
 On the assumption that all the revenue from the carbon tax (and from 
the auctioning of permits) is used to reduce the average rate of personal 
taxation, there is no net effect on the government’s finances. The reduction 
in direct taxes, and the consequent moderating impact on labour costs for 
firms, would more than offset the effects of the higher price of carbon, and 
hence energy, on the competitiveness of both the manufacturing and the 
market services sector. This would see output in 2020 rise by a cumulative 
0.8 per cent in manufacturing and a cumulative 1.6 per cent in business and 
financial services relative to the Benchmark forecast. While positive, these 
effects are small. There would, of course, be more negative consequences 
for more carbon intensive sectors. However, the HERMES model shows 
that the negative effects on such firms would be more than offset by the 
positive effects for the vast bulk of the business sector that is competing on 
the global market. This reflects the decline in the carbon intensity of the 
Irish economy in recent years, discussed in Chapter 5. It also highlights 
again the importance of labour costs as a fundamental driver of the 
competitiveness of the Irish economy. 
 The combined effect of the carbon tax and the reduction in labour 
taxes would be to raise the level of GNP in 2020 by 1¼ per cent, with very 
little further impact thereafter. Total employment would increase by almost 
the same amount. 
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SAVINGS 
The latter half of the 1990s saw the personal savings ratio fall so that by 
2000 the ratio was at a low of 3.2 per cent of personal disposable income. 
However, the savings ratio recovered sharply in 2001 to 7.8 per cent.  
Having averaged 8.2 per cent between 2000 and 2005 the personal savings 
ratio is expected to average 6.1 per cent per annum between 2005 and 
2010. On the basis of the economic and labour market forecasts outlined in 
this chapter, we do not expect this to change significantly. The personal 
savings ratio is forecast to average just over 6 per cent per annum between 
2010-15 and 2015-20.  
 
An important issue for the future is the level of consumer debt. Official 
statistics show strong growth in private sector credit and there has also 
been a substantial rise in the level of gross indebtedness of the Irish 
household sector. In recent years there has been a dramatic increase in 
gross indebtedness, primarily due to increased borrowing for housing 
purposes. Household debt increased from 68.9 per cent of personal 
disposable income in 2000 to 145.3 per cent in 2007. While this is high by 
historic levels in Ireland, it is not substantially out of line with debt-to-
income ratios in other developed economies like the UK or the US. 
However, the increase in debt levels does mean that Irish households are 
exposed to any sharp rise in interest rates or income falls. These figures 
represent gross debt and so do not adjust for assets or savings by the 
personal sector. Although housing was the main contributing factor behind 
higher indebtedness, rising property values are also responsible for a 
substantial increase in household assets. 
 
As shown in Box 4.2, in spite of the huge increase in gross borrowing by 
households, their net financial asset position actually improved between 
2001 and 2006. To this improvement in their net financial position must be 
ad
a 
 
ed 
employment, the burden of debt will be readily supported, and will tend to 
fall over time. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ded the massive increase in their physical asset position through the 
acquisition of many new dwellings. This suggests that the household sector 
as a whole is in a very strong financial position in Ireland, rather different 
from the popular picture. 
 
These data reflect the fact that for many older households the 
combination of their housing wealth and the accumulated value of their 
financial assets, especially in the form of pension funds, leaves them in a 
very strong financial position. It is younger households, who face heavy 
debts as a counterpart to their acquisition of new dwellings, who face 
more difficult environment. However, even for such households, with
interest rates remaining relatively low and with their continu
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Box 4.2: Net Worth of Irish Households56
Much of the focus in recent years has been on the indebtedness of the 
household sector, particularly given the growth in private sector credit and 
borrowing for housing purposes. Another perspective is provided by CSO 
institutional accounts data. These data provide a more comprehensive 
picture by presenting a household balance sheet, which shows household 
assets as well as household debt.   
 The financial liabilities of the Irish household sector are on a sharply 
rising trend.  By 2006, these liabilities had increased by 181 per cent since 
2001 to €176.3 billion. It is worth pointing out that the increase is in the 
c text of very strong economic growth, with strong growth in on
employment and after tax incomes. A major contribution of the CSO 
sectoral accounts data is that they allow us to look at both sides of the 
balance sheet of Irish households. Over the same period, 2001-06, the 
financial assets of Irish households rose by 71 per cent to €308.2 billion.   
 
Financial Balance Sheet, Household Sector, 2001-06   
 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
Financial Assets 180.4 185.5 214.9 240.1 277.0 308.2 
Financial Liabilities 62.8 75.4 89.7 112.3 146.0 176.3 
Net Financial Assets 117.7 110.1 125.2 127.9 131.0 131.9 
       
Source: CSO, Institutional Sector Accounts, Financial 2001-2006. 
 
A breakdown showing the composition of financial assets indicates that 
households now have large holdings of currency and deposits, which 
account for approximately 30 per cent of household financial assets. 
Insurance policies and pension fund assets account for about 43 per cent. 
The balance is accounted for by shares and other equity assets. The 
majority of household liabilities are in the form of loans, predominantly 
long-term loans. If account is taken of housing assets then the picture is 
one of a substantial increase in the net asset position of the Irish household 
sector. Thus, much of the increase in liabilities has been used by 
households to accumulate housing assets. Even allowing for the current 
decline in house prices, the net financial position of Irish households 
remains positive.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
56For a detailed analysis see Kelly, J., M. Cussen and G. Phelan, 2007. “The Net Worth of 
Irish Households – An Update,” CBFSAI Quarterly Bulletin 3. 
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Figure 4.23: Personal Savings Ratio, as a Percentage of Disposable 
Income 
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Figure 4.24: Household Gross Debt 
 
 The fortunes of the Irish housing market have changed substantially since 
the last Medium-Term Review. Having risen dramatically in the late 1990s 
house prices continued to appreciate in the first half of this decade. The 
scale of the increases and the length of the boom in the housing market 
prompted concerns about the sustainability of the housing market and its 
 of the highest proportions of vulnerability to a shock. Ireland has one
owner-occupiers in the EU. The recent Census shows the proportion of 
ed ands at 77 per 
ent, down slightly from the 79.8 per cent recorded nsu . 
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 per head to new house prices showed a deterioration in 
affordability over that period. However, the forecasts in this Medium-Term 
 indicate that in the current period, 2005-10, annual average growth 
tes in these two variables will be much more closely matched. The recent 
decline in house prices coupled with continued income growth suggests an 
improvement in affordability. Our view is that once the current housing 
market correction has occurred house prices will grow by much more 
moderate rates than those experienced between 1995 and 2005 and so 
further improvements in affordability are forecast. 
Figure 4.25: Average House Price Pe 2, 2006, Ireland = 100 
rce: ERA Europe. 
 
Entry to EMU resulted in a sharp downward adjustment in Irish interest 
rates. However, the rise in house pr  
result in improvements to the affordability of homeownership. Despite 
this, the demand for housing remained strong. One explanation is provided 
sing. The user cost of housing, or the 
rate of return, provides a measure of the cost of owning a house and aims 
to take account of the role played by capital appreciation, taxation, 
indebtedness and expectations. A basic calculation approximates user cost 
based on the mortgage interest rate minus the change in house prices. This 
nomic rivers  the h sing m ket wi  remai
p xt  ec
that house price growth will be much more mod
th
w by an annual average of 3.2 per cent and by an average of 3 per cent 
per annum over the rest of the forecast period. However, the comparison 
shown in Figure 4.25 indicates that the lower growth rate in Irish house 
prices will be from a much higher price level than many other European 
countries. 
 
Current and expected personal income are important factors 
determining the demand for housing. Between 1995 and 2000 annual 
average growth in house prices was much higher than growth in disposable 
personal income per head and, although the gap narrowed, this differential 
remained in place between 2000 and 2005. As a result, the ratio of personal 
disposable income
Review
ra
r m
Sou
ices has been such that this did not
by the trend in the user cost of hou
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shows that the user cost of housing has fallen since 1992 and is estimated 
to be negative between 1996 and 2006 because of the growth in house 
prices. Houses, although highly priced, remained attractive because of low 
real interest rates and expected capital gains, resulting in housing being a 
very profitable investment. However, recent falls in house prices and the 
expectation that future house price growth will be low means that this will 
not support housing demand to the same extent over the next few years. 
The steady increase in interest rates has been a factor behind the current 
slowdown in the housing market. Having kept interest rates steady for 
around two years the European Central Bank (ECB) began to increase 
interest rates in December 2005. This was followed by a series of interest 
rate increases during 2006 and into 2007. The effect of this has been to add 
2 percentage points to official interest rates compared to where they were, 
with a knock on impact on mortgage rates. Such a steady increase in 
interest rates has had a negative impact on affordability, particularly for 
recent entrants into homeownership.  
Figure 4.26: House Price to Personal Disposable Income Per Head Ratio 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.27: User Cost of New Houses, 1972-2015 
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Table 4.11: Decomposition of Housing Demand, Thousands, Annual 
Averages 
      
  1991-1996 1997-2002 2003-2006 2007-2011 2012-2016 
Population Growth 16.5 20.0 19.8 22.2 22.8 
Change in Headship 3.1 0.9 8.2 8.2 7.9 
Migration 0.0 5.9 17.5 9.0 5.3 
Vacant 0.1 6.4 19.7 7.1 5.6 
Obsolescence 4.9 11.6 13.4 7.0 7.0 
      
Dwellings Built 27.0 48.0 80.0 53.5 48.6 
      
 
Table 4.11 shows a breakdown of housing needs into five main 
categories – the change due to population growth (rising number of adults), 
the change in headship (proportion of each age group who are heads of 
households), the change due to net migration, the change due to the 
demand for second dwellings and the change due to the replacement of 
obsolescent stock. Population growth, excluding the effects of migration, 
has been the main factor underpinning housing demand and this is 
expected to remain the case, contributing an annual average of over 22,000 
units per annum to housing needs. The housing market boom prevented 
s forming independent households and resulted in the 
ntributing less than ,000 units per annum between 1997 
an
is would represent a return to the 
 
 
 
some young adult
rise in headship co  1
d 2002. However, the expectation that house price increases would 
continue and would be higher than the cost of borrowing encouraged many 
adults to form independent households and as a result the rise in headship 
increased the demand for housing units by 8,200 per annum between 2003 
and 2006. The number of units needed to meet this component of demand 
is expected to average around 8,000 units per annum over the remainder of 
the forecast period. The implied rise in headship in the forecast period will 
be supported by the anticipated fall in the real cost of dwellings over the 
same period. Net migration to Ireland rose substantially following the 
accession of the New Member States to the EU. This is reflected in the 
growth of the estimate of the number of housing units required to meet 
demand from this factor, an annual average of 17,500 units between 2003 
and 2006. On the basis of the levels of migration assumed as part of this 
forecast (a net inflow averaging 15,000 per annum) there will be a need for 
9,000 dwellings a year between 2007 and 2011 and 5,300 dwelling per 
annum in the period 2012-16. Rising standards of living have also increased 
the demand for second dwellings, i.e., holiday homes. The most recent 
Census records 49,789 dwellings as holiday homes. When vacant dwellings 
are included the Census records a vacancy rate of 15 per cent of the 
housing stock. The forecasts in this chapter anticipate that income growth 
is to slow and so we expect that the demand for second dwellings will make 
a lower contribution to housing demand over the period, averaging 7,100 
units per annum between 2007 and 2011 and 5,600 units a year between 
2012 and 2016. With regard to the replacement of obsolescent stock we 
conservatively estimate that this will add 7,000 units per annum to housing 
demand over the forecast period. Th
levels of replacement stock required during the 1980s and 1990s. 
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Box 4.3: The Housing Tenure of Immigrants in Ireland 
Microdata from the CSO Quarterly National Household Survey allow us to 
examine headship rates and housing tenure for both Irish nationals and 
immigrants resident in Ireland. Immigrants are defined as individuals who 
describe themselves as born outside the Republic of Ireland and are not 
Irish nationals. Those who say that they were born in Ireland and describe 
themselves as Irish nationals are the “native” population. To be included an 
individual must be aged 20 years or over. In order to ensure sufficient 
responses are available the microdata for 1993 and 1994, 2003 and 2004, 
and 2005 and 2006 are merged. 
Table 4.3.1 shows that headship rates (proportion of each age group 
who are heads of households) are lower for immigrants in the later period 
for those in the 25-54 year age groups than they were in the mid-1990s. 
However, they are surprisingly close to those for natives, indicating that the 
flow of immigration added substantially to the demand for dwellings. 
 
Table 4.3.1: Headship Rates, Percentage of Age Cohort Who Are “Heads 
of Households” 
    
 Native Immigrant 
  19951 20042 200 36 19951 20042 20063
 
Years % % % % % % 
 
20-24 14.4 16.6 17.0 31.9 33.4 33.0 
25-34 39.3 40.1 40.5 47.3 44.5 41.1 
35-44 50.8 51.5 51.7 53.1 52.4 48.7 
45-54 54.1 52.5 53.0 54.2 54.1 49.8 
55-59 56.7 54.4 54.1 64.7 57.2 62.2 
60-64 60.8 55.9 56.9 55.9 58.5 57.3 
65+ 68.6 66.2 56.6 67.2 64.1 64.7 
        
1 Labour Force Survey 1993 and 1994. 
2 QNHS 2003 and 2004. 
3 QNHS 2005 and 2006. 
 
When examining housing tenure we use those who identify themselves 
as househo e data shows that the homeownership rate amongst ld heads. Th
immigrants has fallen rom 46.3 n 2004 to 36.7 in 2006. This decline has  f  i
occurred a time w v w  at hen nati e homeo nership rates have remained
broadly stable at around r cen e dat83 pe t. Th a do not directly allow us to 
ascertain what has caused  declin owev we can lore if there  the e. H er,  exp
have been changes in the posit f m s in Ir  since 4  com ion o igrant eland  200
and the opening of the EU to the New Member States (NMS). 
 NMS immigrants now count nearl per ce f imm nt  ac  for y 22 nt o igra
household heads. These im igrants nd to be younger,  per cen are m te  76 t 
aged under 34 years old c ared w 8.3 p nt of  imm s. omp ith 3 er ce other igrant
Just under 38 per cent of N S immig ants have a third level qualification, M r
compared to just under 50 per cent of other immigrants. Of NMS 
immigrants 56 per cent indicate that they are single compared to 31.6 per 
cent of other immigrants. Nearly all NMS immigrants (99.5 per cent) 
indicate that they have been in Ireland for less than 10 years. In contrast 
69.4 per cent of other immigrants are resident less than 10 years. Detailed 
year of arrival data shows that 66 per cent of NMS immigrants arrived in 
Ireland since 2004 compared to 16.3 per cent of other immigrants. 
 A contributing factor to the decline in homeownership is the changing 
mix of immigrants to Ireland. Many immigrants now in Ireland have only 
recently arrived and may not have decided on their long-term plans or 
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made a long-term decision about housing tenure. Other reasons may exist 
as to why immigrants have a lower homeownership rate than natives and 
these are outlined in Duffy (2007). They include preferences and may also 
include difficulties accessing financial services and affordability constraints.  
 
A factor that may become more important in the current financial 
environment is the availability of credit and mortgages to individuals and 
households. If banks have to raise interest rates or tighten lending 
conditions in the face of funding constraints this will have a negative 
impact on the supply of credit. 
 
The housing sub-model also forecasts housing completions, with one of 
the main drivers being the change in new house prices. In recent years 
there has been a large increase in the number of housing units completed as 
developers responded to the boom in the housing market. On the basis of 
a forecast slowdown in economic growth and slower house price growth 
the level of housing completions is expected to moderate. However, as 
illustrated in Table 4.11 the economy has an underlying need for an annual 
average of around 50,000 units per annum in the period to 2016. 
Figure 4.28: New House Completions 
5. ENERGY, 
ENVIRONMENT AND 
TRANSPORT  
Energy has always been a part of the ESRI forecasts for the economy, 
although it has received more or less attention depending on public 
perceptions and economic circumstances. The extension of the modelling 
and forecasting of fossil fuel use to carbon dioxide emissions is more 
recent (Fitz Gerald et al., 2002). In the previous Medium-Term Review, we 
introduced a detailed treatment of the power generation sector. In the 
current Review, we extend previous forecasts in three areas. First, we include 
greenhouse gases other than carbon dioxide. In fact, we have modelled 
many emissions to air, but are able to show only selected results in this 
chapter. Second, we provide more detail on the transport sector. Third, we 
forecast waste and its disposition. 
5.1 
Introduction 
 
There are two reasons for the expanded treatment of the environment. 
The first is that environmental care and particularly greenhouse gas 
emission reduction is high on the political agenda and important in the 
Irish mind – in sharp contrast to previous years. The public profile of 
climate change was stimulated by the release of the Stern Review on the 
Economics of Climate Change (Stern et al., 2006; cf. Yohe and Tol, 2007), the 
publication of the Fourth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on 
Climate Change,58 the success of the Oscar-winning movie An Inconvenient 
Truth, and the Nobel Peace Prize shared by Albert Gore and the IPCC. 
 
Following the 2007 election, the Green Party entered into government. 
This increased the political profile of environmental issues. The emphasis is 
again on climate change, with substantial emission reductions advocated in 
the Programme for Government. The European Union has also 
announced ambitious plans for greenhouse gas emission reduction – and in 
the current proposals Ireland faces the strictest targets of all Member 
States. The EU National Emissions Ceilings Directive already imposes 
targets for emissions of sulphur, oxides of nitrogen, ammonia, and volatile 
organic compounds. Some of these targets may be difficult to meet. The 
EU Landfill Directive sets tough targets for waste. 
 
The second reason to pay increased attention to environmental issues is 
that the plans and policies for environmental protection are couched in 
terms of specific targets or limits on emissions. If these targets or limits are 
 
58 http://www.ipcc.ch/ 
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to be achieved, policies will need to be implemented that would potentially 
affect the rate and pattern of economic growth. Chapter 4 shows that this 
is the case. The tax on carbon dioxide emissions allows for income taxes to 
be below what they otherwise would have been. This increases the 
competitiveness of the Irish economy, and thus leads to higher 
employment and faster economic growth. Other policies may have a 
different impact on economic activity. 
 
This chapter presents forecasts of energy use; power generation; 
transport, greenhouse gas and sulphur dioxide emissions; and waste. These 
forecasts necessarily make assumptions about future policy. In the set of 
models used in this exercise, we can only implement changes based on 
policy instruments. We cannot impose policy targets. For climate and 
energy, we assume: 
 
• that there will be a domestic carbon tax; 
• that this tax will cover all carbon dioxide emissions that are not 
already regulated by the EU Emissions Trading Scheme (ETS);59 
• that the carbon tax will equal the projected permit price (Table 5.1); 
and 
• that a similar tax will be levied in other EU countries, so that there 
are no effects on the competitiveness of Irish firms and farms 
relative to the rest of Europe. 
 
For waste, we assume that prices of collection, recycling and disposal 
remain constant in real terms, incineration capacity expands as currently 
planned, and that incentives will eventually be put in place to ensure that 
waste will be incinerated. 
 
To date, Irish policymakers have emphasised the formulation of targets 
for environmental protection rather than developing and implementing 
policies for emission reduction. The setting of goals is a necessary first step, 
but objectives will not be met without the use of instruments that change 
the actual behaviour of people and companies. 
 
We decided to include a domestic carbon tax in the Benchmark forecast 
for several reasons. A carbon tax is anticipated in the Programme for 
Government, and the Commission on Taxation is studying a carbon tax at 
the time of writing. There is virtual consensus amongst economists that a 
carbon tax is the most appropriate policy instrument to reduce greenhouse 
gas emissions. The cheapest way to meet any emissions target is to price all 
emissions at the margin at the same rate. Besides economic efficiency, 
uniform carbon prices also adhere to the basic notion of fairness to treat 
like cases alike. More specifically, everybody pays the same amount per 
tonne of carbon. Uniform emission pricing can be achieved by taxes, 
subsidies, or tradable permits. Subsidies reduce emissions as much as taxes 
or tradable permits in the short run, but subsidies lead to higher emissions 
in the long run. For stock pollutants like greenhouse gas emissions, the 
impact of the uncertainty about the costs and the benefits of the policy 
 
59 This tax covers only carbon dioxide emissions and not other greenhouse gas emissions 
such as methane and halocarbons. Agricultural emissions are, therefore, essentially not 
affected by the tax. 
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intervention is much more favourable for taxes than it is for permits 
(Weitzman, 1974). A carbon tax is, therefore, the instrument of choice for 
reducing greenhouse gas emissions. 
 
However, the European Union has created an Emissions Trading 
System (ETS), and Ireland is participating in it. The ETS covers carbon 
dioxide emissions from power generation, cement production, the pulp and 
paper industry, and aluminium production.60 That is, the price of carbon is 
not uniform. For example, it is currently €23.18/tCO2 for electricity and 0 
for transport.61 If transport and other sectors were included in the ETS, a 
uniform carbon price would arise automatically – but it is unlikely the 
European Union will decide to do this during the forecast period of the 
current Medium-Term Review. An alternative way to create a uniform carbon 
price is to set the domestic carbon tax equal to the ETS permit price.62 In 
order to prevent double regulation, sectors that are covered by the ETS 
should be exempted from the carbon tax.63  
 
 Table 5.1 summarises the main assumptions on energy prices for 2012, 
2020 and 2025. Our assumptions on energy prices are derived from the 
International Energy Agency’s forecasts. Together with the level of 
economic activity and technical progress, these drive the demand for 
energy. 
5.2 
Energy 
Demand 
Table 5.1: Energy Price Assumptions 
     
 2007 2012 2020 2025 
Oil price $ a barrel, nominal 70.5 73.9 90.5 110.3 
Coal price € a barrel, nominal 51.5 52.0 66.9 77.7 
Exchange rate $/€ 1.37 1.42 1.42 1.42 
Carbon price (2004 €/tCO2), real 0.12* 20.8 38.2 49.0 
Carbon tax (2004 €/l petrol), real 0 0.05 0.09 0.11 
     
Average annual per cent change  2007- 2012- 2020- 
  2012 2020 2025 
Oil price, nominal growth in €  0.2 3.2 3.0 
Coal price, nominal growth in €  1.2 1.7 1.5 
Inflation rate  2.0 2.0 2.0 
Oil and gas price, real growth  -1.8 1.2 1.0 
Coal price, real growth  -0.8 -0.3 -0.5 
Peat price real growth  0.0 0.0 0.0 
     
* The price of carbon fell steadily through 2007, from 5.53 €/tCO2 on January 2 to 0.02 
€/tCO2 on December 28; the price quoted here is for the middle of the year 
http://www.eex.com/ 
 
60 Aviation will be added in 2012. 
61 April 30, 2008; http://www.eex.com/ 
62 Note the carbon price in the ETS has been volatile while taxes are typically fixed for the 
budget period. One solution would be to change the carbon tax every year, and set the 
carbon tax equal to the futures price of carbon at the time that the budget is announced. 
63 A domestic carbon tax on emissions regulated under the ETS would reduce emissions in 
Ireland, but would increase emissions elsewhere in Europe by the same amount. The costs 
of compliance would increase both in Ireland and elsewhere (Tol, 2007). 
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On the basis of our assumptions, demand for energy is expected to 
continue to grow in the medium term, albeit at a slower rate than during 
the past fifteen years (Tables 5.2 and 5.3). Total Final Energy Use is 
expected to rise above 17.7 million Tonnes of Oil Equivalent (TOE) by 
2025, an increase of almost 35 per cent over the 2005 level. Average annual 
increases will be between 1.6 per cent and 1.9 per cent for each five-year 
period out to 2025. The transport sector sees the strongest growth in 
energy use. We expect an increase of almost 60 per cent between 2005 and 
2025. We also expect to see strong growth in the energy use of household 
and services sectors rising to 47 per cent and 43 per cent above their 
respective 2005 levels. Industry is the only sector where we expect to see a 
decline, of 2 per cent by 2025. Oil will remain the country’s dominant 
energy source. Its share of final energy use is not expected to deviate much 
from the 65 per cent observed for 2005. Thus it will make up the bulk of 
increases in absolute terms. However, the greatest relative increase should 
be observed for gas consumption, where we forecast 75 per cent growth 
over its 2005 level by 2025. 
Table 5.2: Final Energy Use by Sector, Thousand TOE 
   
    Average Annual Growth Rates 
  2005  1990- 1995- 2000- 2005- 2010- 2015- 2020-
  Level 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015 2020 2025 
Household 2,954 -0.4 2.6 3.2 2.5 1.7 1.7 1.8 
Industry 2,641 2.8 5.2 0.8 -0.3 -0.4 0.0 0.2 
Services 1,702 1.6 4.6 4.5 3.9 0.8 1.4 1.2 
Agriculture 339 6.2 -1.4 1.4 -0.4 1.0 1.0 1.0 
Transport 5,031 3.4 11.3 4.3 2.1 2.7 2.5 2.1 
Total 12,668 2.0 6.2 3.2 1.9 1.6 1.7 1.6 
         
Table 5.3: Final Energy Use by Fuel, Thousand TOE 
   
  Average Annual Growth Rates 
 2005 1990- 1995- 2000- 2005- 2010- 2015- 2020-
 Level 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015 2020 2025 
Coal 435 -18 4.6 1.8 -8.9 -5.2 -4.6 -4.3 
Oil 8,196 4.4 7.5 3.0 1.5 2.0 1.9 1.7 
Gas 1,485 7.0 8.6 4.3 4.4 1.9 2.4 2.7 
Peat 274 -4.2 -13.1 -2.0 -1.3 -4.9 -4.9 -4.8 
Renewables 184 -3.1 5.1 9.3 0.2 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 
Electricity 2,094 4.6 6.4 3.7 3.9 1.4 1.4 1.1 
Total 12,668 2.0 6.2 3.2 1.9 1.6 1.7 1.6 
         
 
Final energy use in the services sector has grown at an average annual 
rate of about 4.5 per cent since 1995, but increases in energy consumption 
in the sector will see a marked slowdown after 2010. Increases in 
household consumption will also moderate after 2010, settling to a level of 
average annual increases in line with overall final energy use. In recent years 
the industrial, services and household sectors have consumed roughly 
similar quantities of electricity. However, the share of electricity consumed 
by services is expected to reach 41 per cent by 2015 compared to 
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household use of 30 per cent and industrial use of just 26 per cent. A 
similar pattern for gas consumption will mean that the services sector 
should overtake industry as the second largest consumer of gas (after 
households) late in the next decade. Final energy use in agriculture is 
forecast to decline at a rate of 0.4 per cent between 2005 and 2010. 
However, for the remainder of the forecast period it is expected to grow at 
an average annual rate of 1.0 per cent. 
 
Oil will continue to be the dominant fuel in transport, while electricity, 
the only alternative, will remain only a minor contributor, making up less 
than 0.1 per cent of total final energy use. However, oil use in services will 
decline rapidly over the forecast period. In industry, oil use will decline 
during 2005-2010 after which it will show small increases. Oil will remain 
the main fuel used in agriculture, but electricity will see its share increase 
from 16 per cent in 2005 to 22 per cent in 2025. The use of both coal and 
peat will steadily decline over the forecast period, with both reaching a 
share of just 0.7 per cent of total final energy use by 2025. Apart from 
electricity generation, the use of renewables will change little between 2005 
and 2025, assuming that there is no significant adoption of bio-heat. 
 
 A new all-island electricity market, including both the Republic of Ireland 
and Northern Ireland, started in November 2007. It compensates electricity 
generators directly for the fuel and carbon costs of the electricity they 
produce. It also incentivises generators through the use of capacity 
payments, which are designed to help cover their capital costs and 
encourage an efficient use of available generating plants.64 Electricity 
generation is a large consumer of primary energy in Ireland. Demand for 
electricity is also growing rapidly; new investments are needed to meet this 
demand and replace older infrastructure. 
5.3  
Power 
Generation 
MAIN ASSUMPTIONS 
Table 5.4 shows the assumed commissioning and decommissioning of 
plants out to 2025. The commissioning and decommissioning schedule out 
to 2013/2014 is based on: 
 
• EirGrid’s 2008-2014 Generation Adequacy Requirement (GAR); 
• The System Operator of Northern Ireland (SONI) Seven Year 
Statement 2007-2013 (SYS); 
• The June 2007 Asset Strategy Agreement between ESB and CER; 
• An additional 500 MW interconnector running from Wales to the 
Republic of Ireland in 2012. 
 
Additional thermal plants are needed in 2020 and 2025 in order to 
maintain the reliability of electricity supply. Specifically we assume that an 
extra 400MW Combined-Cycle Gas Turbine (CCGT) will be 
commissioned by 2014 and another one by 2020, and that two 200MW 
Open-Cycle Gas Turbines (OCGT) will come online by 2020 (one of 
which will be in Northern Ireland). We also assume that Moneypoint will 
 
64More information on the single electricity market can be found at 
www.allislandmarket.com. 
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be closed by 2025, to be replaced by a new conventional 1,000MW coal-
powered plant, and that a further 500MW interconnector will be in place by 
2025, bringing the total capacity of interconnection with Great Britain to 
1,400MW. We further assume that Great Britain will be able to export 
electricity to Ireland when needed.65 With respect to renewables, we follow 
the central scenarios of the 2007 Grid Study and assume that wind 
generation capacity on the All-Island system will increase from about 
1,000MW available at the beginning of 2008 to 4,000MW by 2020 and 
4,700MW by 2025. We also assume that starting in 2012 about 10 per cent 
of the energy produced by peat plants will come from burning biomass, but 
that peat plants lose their “must run” status. 
Table 5.4: Commissioning/Decommissioning Schedule for All-Island 
Market 
    
Plant Name Capacity Commissioning Decommissioning
 (MW) Date Date 
Poolbeg 3 242  2007 
Great Island 216  2008 
Poolbeg 1&2 219  2009 
Marina 27  2009 
Tarbert 590  2009/2010 
Ballylumford (NI) 340  2013 
Kilroot (NI) 390  2019 
Aghada 270  2019 
Moneypoint 845  2024 
Aghada (CCGT) 431 2010  
Whitegate (CCGT) 445 2011  
Interconnector 500 2012  
Quinn (CCGT) 400 2014  
Incinerator 60 2014  
Kilroot (CCGT) (NI) 430 2020  
OCGT (NI) 200 2020  
OCGT 200 2020  
CCGT 400 2020  
Coal (w/o CCS) 1000 2025  
Interconnector 500 2025  
Total shut down   3139 
Total new capacity  3566  
Total new interconnector  1000  
    
 
Using these assumptions and the model described in Box 5.1, we 
calculated the fuel mix for power generation for 2012, 2020, and 2025, 
given the existing technology. The results are shown in Table 5.5. 
 
 
 
 
 
65 Specifically, we assume that generation capacity in Great Britain will grow at the same 
rate as electricity demand. 
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Box 5.1: Electricity Model 
The model of the electricity generation market used in this Medium-Term 
Review reflects the new All-Island Market for wholesale electricity. This 
market started in November 2007 and includes both the Republic of 
Ireland and Northern Ireland. 
 A demand curve based on actual 2007 consumption determines the 
amount of electricity that is needed in each half hour of the year. 
HERMES estimates the rate of increase of demand for future years linking 
it to general economic growth.  
 The model is an optimal dispatch model. It details all the plants 
generating electricity in Ireland, their size, the type of fuel they use with its 
associated carbon content, their yearly availability and how efficient they 
are at converting fuel into electricity. It then determines the least costly 
schedule of generating plants needed to match electricity consumption for 
each half-hour of the year.  
 To determine the cost of electricity for the interconnector (and 
therefore determine if there are imports or exports to Great Britain), a 
simulation of the British system is also set up. We simplify the British 
wholesale electricity market and design a dispatch model for Great Britain 
that is similar to the one for Ireland, albeit less detailed. Generating plants 
that use the same type of fuel (e.g. coal or natural gas) are aggregated into a 
few large plants. 
 The simulations provide an estimate of which plants run and which 
fuels are used in the Republic of Ireland, the carbon dioxide associated with 
electricity production, and the level of Irish electricity trade. For a more 
detailed discussion of the model, see McCarthy (2005). 
 
Electricity demand is forecast to continue to grow significantly up to 
2025. By 2020 it will be 30 per cent higher than in 2005, and 37 per cent 
higher by 2025. As described above, most of the net increase in the 
electricity generation capacity will be powered by wind. Thanks to this large 
increase in wind, renewables reach 37 per cent of electricity generated by 
2025, as shown in Table 5.5. Ireland thus meets this particular EU target 
without any difficulty. The very limited amount of biomass reflects the fact 
that it is used as a co-firing fuel in peat plants. Since peat plants do not 
have priority dispatch in this scenario, they run very little, therefore keeping 
the amount of biomass low as well. 
 
The share of coal generation decreases as Moneypoint ages and 
becomes less competitive, especially when it is faced with increasing costs 
of carbon. The addition of an efficient new plant in 2025 drives the share 
of coal generation back up. 
 
The large amount of wind mainly removes the need for additional 
natural gas generation, which would otherwise grow at a much faster rate. 
However, it might not be realistic to assume that large amounts of wind 
can be seamlessly accommodated on the electricity system. See Box 5.2 for 
more details. Finally, the increased size of electricity interconnection to 
Great Britain allows for significant imports of electricity over time, as well 
as limited exports. Net imports from Northern Ireland and Great Britain 
account for 14 per cent of total electricity consumption in 2012. In later 
years, net imports decrease, but still account for 8 per cent of total 
consumption in 2020 and 2025. If investment in power generation in Great 
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Britain does not keep up with demand growth, Ireland may become a net 
exporter of electricity – and prices and emissions would be higher than 
indicated in Tables 5.5 and 5.7. 
Table 5.5: Power Generation 
     
 2005 2012 2020 2025 
Peak electricity demand (MW) 4,823 5,627 6,235 6,620 
Real carbon price per tonne, 2004€ 17.666 20.8 38.2 49.0 
Cost of carbon/KWh 2004 € 0.09 0.09 0.16 0.21 
Imports (KTOE)  176 397 253 304 
Exports (KTOE)  0 5 24 68 
Fuel Used in Power Generation         
Coal (%) 27.8 24.6 9.9 22.8 
Oil (%) 15.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Gas (%) 40.1 46.8 56.0 40.3 
Peat (%) 10.0 0.08 0.06 0.02 
Landfill gas (%) 0.5 1.2 2.7 2.6 
Hydro (%) 1.1 2.1 1.8 1.7 
Wind (%) 1.9 25.2 29.5 32.6 
Biomass (%) 0.0 0.01 0.01 0.0 
Total (%) 100 100 100 100 
     
 
Box 5.2: When Wind Power Might be Curtailed 
Wind is a variable source of energy. It sometimes blows strongly and 
sometimes not at all. When this is coupled with the fact that storage of 
electricity is not economic, it means that the System Operator has to call on 
conventional plants to produce electricity when the wind slackens, but 
curtail conventional plants when the wind blows. This is not always 
possible. Conventional plants (such as coal-fuelled or gas-fuelled base-load 
plants, designed to run 24 hours a day) take several hours to warm up and 
be ready for production. Therefore a realistic scenario will see the 
occasional curtailment of wind energy, in order to keep conventional plants 
running and maintain the reliability of the electricity system. 
 To see what the effects might be on the share of renewables and on 
carbon dioxide emissions, we ran a scenario where base-load gas plants and 
coal plants run at least at their minimal stable capacity during the whole 
day. This means that wind is curtailed at times of low electricity 
consumption. Under this scenario, the generation share of renewable 
electricity in 2020 and 2025 reduces to 30 per cent (from 34 per cent) and 
31 per cent (from 37 per cent) respectively and emissions from the 
electricity system increase by 17 per cent in 2020 and 16 per cent in 2025 
relative to the Benchmark forecast. 
 
 
66 The price of carbon was very volatile in 2005, ranging from about €7/tonne to 
€30/tonne. We have taken an average price for the year, equal to €18/tonne of carbon 
(and deflated to 2004 prices). 
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Table 5.5 reports the cost of carbon per KiloWatt hour (KWh), which 
increases from €0.009/KWh in 2005 to €0.021/KWh in 2025. This 
compares to the current unit rate of €0.132/KWh for the domestic 
standard tariff (CER, 2007). In addition to the cost of fuel and carbon, 
electricity prices also cover the cost of power plants, the cost of 
transmission and distribution of electricity and the cost of retail to final 
consumers. The new power plants will add to the cost of electricity. The 
All Island Grid Study (Ecofys, 2008) suggests that the investment in 
renewable generation capacity (mostly wind-powered plants) will be of the 
order of €7 billion. To this we have to add the cost of the new thermal-
generated plants. Finally, the electricity transmission network will need to 
be reinforced to accommodate the new plants and this will cost at least €1 
billion (Ecofys, 2008). It is evident, therefore, that the price of electricity 
will rise. 
EMISSIONS FROM ELECTRICITY GENERATION 
The carbon emissions from electricity generation can be found in Table 
5.7. Emissions in this sector started decreasing during the 2000-2005 period 
and are set to continue to fall until the advent of the new coal plant in 
2025. As mentioned above, the coal plant in this scenario is a traditional 
coal plant. At a real price of carbon of €49/tonne it might be profitable to 
build a coal plant with carbon capture and storage instead.67 This would 
undoubtedly be much more expensive, but it could save the economy 
between 5 and 6 million tonnes of CO2 in 2025. Much will depend on the 
speed with which this new technology (carbon capture) is developed and 
the expected long-run price of carbon. Obviously, in making the decision 
on a replacement for Moneypoint, the assessment of the best option will 
depend very much on the expected price of carbon over the lifetime of the 
plant (out to 2050 and beyond). 
 
The decrease in emissions of CO2 reflects the increase in wind 
generation on the system, the addition of newer, more efficient gas-fuelled 
plants, and the decrease in the use of the most polluting fuels: peat and 
coal. Moreover, there is a large increase in electricity imports, which have 
no associated carbon emissions (in the Republic of Ireland). Box 5.3 
discusses what CO2 emissions would be in the absence of climate policy. 
 
Emissions of sulphur dioxide are shown in Figure 5.6. Sulphur dioxide 
emissions from electricity have greatly decreased in Ireland. Moneypoint, 
the largest emitter, has installed desulphurisation equipment in 2007-2008, 
leading to a significant drop in emissions. Natural gas plants produce 
almost no sulphur dioxide during the electricity generation process. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
67 Although carbon capture and storage (CCS) is a compilation of proven technologies, the 
plans for building the first large-scale demonstration plants in the UK and USA have been 
postponed. It is uncertain whether CCS will be a proven technology when the Moneypoint 
replacement will be commissioned (around 2020) or, if not, whether the then government 
will underwrite the technical risk. 
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Box 5.3: The Impact of Climate Policy on Power Generation 
In the Benchmark forecast, we assume that the spot price of carbon dioxide 
emission permits in the EU Emissions Trading System (ETS) will be as is 
currently foreseen by the futures markets of the ETS (up to 2012) and as is 
predicted by the European Commission (up to 2020). Table 5.1 shows the 
numbers, which entail a steadily rising carbon price. 
  We here use a radically different assumption: We set the price of 
carbon to zero.68 The main purpose of this exercise is to distinguish the 
changes in the electricity sector induced by climate policy from the changes 
due to other reasons.  
 Table 5.3.1 compares the electricity sector in 2020 and 2025 for the two 
scenarios. We assumed that the investment in generation capacity and 
power grid is identical between the scenarios. Indeed, the planned 
expansion of wind power and interconnection may have more to do with 
market regulation than with climate policy. However, climate policy does 
imply that the invested capital is deployed in a different way. 
Table 5.3.1: The Effect of Climate Policy on Power Generation 
     
 2020 2025 2020 2025 
Carbon cost/KWh 2004 € 0.16 0.21 0.0 0.0 
Net imports (KTOE)  229 236 57 262 
CO2 emissions (000 tCO2) 10,074 10,915 15,307 12,885 
Fuel used in power generation     
Coal (%) 9.9 22.8 19.0 23.0 
Gas (%) 56 40.3 41.6 33.0 
Peat (%) 0.0 0.0 6.6 6.1 
Renewables (%) 34.0 36.9 32.8 37.9 
      
 
 The main impact of carbon pricing is on peat. With a price of carbon in 
the order of €40/tCO2, Ireland’s peat stations only occasionally produce 
electricity. With a zero price, peat supplies 6 to 7 per cent of the power 
generated in the Republic of Ireland. Table 5.3.1 also shows that climate 
policy curtails the output of Moneypoint towards the end of its lifetime – 
but not of its assumed coal-fired successor. As a result, more electricity 
would need to be imported from the United Kingdom. 
 Finally, carbon dioxide emissions would be substantially larger if the 
price of carbon dioxide emissions permits were zero. In 2020, CO2 
emissions in electricity would be 50 per cent higher than in the Benchmark 
forecast. In the 2025, the difference is much smaller because the assumed 
new coal-fired power plant is able to compete, even with a €50/tCO2 
permit price. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
68 Boehringer and Loeschel (2003) and Svendsen (2005) discuss reasons why the permit 
price may be very low. 
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 The transport sector includes all road transport (both passenger and 
freight), air transport (including international aviation) and rail, but it 
excludes other forms of transport such as sea shipping. Transport is a 
derived demand, in the sense that there is little transport performed for the 
sake of transport. People travel to get to and from places of work and 
leisure and goods are transported between their place of production and 
their market outlet. Energy use in transport has grown rapidly in the past 
ten years, as shown in Table 5.6. Between 1990 and 2005 growth in energy 
consumed in transport (measured in thousand tonnes of oil equivalent) was 
significantly higher than growth in GNP, although growth slowed to a level 
more into line with GNP growth after 2000.  
5.4  
Transport 
 
Energy consumption in the transport sector is mainly accounted for by 
petrol (36 per cent in 2005), diesel oil (46 per cent in 2005) and kerosene 
(17 per cent in 2005) with negligible amounts of electricity, LPG and 
biofuel. Most of the kerosene used in the transport sector is to fuel jet 
aircraft for international travel. With the increase in domestic aviation and 
the expansion of low-cost international carriers such as RyanAir, the 
consumption of kerosene took off after 1995. However, the most rapid 
growth up to 2005 is in diesel consumption. It has outstripped the growth 
in GNP for the whole period between 1990 and 2005. Note that diesel 
fuels most of the freight vehicles transporting goods as well as all diesel-
powered cars. 
MAIN ASSUMPTIONS 
The demand for transport is driven both by the level of economic activity 
and its cost, which is directly tied to the price of fuel. The early 1990s saw a 
drop in the price of fuel, whereas it started recovering in the late 1990s and 
has grown steadily since. The assumption is that it will continue to grow in 
line with the world market price of oil. In the following forecasts a key 
assumption is that a carbon tax will be implemented starting in 2010 and 
that it will equal the price of carbon emission permits in the European 
Trading System (ETS).69
 
Starting this year, HERMES forecasts the demand for petrol separately 
from the demand for diesel. Petrol consumption is driven by the number 
of cars in the economy and the relative price of petrol in Ireland with 
respect to the United Kingdom. The number of cars in turn is a function of 
disposable income, the underlying demographic trends and the rate at 
which the number of cars per adult reaches saturation (set at 0.8 cars per 
adult – roughly the same level as in Germany today). The relative price of 
fuel with respect to the United Kingdom drives the extent of “fuel 
tourism” (see Box 5.4). 
 
The model does not consider other forms of transport. Implicitly, we 
assume that cycling and walking continue to decline, and that the 
consequent additional demand for motorised transport is met by public 
transport. Car and lorry remain the main mode of transport. 
 
 
69 See Table 5.1 for the detailed assumptions on the price of fuel and the cost of carbon.  
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Diesel consumption is a function of tonne-kilometres70 of freight (which 
depend on GNP) and the price of diesel in Ireland relative to its price in 
the United Kingdom. The latter again drives the amount of “fuel tourism”. 
Box 5.4: Fuel Tourism 
Fuel tourism is defined as the amount of fuel bought in Ireland but 
consumed abroad. When fuel is cheaper in the Republic of Ireland, 
consumers from Northern Ireland and Great Britain will engage in cross-
border fuel shopping. HERMES estimates this behaviour by measuring the 
sensitivity of sales of fuel to the ratio of the fuel price in the Republic of 
Ireland with respect to its price in the UK. 
 In this Medium-Term Review we estimate that in 2005 between 5 and 9 
per cent of total petrol sales in Ireland were consumed abroad. The figure 
for diesel is 15 to 20 per cent. More work is needed to measure fuel 
tourism with precision. We can, however, get an idea of the effect of 
changes in taxation on fuel tourism and revenue entries. Adopting a carbon 
tax equal to €20/tonne of CO2 would reduce fuel tourism and associated 
carbon emissions by about 285 thousand tonnes of CO2 in 2005, which is 
about 0.5 per cent. The decrease in fuel tourism would reduce the amount 
of excise taxes paid by non-residents to the Irish revenue by about €26 
million. The non-residents who continue buying fuel in Ireland pay the 
carbon tax, thereby increasing Irish revenues by €14 million. On net, the 
Irish revenue would lose approximately €12 million (or about 0.03 per cent 
of its 2005 revenue) by imposing a tax of €20/tonne of CO2. 
FORECAST 
Table 5.6 shows the forecasted growth rates of the main transport variables 
up to 2025 in five-year periods. The growth rate of GNP is also reported 
for convenience. 
Table 5.6: Average Growth Rates of Transport Variables and their 2005 
Levels 
   
  Average Annual Growth Rates 
 2005 1990- 1995- 2000- 2005- 2010- 2015- 2020- 
 Level* 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015 2020 2025 
GNP  4.3 8.6 4.4 4.1 3.8 3.5 3.0 
Total energy  5,031 3.4 11.3 4.3 2.1 2.7 2.5 2.1 
   Kerosene 857 1.4 9.5 6.4 4.3 4.3 3.7 3.3 
   Petrol 1,822 3.2 7.6 2.7 0.7 0.2 0.0 -0.2 
   Diesel 2,329 4.7 16.6 4.9 2.3 3.8 2.4 2.8 
Cars 1,662 4.5 5.9 4.7 2.8 2.0 1.8 1.6 
Freight 18.2 1.4 17.6 8.0 7.5 4.2 3.7 2.8 
         
* Thousand tonnes of oil equivalent for total energy and fuels; thousand cars; billion 
tonne-kilometres. 
 
The growth rate in the demand for petrol decreases over time. This is 
due to a combination of factors: the number of cars is increasing, but this is 
accompanied by a slight decrease in the average mileage of cars; there is an 
 
70 A tonne-kilometre is equal to a tonne of goods transported for one kilometre. 
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increase in the number of diesel cars; and there is an improvement in fuel 
efficiency, although this is in part countered by a tendency towards buying 
larger cars.71
 
Figure 5.1 shows the profile of the Irish stock of cars, disaggregated by 
size of engine. The engine size has been growing over time.72 The type of 
cars that will be bought in the future (shown as “undecided” in Figure 
5.173) will be influenced by consumers’ income, the price of fuel and 
government policies. If the price of fuel continues to rise and a carbon tax 
is implemented, small-engine cars would become more appealing. 
Figure 5.1: The Stock of Cars by Engine Size (Million Cars) 
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Diesel use grows much faster than petrol use (Table 5.6). This is due in 
part to an increased adoption of diesel-fuelled cars, which are cheaper per 
kilometre to drive. The main driver of the growth in diesel use, however, is 
the increase in the amount of freight transported. Table 5.6 shows that 
after 2010 the amount of freight transported in Ireland, measured in tonne-
kilometres, grows broadly in line with GNP. This reflects the limited 
options available in Ireland to shift the transport of goods away from the 
road. Road freight transport represented about 99 per cent of total inland 
freight transport in 2006, and freight transport by rail is unlikely to increase 
within the next 20 years. This is because of limited capacity of the current 
rail infrastructure, and because the average length of haul in Ireland is 
short, which makes the use of rail unattractive. 
 
 
71 As the 2008 reform of the Vehicle Registration Tax and the Motor Tax left the prices of 
most cars unchanged, we have no reason to assume that these trends will not continue in 
the future. 
72 Note that this trend was reversed in the first two months of 2008. It is too early to say 
whether this is a trend break, or a temporary deviation as in 1996-7. 
73 Note that after 2007, the assumption is that existing cars will be scrapped at the same 
rate as they have in the past. 
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Finally, the increase in kerosene use mirrors the expected increase in 
flights, both domestically and internationally.74
TRENDS IN CO2 EMISSIONS 
Given the level of activity shown in the previous paragraphs, it is possible 
to forecast CO2 emissions from transport.  
 
Table 5.7 shows the level of carbon dioxide emissions from transport 
and their average yearly growth rate. In Table 5.7, CO2 emissions from 
kerosene are limited to the amount of fuel used in domestic aviation in 
accordance with the international accounting rules for greenhouse gas 
emissions. 
Table 5.7: Average Growth Rates of Greenhouse Gases and their 2005 Levels 
    
   Average Annual Growth Rates 
  2005 1990- 1995- 2000- 2005- 2010- 2015- 2020-
  kTCO2eq 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015 2020 2025
GNP     4.3 8.6 4.4 4.1 3.8 3.5 3.0 
Greenhouse gases Total 70,269 1.3 3.1 0.4 -0.1 0.0 1.1 0.5 
Carbon dioxide Total 47,723 1.7 4.8 1.3 0.3 0.4 1.4 0.7 
  Electricity 15,136 3.7 3.7 -0.7 -2.5 -3.7 -1.8 1.6 
  Transport 12,797 3.9 11.5 4.0 1.8 2.3 2.4 2.0 
  Cement 4,431 -5.6 10.7 10.2 1.6 3.6 4.8 3.8 
  Other 15,358 0.3 1.7 -0.7 1.1 0.7 1.1 -2.9 
Methane Total 13,262 0.5 -0.4 -0.4 -1.1 -1.4 0.6 -0.6 
  Agriculture 11,454 0.3 -0.3 -0.6 -1.7 -1.5 -1.5 -1.6 
  Waste 1,646 3.2 -0.8 1.6 2.7 -0.9 5.3 4.6 
Nitrous oxide Total 8661 0.9 0.3 -2.9 -1.4 -1.5 -1.4 -1.5 
Halocarbons Total 623 41 23 1.8 10.5 8.1 7.9 6.5 
          
 
Even with a carbon tax that starts at €20/tonne of CO2 emissions in 
2010 and grows over time, emissions from transport grow by more than 35 
per cent between 2005 and 2020. This is notably higher than the 20 per 
cent decrease for the economy as a whole suggested by the EU climate 
change and renewable energy package currently being discussed in Brussels. 
There are two reasons for this. First, the level of the carbon tax is low. 
Petrol, for instance, would be taxed by €0.11 per litre in 2025 (see Table 
5.1). One would not expect a large change in driving behaviour, a 
substantial increase in the purchase of more energy-efficient cars, or a 
modal shift to public transport, cycling, or walking. Second, even if 
commuters would like to change their behaviour, they are not necessarily 
able to. Alternative modes of transport may be unavailable and impractical, 
or may be deemed unsafe or of low social status. Public transport 
infrastructure, in particular, takes considerable time to build. Currently, 
planned extensions of rail and light rail will provide an alternative to a 
 
74 Kerosene used for international flights is assumed to grow in proportion to the number 
of outbound and inbound international tourists according to Hamilton, Maddison and 
Tol, 2005. 
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fraction of commuters only. Cars with very high energy- or carbon-
efficiency are a niche market at present, and although we expect this niche 
to grow, we do not expect that these cars will dominate sales by 2020, let 
alone the stock of cars. Driving behaviour, finally, is determined by habit 
and patterns of living and work – both factors change only slowly, and are 
difficult to influence.  
 
The above forecasts assume that little biofuel will be burned before 
2025. There is an EU biofuels target for Ireland, but this has yet to be 
implemented in domestic policy. Economically, biofuels are a bad 
proposition (Fitz Gerald, 2003) and the environmental benefits are 
controversial (Crutzen et al., 2007). If policy mandates a 5 per cent mix of 
biofuel in total transport fuel, CO2 emissions from transport would 
increase by about 0.2 per cent in 2020, relative to the baseline in Table 
5.7.75 Box 5.5 explains in more detail the issues associated with the 
adoption of biofuel in Ireland. 
Box 5.5: CO2 Emissions and Biofuel Adoption 
Biofuels are transformed from biomass into liquid or gas fuels that can be 
used for transport or heating. They are seen as an alternative to fossil fuels 
and are encouraged for two main reasons. First, they reduce the need for 
oil imports, although this does not necessarily increase the security of 
supply (Brännlund et al., 2008). Second, some biofuels (but not all) reduce 
air pollution. The most common types of biofuel at the moment are 
ethanol, a substitute for petrol, and biodiesel, a substitute for diesel. 
Ethanol is mostly made from corn and sugarcane, whereas biodiesel is 
mainly produced from plant oils such as rapeseed, palm, coconut and 
soybean. Whether or not these biofuels are net providers of energy is 
subject to debate. The answer depends on the biomass source of the fuel, 
the refinement process and the estimation techniques (Dufey, 2007; 
Brännlund et al., 2008). 
 At the moment at least 90 per cent of biofuels are consumed in the 
country in which they are produced (Dufey, 2007). However, international 
trade is bound to grow quickly, especially if countries pursue biofuel 
adoption targets. It is unlikely that there will be sufficient biomass available 
in Ireland to produce the amount of biofuel necessary to replace 5 per cent 
of motor fuel. This means that Ireland, and other countries in the same 
situation, will need to import at least part of their biofuel needs, which 
makes it important to understand issues surrounding international trade of 
bioenergy. 
 The international law governing bioenergy trade is at the moment 
undeveloped (Switzer, 2007). Dufey (2007) points out the potential pitfalls 
in international trade of bioenergy.  
 First, there are no well-recognised standards that certify bioenergy as 
being sustainable.  The life-cycle emissions of biofuels depend heavily on 
the way in which biomass is grown and on the process used to transform 
the raw material into fuel. Life-cycle emissions also depend on transport 
 
75 This specific calculation assumes that biodiesel would substitute traditional diesel in 
order to attain the 5 per cent target. The result is the same if we assume 5 per cent 
biodiesel and 5 per cent bioethanol. 
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and land use change. There is ongoing work to determine standards and 
standard certification, but they are not at all defined. 
 Second, there are huge disparities in tariffs applied to bioenergy 
products, since they are classified as food (biodiesel) and spirits 
(bioethanol). Developing countries may end up exporting raw materials, 
which face lower tariffs, and therefore miss out on the stages of biofuel 
refinement that produce the most value added. This is subject to ongoing 
negotiations in the World Trade Organisation. 
 Third, biofuels production may replace food production. Although this 
should diminish with the adoption of second-generation of biofuels – 
based on the transformation of non-edible (parts of) plants – competition 
for land and water will remain an issue. 
 In addition, accounting rules for greenhouse gas emissions need to be 
clarified. If biofuels are produced in Brazil and consumed in Ireland, which 
country accounts for the carbon sequestration taking place while the 
biomass is growing? Most likely Ireland will not be allowed to claim any of 
the carbon sequestration benefits, but will have to account for all the 
tailpipe emissions of the biofuel it uses. Since CO2 emissions for biofuel 
and fossil fuel combustion are similar, imported biofuels would help in 
meeting the biofuel target, but would not help in curbing Irish carbon 
emissions. 
 Given the uncertainty surrounding all stages of international trade in 
biofuels, our best guess is that carbon emissions for countries like Ireland 
will not change significantly even if biofuel targets are met, be they at 5 per 
cent, 10 per cent or 20 per cent of oil consumption in transport. 
 
 
 Emissions to air are projected using the ISus model.76 Following 
O’Doherty and Tol (2007), ISus uses the median change in the past 
emission intensities per sector and substance to project future emission 
intensities. ISus further uses the projected sectoral output from the 
HERMES model, downscaled to the 19 sectors in the ESRI 
Environmental Accounts (Lyons, Mayor and Tol, 2008). For household 
emissions, we use the estimated income elasticities of emission per capita 
and the number of people as projected by the demographic model. 
Emissions of carbon dioxide from power generation are taken from the 
dispatch model (see Section 5.3). Emissions of methane from landfill are 
taken from the waste model (see Section 5.6). 
5.5 
Emissions to 
Air 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
76 See http://www.esri.ie/research/research_areas/environment/isus/ 
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Figure 5.2: Carbon Dioxide Emissions by Sector 
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Figure 5.2 shows carbon dioxide emissions by production sector as 
observed (1990-2005) and as projected (2006-2025).77 In the past, emissions 
have grown considerably slower than the economy. Figure 5.3 compares 
the emission intensity of Ireland (measured in grams of carbon dioxide 
emitted per dollar of gross domestic product) to the rest of the “old” 
European Union (EU-15), the recent Member States, and the USA. In 
1990, Ireland emitted considerably more CO2 per euro earned than the rest 
of the EU-15, but progress has been much faster so that Ireland is now 
close to the average. In fact, the Irish rate of progress in reducing the 
carbon intensity of the economy is almost at par with the accession 
countries, many of which experienced a major economic restructuring after 
the fall of the Berlin Wall. Diakoulaki and Mandaraka (2007) show that, for 
economic production, Ireland was one of the most carbon-intense 
economies in the EU-15 in 1990, and one of the least carbon-intense 
economies in 2005. They attribute this to the modernisation of the power 
generation sector and the shift from manufacturing to services. However, 
transport in Ireland is more carbon-intensive than elsewhere in the 
European Union, which explains why Ireland is slightly above the EU-15 
average. 
 
Emissions from power generation are expected to fall substantially 
(Section 5.3), but Figure 5.2 reveals that emissions from other sectors do 
not fall, despite the carbon tax.78 Emissions from transport and cement 
production are responsible for most of the growth. Emissions from 
households and the service sector are essentially flat. For services, this is 
because the economic expansion is by and large offset by energy efficiency 
improvements. The trend towards larger homes and smaller households is 
offset by improved insulation and more efficient heaters. There are limited 
 
77 Projected emissions for 2006 are 1.8 per cent above observed emissions. 
78 We agree with McCarthy and Scott (2008) that the National Climate Change Strategy 
will do little for emission reduction. 
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options for reducing carbon dioxide emissions from the residential and 
services sector, because its energy use is to a large extent determined by 
building design and long-lived equipment. A large share of the stock of 
houses and offices is relatively young and will, therefore, not be replaced in 
the near future. Box 5.6 shows CO2 emissions in the absence of climate 
policy. 
Figure 5.3: The Carbon Intensity of the Irish Economy Relative to Other 
Countries 
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Box 5.6: The Impact of Climate Policy on Carbon Dioxide Emissions 
In the Benchmark forcast, we assume the domestic carbon tax equals the 
permit price in the Emissions Trading System of the European Union. 
Table 5.1 shows the assumed carbon tax. 
 We here explore the implications for emissions if there were no carbon 
tax. A comparison of the cases with and without a potential carbon tax 
yields valuable insights into the impact of this policy. Box 5.3 discusses the 
implications of a zero carbon price for the power generation sector. 
 Box 4.1 in Chapter 4 shows the implications of a carbon tax for 
economic growth, employment, and the government budget. We assume 
that the revenue from the carbon tax is used to reduce income tax. Because 
labour costs are more important than energy costs for the competitiveness 
of the Irish economy, this implies that the economy is stimulated by a shift 
from income to carbon taxation. There are therefore two counteracting 
effects. On the one hand, a carbon tax would induce people and companies 
to use less and different energy. On the other hand, faster economic 
growth would increase energy use. 
 Table 5.6.1 shows the carbon dioxide emissions with and without 
climate policy. Emissions from power generation are taken from Box 5.3. 
Without climate policy, carbon dioxide emissions in 2020 would be 10  per 
cent higher than in the Benchmark forecast.  Most of the emission reduction 
is realised in electricity, where emissions fall by 34 per cent. In the rest of 
the economy, emission reduction is only 1 per cent. 
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Table 5.6.1: The Impact of Climate Policy on 2020 Carbon Dioxide 
Emissions (000 tCO2) 
     
 No Policy Tax + ETS Difference Percentage 
Difference 
% 
CO2 from power generation 15,307 10,074 5,232 -34.20 
CO2 from other sources 42,743 42,273 470 -1.10 
Total CO2 58,049 52,348 5,702 -9.80 
 
 The 470 kTCO2 emissions avoided by a carbon tax consist of an 
increase in emissions of 408 kTCO2 due to faster economic growth, and a 
reduction of 878 kTCO2 due to energy efficiency and fuel switching. That 
is, 47 per cent of the gains in carbon efficiency of the economy (bar 
electricity) are negated by faster economic growth. 
 It should be noted that our current models do not allow for major 
shifts in technology. This is not a big problem for the period to 2025 and 
the relatively modest carbon tax assumed here, but it does imply that we 
slightly underestimate emission reduction for any given carbon tax. In the 
short- to medium-term, the main purpose of a small but rising carbon tax is 
not an immediate emission reduction. The carbon tax rather serves as a 
signal to industry and innovators that the time has come to start preparing 
for substantial, perhaps even radical, changes in energy and transport 
technologies. 
 
In considering Irish emissions of greenhouse gases we have so far used 
the standard practice of accounting for all emissions which enter the 
atmosphere in Ireland, either from domestic production or domestic 
consumption. However, there is a different way of looking at this issue, 
where accounting is based on the emissions embodied, directly or 
indirectly, in the goods and services consumed in Ireland. For example, 
when we import a desk, a machine or a bunch of flowers, emissions have 
resulted from the production of the item abroad and its transport to 
Ireland. Under the alternative consumption-based accounting framework 
the emissions embodied in the goods and services we consume, including 
those embodied in imports, would be allocated to Ireland while the 
emissions produced in making goods and services in Ireland for export 
would be allocated to the foreign consumer. 
 
This alternative consumption-based accounting framework would be 
difficult to implement on a consistent basis as part of a legal agreement – 
hence the concentration on the production based measure. However, it is 
of considerable importance to examine trends in the consumption based 
measure. Helm, Smale and Phillips (2007) show that while UK emissions 
under the normal production-based measure have fallen in recent years, 
under the consumption based measure they have risen. This reflects the 
fact that “dirty” business has been outsourced to countries like China. Here 
we apply the consumption-based accounting framework to Irish emissions. 
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Figure 5.4: Carbon Dioxide Emissions by Final Demand 
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Figure 5.4 shows carbon dioxide emissions by final demand. Emissions 
are attributed to final demand using an environmental input-output model 
(O’Doherty and Tol, 2007). The 2002 input-output table (CSO, 2006) is 
updated with the RAS method (Parikh, 1979) using the projected 
production from HERMES and the projected consumption according to 
Lyons, Mayor and Tol (2007). Virtual CO2 imports79 for 2001 are taken 
from Peters and Hertwich (2008) and projected using non-energy imports 
according to HERMES assuming that the CO2 intensity of imports falls by 
1 per cent per year. In 2005, 54 per cent of CO2 can be ascribed to 
household consumption, 12 per cent to government consumption, 8 per 
cent to investment, and 23 per cent to exports. The trade balance for CO2 
is very negative: 11 million tonnes of CO2 emitted in Ireland are for 
exports, but companies abroad emit 33 million tonnes of CO2 to meet the 
demand of Irish households and companies. Figure 5.4 shows that the CO2 
contained in Irish imports grows much more rapidly than the CO2 emitted 
in Ireland. This pattern is similar to that of the UK (Helm et al., 2007). 
 
Figure 5.5 shows total greenhouse gas emissions. Emissions of methane 
and nitrous oxide from agriculture fall slightly with improved management. 
However, methane emissions from landfill increase, even though this trend 
is moderated by the diversion of waste from landfill to incineration. The 
projected growth rate of halocarbons is much slower than observed in the 
past, but halocarbons do continue to grow rapidly and could contribute 4.0 
per cent of total greenhouse gas emissions in 2025, up from 0.9 per cent in 
2005. Halocarbons are emitted by very specific industrial processes, and are 
therefore extremely volatile and very hard to predict. If we re-estimate the 
model for the data of the last six years only, emissions grow from 0.6 
million tonnes of carbon dioxide equivalent (tCO2eq) in 2005 to 2.1 million 
 
79 That is, carbon dioxide emitted abroad to produce goods and services consumed by 
Irish residents. Virtual CO2 is also referred to as embedded CO2 or embodied CO2. 
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tCO2eq in 2025, which is considerably lower than the 3.0 million tCO2eq in 
Figure 5.5, but still very rapid growth.80
 
Figure 5.5 compares the projected emissions of greenhouse gases with 
the policy targets.81 Current policy is clearly insufficient to meet the current 
aspirations – even if we assume that the proposed carbon tax will become 
reality. The gap between targets and projections grows if one considers the 
emissions trade balance. Although a substantial share of Irish greenhouse 
gas emissions is generated for export, a larger amount of carbon dioxide is 
emitted abroad to satisfy the import needs of Irish consumers and 
businesses. Even the decline in CO2 emissions is partly due to the import 
of fossil-based electricity from the UK. 
 
Figure 5.6 shows total emissions of sulphur dioxide. Power generation 
used to be the dominant source, but changes in the fuel mix and technical 
interventions have led to substantial emission reduction. Other sectors emit 
much less, but emission reduction has been more gradual. We expect that 
Ireland will meet its 2010 target (42 thousand tonnes of SO2) by 2014. 
Figure 5.5: Greenhouse Gas Emissions by Type 
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80 Expressing emissions in terms of CO2eq is convenient, since it refers to the combination 
of all greenhouse gases, e.g. carbon dioxide, methane, halocarbons. 
81  We assumed -3 per cent per year for the current legislative period. For 2020, the target 
is 80 per cent of 2005 emissions, while for 2025 we assumed a 75 per cent target. Between 
2012 and 2020, we used a linear interpolation. 
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Figure 5.6: Sulphur Dioxide Emissions by Sector 
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Table 5.8 summarises the trends for all emissions to air included in the 
ISus model. Greenhouse gas emissions (least improvement) and sulphur 
dioxide (most improvement) emissions span the range. Ammonia 
emissions are projected to fall gradually, which should ease problems of 
eutrophication. Ireland has been in compliance with its 2010 ammonia 
target (116 thousand tonnes of NH3) since 2003. Emissions of oxides of 
nitrogen, carbon monoxide and volatile organic compounds (VOCs) also 
fall gradually, which should improve the quality of air in the cities and 
towns. The 2010 target for VOCs (55 thousand tonnes) will probably be 
met by 2009 already. Emissions of nitrogen oxides (NOx) fall more rapidly 
at first because of the scrubbers being installed at Moneypoint. However, 
emissions only fall to 102 thousand tons of NOx in 2025, substantially in 
excess of the 2010 target of 65 thousand tonnes. 
Table 5.8: Average Growth Rates of Emissions to Air and their 2005 
Levels 
   
  Average Annual Growth Rates 
 2005 1990- 1996- 2001- 2006- 2011- 2016- 2021-
kTonnes 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015 2020 2025
GNP  4.3 8.6 4.4 4.1 3.8 3.5 3.0 
Greenhouse gases 70,269 1.3 3.1 0.4 0.0 0.1 1.0 0.5 
Sulphur dioxide 71 -2.6 -3.1 -12.4 -7.5 -3.1 -2.9 -3.2 
Nitrogen oxides 124 0.2 1.6 -1.8 -2.6 -0.6 -0.2 -0.5 
Carbon monoxide 183 -5.4 -4.5 -5.5 -1.3 -0.9 -0.3 -0.4 
Volatile organic compounds 46 -1.0 -5.7 -6.7 -1.9 -1.3 -0.7 -0.8 
Ammonia 113 n/a 0.5 -1.6 -0.4 -0.2 -0.2 -0.2 
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 Solid waste includes a wide range of materials with varying physical and 
economic characteristics. We group these materials into three broad types: 5.6  Waste  
• Hazardous waste, which includes materials classified by regulators 
as having a significant potential to harm human health or the 
environment if not managed appropriately; 
• Biodegradable municipal waste (BMW), another regulatory category 
that includes waste materials from the household and services 
sectors that are prone to biodegrade over time, releasing 
environmentally-harmful or noxious decay products; and 
• Other waste, which includes both biologically inert and 
biodegradable materials that are not classified as hazardous waste or 
BMW. 
 
Because the environmental and economic effects of solid waste may be 
significantly different depending upon how the material is managed, we 
further divide the waste categories by disposition, including whether it was 
sent to landfill, recycled,82 incinerated or where the disposition is not 
known. Available sources of data do not include much information on the 
reuse of materials, although this is another potentially important 
disposition. 
 
There is as yet little published research into the socio-economic 
determinants of solid waste generation and disposition in Ireland.83 Time 
series analysis is generally not possible for these emissions, because detailed 
sector-level data has only recently become available through the EPA’s 
National Waste Reports.84 As a consequence, when forecasting waste flows 
we rely mainly on estimates of behavioural parameters drawn from 
microeconomic analyses. 
 
The quantity of hazardous waste generated in Ireland is dominated by 
the construction sector, in the form of contaminated soil, and the chemical 
production sector (see Table 5.9). As of 2006, over 78,000 tonnes was not 
attributed to any sector. The fall off in construction activity noted in 
Chapter 4 and, in particular, the recent decline in residential housing 
construction, are expected to lead to a significant reduction in hazardous 
waste emissions of 4.5 per cent per annum on average for the 2006-10 
period. This is a very considerable change from the trend in recent years: 
hazardous construction waste grew 84 per cent between 2004 and 2006. 
Emissions from chemical production, driven by modest growth in 
manufacturing, are projected to grow at an annualised rate of 5.9 per cent 
over the same period. However, we expect hazardous waste from chemical 
production and other manufacturing sectors to grow at a lower rate 
thereafter. We project that total hazardous waste emissions will rise 
gradually over the period of this review. Of course, this rise may or may 
 
82 The recycled category includes other forms of waste recovery such as ‘reuse as fuel’. 
83 Contributions include O’Callaghan-Platt and Davies (2007), Scott and Watson (2007) 
and Barrett and Lawlor (1995). 
84 Fully disaggregated data for most emissions is available only for 2001, 2004 and 2006.  
Also, the coverage and quality of data collected improved over this period, making 
comparisons between historical years difficult. 
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not represent an increase in the potential environmental effects from 
hazardous waste, since hazardous wastes vary in toxicity and the mix of 
materials within the total may change over time. 
Table 5.9: Hazardous Waste Quantities and Projected Growth Rates by Sector 
   
  2006 Average Annual Growth Rates  
  Tonnes 2007- 2011- 2016- 2021- 
  2010 2015 2020 2025 
Agriculture, fishing, forestry 22,923 -0.4 -0.3 -0.3 -0.4 
Coal, peat, petroleum, metal ores, quarrying 9,929 1.2 2.0 2.0 2.0 
Food, beverage, tobacco 2,482 2.9 2.0 2.0 2.0 
Textiles Clothing Leather & Footwear 1,343 1.2 2.0 2.0 2.0 
Wood & wood products 420 1.2 2.0 2.0 2.0 
Pulp, paper & print production 17,152 1.2 2.0 2.0 2.0 
Chemical production 168,179 5.9 3.2 3.1 1.7 
Rubber & plastic production 1,866 1.2 2.0 2.0 2.0 
Non-metallic mineral production 21,156 -2.8 0.8 1.9 1.0 
Metal prod. excl. machinery & transport equip. 19,302 5.9 3.2 3.1 1.7 
Agriculture & industrial machinery 1,964 5.9 3.2 3.1 1.7 
Office and data process machines 1,313 5.9 3.2 3.1 1.7 
Electrical goods 10,447 5.9 3.2 3.1 1.7 
Transport equipment 1,333 5.9 3.2 3.1 1.7 
Other manufacturing 1,687 1.2 2.0 2.0 2.0 
Fuel, power, water 13,426 6.9 1.3 1.3 1.0 
Construction 406,905 -4.5 0.3 0.5 -0.9 
Services (excl. Transport) 501 4.6 4.4 3.7 3.0 
Transport 2,539 n/a n/a n/a n/a 
Residential 10,251 3.4 4.0 3.7 4.0 
Sub-Total 715,117 -0.4 1.5 1.7 0.6 
Not attributed to any sector 7,8491 n/a n/a n/a n/a 
Total 793,608 -0.4 1.4 1.6 0.5 
      
 
 
Biodegradable Municipal Waste (BMW) is projected to continue 
growing as the number of households and level of real incomes in Ireland 
rise (Table 5.10). These factors are expected to more than offset the 
negative impact of a projected fall in the number of persons per household. 
Table 5.10: Biodegradable Municipal Waste (BMW) Quantities and 
Projected Growth Rates by Sector 
   
 2006 Average Annual Growth Rates 
 Tonnes 2007- 2011- 2016- 2021- 
  2010 2015 2020 2025 
Services (excl. Transport) 1,080,478 4.6 4.4 3.7 3.0 
Residential 1,199,072 3.4 4.0 3.7 4.0 
Total 2,279,550 4.0 4.2 3.7 3.5 
      
 
The broadly similar sector shares apparent in BMW generation contrast 
with the very different patterns of disposition exhibited by services and the 
residential sector. While about 43 per cent of services sector waste was sent 
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to landfill in 2006, almost 80 per cent of residential BMW went to landfill. 
Unless there is a substantial shift to recycling85 or large-scale use of 
incineration, it is unlikely that Ireland’s targets for diverting BMW from 
landfill will be met. Figure 5.7 illustrates the baseline development of 
disposition over time, assuming that planned incinerators at Carranstown 
and Poolbeg are brought into service in 2010 and 2013, respectively, and 
that no changes are made to the relative prices or availability of disposition 
options. Landfill charges have been falling and may well fall further. On 
current trends, it is not inconceivable that landfill will become cheaper than 
incineration. EU targets require Ireland to reduce landfilled waste as a 
proportion of total BMW to 967,433 tonnes in 2010; 644,956 tonnes in 
2013 and 451,463 tonnes in 2016.86
Figure 5.7: Projected Biodegradable Municipal Waste by Disposition 
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The largest sectoral contributors to other (non-BMW, non-hazardous) 
waste are agriculture, construction, mining and quarrying, food production 
and metal production (see Table 5.11). Agricultural organic waste is no 
longer classified as “waste” for regulatory purposes, but we report it here 
because it may have significant effects on the environment if not managed 
properly. However, we also report the total for this category with 
agricultural waste excluded for comparability with official statistics. We 
expect this emission category to undergo a contraction in the short term 
due to the slowdown in construction, which is driven by the slowdown in 
residential housing construction (see Figure 5.8).  However, we project that 
emissions will exhibit slow positive growth in the medium term. 
 
 
 
 
 
85e.g. through changes in collection arrangements or widespread adoption of mechanical-
biological treatment, perhaps supported by charges and other incentives for separation at 
source. 
86 National Waste Report, 2006, Table 15. 
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Table 5.11: Other (Non-BMW, Non-Hazardous) Waste Quantities and Projected 
Growth Rates, by Sector 
   
 2006 Average Annual Growth Rates
 Tonnes 2007- 2011- 2016- 2021-
  2010 2015 2020 2025 
Agriculture, fishing, forestry 59,382,027* -0.4 -0.3 -0.3 -0.4 
Coal, peat, petroleum, metal ores, quarrying 4,782,614 1.2 2.0 2.0 2.0 
Food, beverage, tobacco 1,737,955 2.9 2.0 2.0 2.0 
Textiles Clothing Leather & Footwear 10,547 1.2 2.0 2.0 2.0 
Wood & wood products 245,819 1.2 2.0 2.0 2.0 
Pulp, paper & print production 146,208 1.2 2.0 2.0 2.0 
Chemical production 175,412 5.9 3.2 3.1 1.7 
Rubber & plastic production 22,652 1.2 2.0 2.0 2.0 
Non-metallic mineral production 84,216 -2.8 0.8 1.9 1.0 
Metal prod. excl. machinery & transport equip. 1,242,469 5.9 3.2 3.1 1.7 
Agriculture & industrial machinery 40,069 5.9 3.2 3.1 1.7 
Office and data process machines 23,436 5.9 3.2 3.1 1.7 
Electrical goods 53,674 5.9 3.2 3.1 1.7 
Transport equipment 12,031 5.9 3.2 3.1 1.7 
Other manufacturing 24,223 1.2 2.0 2.0 2.0 
Fuel, power, water 333,341 6.9 1.3 1.3 1.0 
Construction 16,824,257 -4.5 0.3 0.5 -0.9 
Services (excl. transport) 445,708 4.6 4.4 3.7 3.0 
Transport 744,136 n/a n/a n/a n/a 
Residential 833,294 3.4 4.0 3.7 4.0 
Total 87,164,088 -0.8 0.2 0.2 0.0 
Total excluding Agriculture, fishing, forestry 27,782,061 -1.5 1.3 1.4 0.6 
      
*2004 estimates. 
Figure 5.8: Projected Construction Waste (Non-BMW, Non-hazardous) 
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 Over the last fifteen years, there has been a substantial decoupling 
between the growth of the Irish economy and the pressure it exerts on the 
environment. Ireland was one of the least carbon-efficient economies in 
the EU in 1990 (as measured by the amount of carbon dioxide emitted per 
euro value added), but got close to the EU-15 average in 2005. The 
scenario presented in this chapter shows a further decoupling between 
economic growth, energy use, emissions to air, and waste. In some cases – 
sulphur dioxide, other air pollution, ammonia, hazardous waste, other 
waste, and carbon dioxide from electricity – there is even a reduction of 
environmental pressure. However, these trends are not necessarily 
sufficient to meet the stated targets of environmental policy. In our 
Benchmark forecast carbon dioxide emissions are about 30 per cent higher 
than the target for 2020, as seen in Figure 5.6. For sulphur dioxide, it 
appears that the policy target will be met some four years later than 
planned. For oxides of nitrogen, it will be very difficult to meet the target 
without a major shift in policy. 
5.7 
Conclusions 
 
In the areas of biodegradable municipal waste and climate change – 
perhaps the most significant environmental issues in Ireland – the trends 
are in the opposite direction of the declared policy targets, even though the 
Benchmark forecast assumes an acceleration of policy implementation. 
 
For energy and climate, the projected price level in the EU Emissions 
Trading System (ETS) is high enough to drive peat out of the electricity 
market. The current regulatory regime will lead to a further expansion of 
wind power, while enhanced interconnection with Great Britain will secure 
the supply of electricity. All this implies that carbon dioxide emissions from 
power generation will fall between now and 2020. Ireland will also easily 
meet the EU renewables target in power generation. 
 
We assume that the carbon tax will equal the price of carbon dioxide 
emission permits. Such a tax would be cost-effective (in the sense that the 
costs of emission reduction are minimised) and fair (in the sense that every 
sector pays the same per tonne of CO2). The assumed carbon tax, however, 
would not be high enough to induce substantial changes in emissions in the 
medium term – be it from transport, households, or industry not covered 
by the ETS. In some cases, the assumed carbon tax is not high enough to 
induce a shift in behaviour, and in other cases there are no practical 
alternatives or existing infrastructure precludes a change in behaviour. For 
instance, the boom in construction of recent years means that a large part 
of the energy requirements of households are, literally, set in stone. The 
investment in, and reform of, mass transit for commuting required to 
reduce transport emissions to the desired levels far exceed the investments 
and reforms that are currently planned and discussed. Hybrid cars are 
expensive and will only serve a small market niche. A substantial reduction 
of CO2 emissions from transport by 2020 therefore requires a massive shift 
towards cycling and walking. Even if substantial emission reduction is very 
costly or even infeasible in the medium term, it is much easier in the long 
term. However, a long-term transition to a carbon-neutral economy 
requires a considerable period of preparation, particularly with regard to the 
development of new technologies for energy and transport. A small but 
rising carbon tax, as assumed in the Benchmark forecast, may not have much 
of an effect in the 2020 time frame, but it does signal to industry that it is 
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worthwhile to invest in current carbon-saving technologies and in R&D to 
improve such technologies. 
 
For biodegradable municipal waste, there is a similar discrepancy 
between the stated ambitions of government and the actual policies in 
place. The amount of waste arising will continue to grow as the population 
grows and gets richer. Although the share of waste that is recycled will 
grow, the amount of waste destined for disposal (via incineration or 
landfill) will grow too. Specifically, the current planned infrastructure for 
recovery and incineration of biodegradable municipal waste appears to be 
insufficient to reduce landfill by the amount required to reach EU and 
national targets – and there is no guarantee that the incineration capacity 
will be used in full. 
 
In sum, although there have been marked improvements in the 
pressures that the economy exerts on the environment, and although we 
expect that the rate of progress in environmental protection will accelerate, 
there will remain a substantial gap between the ambitions of policymakers 
and reality – particularly in climate change and waste. 
6. ALTERNATIVE 
SCENARIOS 
The Benchmark forecast presented in Chapter 4 represents our best 
estimate of the likely course of the Irish economy over the next decade. 
This, in turn, is based on a detailed set of assumptions about the world 
economy, demographics, and the likely future policies pursued by the 
government over this period, as outlined in Chapter 3.  
6.1 
Introduction 
 
As with any set of forecasts, there is a margin of error surrounding these 
numbers, particularly the forecasts for individual years. As discussed in 
Appendix 1, past experience can provide some guidance as to the possible 
margin of error in the future. For the last ten Reviews the average absolute 
error in the estimate of the growth in GNP over the forecast horizon was 
around 1 percentage point, with a somewhat smaller error for the most 
recent five Reviews. Based on this past experience with our forecasts, we 
explore two scenarios which might provide an upper and a lower bound to 
the range of possible outcomes for growth in GNP over the next five or 
ten years. The first, the high growth scenario, envisages growth in GNP 
around 0.7 per cent above the Benchmark, and the low growth scenario 
examines what would happen if growth were on average around 0.7 per 
cent below the Benchmark.  
 
As outlined above, growth in GNP is driven by a range of factors, in 
particular by developments in the global economy and domestic 
competitiveness. The make up of the different forces driving the economy 
will, in turn, affect the composition of the growth and its broader 
economic impact. Thus, in examining possible alternative growth paths it is 
essential to develop full scenarios that explain why the economy would 
behave differently from the Benchmark forecast. This characterisation of the 
alternative scenarios will determine their wider economic effects.  
 
In the first two sections of this chapter we discuss two scenarios that 
depart from the Benchmark forecast in important ways. In Section 6.2 of this 
chapter we examine a stylised low-growth scenario: this describes a 
situation where the Irish economy grows significantly below potential over 
the medium term, due to excessive domestic cost increases. This scenario 
describes a “wasted opportunity”. Our second scenario, described in 
Section 6.3, examines the possibility that the economy could grow faster 
over the medium term than anticipated in our Benchmark. Here we examine 
a scenario where the economy is more competitive than we have assumed 
in the Benchmark. The consequences of these shocks for Ireland’s carbon 
dioxide emissions are outlined in Box 6.1. 
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Table 6.1 contrasts the growth in key macroeconomic aggregates under 
these two scenarios. Over the forecast period 2010-2025, average annual 
growth in GNP is over 4 per cent under the higher growth scenario and the 
unemployment rate averages 4.1 per cent over the period. The higher 
growth leads to higher demand for labour and an inflow of migrants 
averaging 17,000 per annum.  
Table 6.1: Overview of Two Scenarios: Impact on Key Aggregates 
     
Average Annual Growth Rate: 2010-15 2015-20 2020-25 2010-25 
Higher Potential Growth Scenario     
GNP 4.3 4.2 3.8 4.1 
Average Non-Agricultural Earnings 4.3 4.5 5.3 4.7 
Employment, April 1.5 1.5 1.3 1.4 
Wasted Opportunity Scenario     
GNP 3.0 2.8 2.3 2.7 
Average Non-Agricultural Earnings 4.9 5.3 6.2 5.5 
Employment, April 0.7 0.6 0.4 0.6 
For End Year: 2015 2020 2025 2010-25 
Average 
Higher Potential Growth Scenario     
Net Immigration 18.6 18.1 18.7 16.7 
Unemployment rate, ILO Basis % 4.6 3.1 2.0 4.1 
Wasted Opportunity Scenario     
Net Immigration -11.6 -11.3 -11.4 -9.6 
Unemployment rate, ILO Basis % 6.7 6.7 7.2 7.0 
     
 
Under the wasted opportunity scenario, average growth is just 2.7 per 
cent and the average unemployment rate is 7 per cent. Higher domestic 
cost increases reduce the demand for labour in this scenario, with net 
emigration flows per year just under 10,000 on average over the forecast 
period. 
 
Both of these scenarios concentrate on uncertainties surrounding our 
assumptions on competitiveness. The effects of the different assumptions 
on competitiveness on the future growth path of the economy is 
summarised in Figure 6.1. If we accept GNP per capita as a measure, albeit 
a proximate one, of living standards, then our Benchmark forecast implies 
real growth in living standards of over 45 per cent out to 2025. Under the 
wasted opportunity scenario this falls to less than 33 per cent, while under 
the high growth scenario it exceeds 60 per cent.  
 
In addition to its vulnerability to differing outturns for domestic 
competitiveness, the Irish economy is also exposed to external demand and 
supply shocks, as witnessed by the current slowdown in the economy. 
Section 6.4 looks at the likely consequences of a more prolonged world 
recession than we have assumed in the Benchmark forecast, consequent on 
the current credit crunch. This would knock almost 5 percentage points off 
the level of GNP by 2010 relative to the Benchmark and would cause a sharp 
further deterioration in the public finances.  
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Figure 6.1: Alternative Scenarios for Real GNP Per Head: 2009=100 
 
 
 
 
 
 The Benchmark forecast assumes that domestic policies will accommodate 
the objective of maintaining competitiveness over the medium term. To 
explore the sensitivity of Ireland’s growth prospects to these assumptions 
we examine the possible effects of a higher rate of wage and price inflation 
than in the Benchmark forecast. In addition, we assume a lower level of 
world demand for Irish produced goods and services, this assumption is 
designed to simulate a situation where the Irish economy loses comparative 
advantage relative to the Benchmark. Beginning in 2010, in this scenario a 
more rapid rise in wage rates in the public and private sector is assumed 
than in the Benchmark, so that wages are 10 per cent above the baseline by 
2025 (see Figure 6.2). Furthermore, we assume that world demand for Irish 
goods and services is 0.25 per cent per annum lower than in the baseline.  
Figure 6.2: Wasted Opportunity: Inflation and Wage Rates Compared to 
Benchmark 
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The growth in non-agricultural wage rates in the medium term at a rate 
well above that in the Benchmark would involve a serious loss of 
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competitiveness (Figure 6.2). In this scenario we have also assumed that in 
the face of a deterioration in the public finances the government would 
raise taxes to ensure that the borrowing requirement would be unchanged 
in the longer term compared to the Benchmark. These higher taxes would 
further increase pressures in the labour market, and further increase the 
loss of competitiveness. The increase in domestic cost inflation in this 
scenario would be domestically generated, thereby leading to a steady 
deterioration in Ireland’s competitiveness on world markets. 
 
Because of the increasingly export-oriented nature of services output, as 
discussed in Chapter 2, this competitiveness shock not only adversely 
affects the traded industrial sector, but also the market services sector. In 
both cases output is down almost 14 per cent relative to the Benchmark by 
2025 (Figure 6.3). This leads to a permanent reduction in the growth rate of 
the economy. In Figure 6.4 we show the impact on the level of GNP of the 
loss in competitiveness. On average the rate of growth would be 0.7 
percentage points lower per annum, leaving the level of real GNP over 10 
per cent below the Benchmark by 2025.  
Figure 6.3: Industrial and Market Services Output Compared to 
Benchmark 
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Table 6.2: Impact on Key Aggregates of Wasted Opportunity Scenario 
     
GDP 2010 2015 2020   2025 
 
Percentage change relative to the Benchmark 
GDP -0.6 -5.3 -8.8 -12.3 
GNP -0.9 -5.0 -7.7 -10.4 
Consumption -0.7 -5.9 -9.5 -13.1 
Total Investment -0.7 -5.1 -7.7 -10.2 
Labour Force 0.0 -1.4 -2.8 -4.2 
Total Employment -0.6 -3.5 -5.7 -7.7 
Consumption Deflator 1.2 1.9 2.4 2.9 
Non-Agricultural Wages 2.4 5.2 7.4 9.9 
New House Prices 0.9 -2.6 -5.0 -7.0 
Absolute change relative to the Benchmark 
Housing Completions -0.2 -3.8 -6.6 -8.1 
Balance of Payments 0.4 0.9 1.0 0.9 
Unemployment Rate 0.5 2.1 2.8 3.5 
Net Immigration -0.1 -3.4 -3.7 -3.6 
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Figure 6.4: GDP and GNP Compared to Benchmark 
 
The underperformance of the economy would seriously affect 
employment. By 2025 total employment would be almost 8 per cent below 
the Benchmark (Figure 6.5). The result would be that the unemployment rate 
by 2025 would be 3.5 percentage points above the Benchmark. This rise 
would occur in spite of a reduction in the labour force through lower 
participation rates and lower immigration. 
Figure 6.5: Employment and Labour Force Compared to Benchmark 
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Faced with this very unfavourable situation, we assume that the 
government would hold the borrowing requirement unchanged by raising 
the personal income tax rate.87 The position of the public finances would 
be further aggravated by the rise in unemployment transfers, and lower 
levels of employment, which reduce revenue. To keep the budget balance 
at the Benchmark level would require an increase of 12 percentage points in 
 
87 This balancing of the books could be effected through raising other taxes or cutting 
current expenditure. The choice of labour taxes is made here to simplify the modelling 
exercise, not because it would necessarily be the wisest choice of instrument. 
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the average personal tax rate by 2025. This is a stylised assumption; in 
practice current expenditure would also need to be cut to balance the 
budget as reliance on tax measures alone would be clearly unsustainable. 
 
This scenario shows that the Irish economy is highly sensitive to its 
international competitive position. Higher domestic costs, together with a 
failure to capture market share in international markets, could put the Irish 
economy onto a lower growth trajectory. This would not only affect 
income measured in terms of GNP; lower employment, higher 
unemployment and higher emigration would constitute an expensive loss to 
society as a whole, which would take time to reverse.  
 
 Given the current slowdown in the Irish economy, it may well seem 
overly optimistic to consider a scenario of higher potential growth. 
Nevertheless, the Irish economy, over the past 15 years, has more often 
than not exceeded forecasts of its medium-term growth path. With this in 
mind it is important to explore the possibility that the estimate of the 
potential growth of the economy underlying the Benchmark forecast is too 
low. Here we describe the results of a simulation where the economy turns 
out to be more competitive than assumed in the Benchmark. This scenario is 
captured in the simulation by a higher level of world demand – assumed to 
be one quarter of a percentage point higher each year. 
6.3  
Higher 
Potential 
Growth 
Table 6.3: Impact on Key Aggregates of Higher Potential Growth Scenario 
     
  2010  2015  2020 2025 
Percentage change relative to the Benchmark    
GDP 0.2 1.9 5.6 10.1 
GNP 0.1 2.1 5.9 10.3 
Consumption -0.5 1.5 6.1 11.8 
Total Investment -0.3 1.2 4.2 7.8 
Labour Force 0.0 0.8 2.0 3.4 
Total Employment 0.1 1.0 3.0 5.5 
Consumption Deflator 0.2 0.2 -0.2 -0.6 
Non-Agricultural Wages 0.9 0.8 -0.9 -2.6 
New House Prices 0.1 2.7 6.0 9.2 
Absolute change relative to the Benchmark    
Housing Completions -0.2 -0.3 1.9 4.5 
Balance of Payments 0.5 0.7 0.6 0.5 
Unemployment Rate -0.1 -0.2 -0.9 -2.0 
Exchequer Borrowing Requirement -0.1 -0.6 -0.7 -0.7 
Net Immigration 0.2 3.6 3.1 3.7 
     
 
Such a higher-growth path implies higher productivity growth (with the 
level of productivity being 4.6 per cent higher than the Benchmark by 2025) 
and higher net immigration than assumed in the Benchmark. As shown in 
Figure 6.6, net immigration would have to average 4,000 a year above that 
in the Benchmark. In addition, this immigration would have to be 
predominantly skilled labour if the realised rate of productivity growth in 
the Benchmark were to rise.  
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Figure 6.6: Higher Potential: Net Immigration Compared to Benchmark 
 
In this scenario we assume that the investment in public infrastructure 
will be adequate to cope with the higher level of activity and the higher 
population. If this were not the case the direct effects of congestion, and its 
indirect effects via the labour market, could prevent this scenario from 
being fully realised.  
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Figure 6.7 shows the level of GNP rising steadily compared to the 
Benchmark. The additional growth in GNP would amount to around 0.7 
percentage points a year, with GNP per head up by just over 0.6 per cent 
by 2025 relative to the Benchmark. This would leave overall economic 
welfare, measured by GNP per head, higher as a result of the higher skilled 
immigration and higher productivity growth. However, in order to assess 
the full impact a positive scenario like this one would need to take account 
of the impact of higher growth on congestion and the environment (see 
Chapter 5). Additional investment would be required to deal with these 
problems, which is not taken account of here. 
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Figure 6.8: Higher Potential: Employment Compared to Benchmark 
 
Under this scenario, the level of employment would also rise more 
rapidly over the course of the decade (Figure 6.8). By 2025 it would be 
almost 6 per cent above the Benchmark. Higher net immigration and higher 
labour force participation would raise the labour force to 3.5 per cent 
above the Benchmark, so that there would also be a further fall in the 
unemployment rate of 2 percentage points by 2025. 
Figure 6.9: Higher Potential: Inflation and Wages Compared to 
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The improved competitive position is illustrated in Figure 6.9. The 
higher growth and employment levels would leave consumer prices slightly 
lower, while non-agricultural wage rates would be 2.5 percentage points 
lower by 2025 reflecting the assumption of increased competitiveness. 
However, this would not constitute a loss in real income for workers; the 
real after tax non-agricultural wage rate in this scenario would be more than 
5.5 percentage points higher than in the Benchmark by 2025. This would be 
partly due to the fact that the higher level of economic activity would allow 
for a reduction in average tax rates, and it would also be partly attributable 
to the lower rate of inflation. 
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Box 6.1: CO2 Forecast 
Chapter 5 discusses the carbon dioxide emissions associated with the 
Benchmark forecast in considerable detail. One would expect that faster 
economic growth would lead to higher emissions, and slower economic 
growth would mean lower emissions. At the same time, economic growth, 
energy use, and carbon dioxide emissions are decoupled to a certain extent 
– and one cannot say that 1 per cent faster economic growth implies 1 per 
cent faster growth of emissions. Figure 6.1.1, therefore, shows the carbon 
dioxide emissions for the Benchmark forecast, the High Growth scenario, 
and the Low Growth scenario. While CO2 emissions grow on average by 
0.7 per cent per year between 2005 and 2025, the growth rate increases to 
1.1 per cent in the High Growth scenario and falls to 0.2 per cent in the 
Low Growth scenario.88 This is further evidence of decoupling. The 
difference between economic growth in the alternative scenarios is roughly 
1 per cent, but the difference in emissions growth between the Low 
Growth and the Benchmark forecast is 0.5 per cent, and between the 
Benchmark and High Growth scenario only 0.4 per cent. 
 One of the results of the Benchmark forecast is that Ireland will not 
meet its targets for greenhouse gas emission reduction, even though a 
carbon tax is imposed. In the High Growth scenario, the gap between the 
projected emissions and the target is even larger. In the Low Growth 
scenario, emissions grow for a number of years and then plateau  – even 
though the stated aim is to reduce emissions. 
Figure 6.1.1: Carbon Dioxide Emissions for Alternative Scenarios 
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 In the last Medium-Term Review we examined the impact on the Irish 
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see
substantial degree of uncertainty surrounding the likely length and depth of 
this slowdown. Our Benchmark forecast is based on the assumption that the 
onomy of a sharp slowdown in the US economy beginning in 2007. It 
ms that this slowdown is currently underway. However, there remains a 
 
6.4 
Credit 
nch Cru
88 Note that emissions fall by 0.1 per cent per year in the Low Scenario between 2007 and 
2025. Emissions increase by 2.7 per cent per year between 2005 and 2007. Although the 
economic scenarios start to separate after 2009, we report CO2 emissions relative to 2005 
because that is the year against which emission targets are defined. 
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effects of the current credit squeeze are short lived and that growth in the 
US, UK and Euro Area revert to rates close to trend by 2010/2011. 
 
In this shock, we consider the impact of a more severe slowdown in 
utput. The scenario we consider is one in which risks on financial assets 
ha
 of this scenario 
would be quite large. In the short term, investment would fall dramatically 
be
o
ve effectively been underpriced and risk premia rise in the US, the UK 
and to a lesser extent in the Euro Area. The consequence of this change in 
the financial environment is that interest rates for borrowers are much 
higher than would be normal given the current official rate of interest, and 
banks may implement credit rationing as they hoard liquidity. This 
combination of events is difficult to model directly. We have implemented 
this using the NiGEM model by raising technical risk premia. This drives a 
wedge between deposit and loan rates and also affects the risk of investing 
in equities and physical assets. These increased risk premia are maintained 
until the end of 2010. This would represent a severe shock to the 
international economy and is not meant as a forecast of things to come. 
This scenario probes the potential impact of a severe credit crunch in the 
international economy and its possible impact on Ireland. 
 
The effects on output in the US, UK and Euro Area
low base as a result of the credit crunch, and consumption would also be 
adversely affected. The impact of the shock would put downwards pressure 
on the price level. The main Central Banks are assumed to react to the 
shock by cutting interest rates. As the effects of the credit crunch would be 
larger in the US and the UK, the Federal Reserve and UK Monetary Policy 
Committee would react aggressively to the shock and cut interest rates to 
below 1 per cent in the short term. The cut in Euro Area interest rates 
would be less dramatic: interest rates are assumed to be cut to around 2.5 
per cent.  
Table 6.4: International Shock Versus Baseline 
   
Interest Rates, %    
Euro Area Short  -0.5 -1.5 -1.4 
 2008 2009 2010 
UK Short -0.1 -2.1 -4.3 
US Short -1.0 -0.9 -1.5 
Japan Short -0.1 -0.2 -0.8 
Growth Rate of GDP    
  Germany  -0.7 -1.7 -1.2 
  UK -0.4 -1.2 -1.3 
  USA  -1.3 -3.8 -2.0 
OECD -1.0 -0.3 -1.0 
    
 
The implications of this deflationary shock for the Irish economy would 
be very significant, testament to our heavy exposure to the world economy, 
and in particular to events in the US. In Table 6.5 we present the likely 
impact of the shock on some key economic aggregates. The effect of this 
credit crunch scenario on the short-term performance of the economy is 
stark. The economy would move into recession in 2009, with GNP and 
employment both falling. Despite emigration this decline in activity would 
lead to a sharp rise in the unemployment rate, peaking at 9 per cent in 
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2010. The deflationary effect of the shock would show up in very low 
growth in non-agricultural wages: in 2010 wages would rise by as little as 
1.4 per cent, with a larger rise in the consumption deflator of 1.9 per cent. 
This would result in a fall in real wages. Such a shock would also impact on 
the growth in new house prices, over the three years 2008-2010 new house 
price levels would be 5 per cent lower than in the Benchmark.  
 
The decline in real wages implies a level of flexibility in the labour 
market in the advent of a severe external shock. However, this measure of 
flexibility would not be nearly enough to reverse the negative impact on the 
labour market over the short to medium term.  
Table 6.5: Credit Crunch Shock Simulation Results 
     
Annual Growth Rates 2008 2009  2010  2011 
GDP 0.7 -0.6 2.9 4.7 
GNP 0.8 -0.3 3.9 5.5 
Consumption  2.4 1.1 0.5 0.9 
Total Investment -7.4 -2.4 3.4 -2.9 
Labour Force 1.9 1.6 1.2 1.2 
Total Employment -0.6 -0.4 0.1 1.7 
Consumption Deflator 1.8 1.2 1.9 1.9 
Non-Agricultural Wages 3.7 2.2 1.4 1.8 
New House Prices -0.2 1.5 0.8 0.7 
Level         
Balance of Payments, % of GNP -5.5 -7.0 -8.8 -6.8 
Unemployment Rate 6.5 8.0 9.0 8.6 
Exchequer Borrowing Requirement, % of GNP -3.6 -6.0 -5.9 -5.9 
Debt-GNP Ratio 20.7 22.0 27.1 31.6 
     
 
Arguably, however, the most dramatic effect of this shock would be its 
effect on the public finances. In this simulation we held tax and 
expenditure levels roughly unchanged in order to assess the likely 
 short term in nature. Beyond 2011 once the 
redit crunch squeeze would have ended, the Irish economy would recover 
rap
or the medium term from this shock is that even in the face 
of a serious downturn in the economy, if managed appropriately, there 
ne
consequences for the budget of such a shock. Looking at Table 6.5 it can 
be seen that the impact on the exchequer borrowing requirement after 
three years is a deficit of 6 per cent of GNP, while the debt-GNP ratio is 6 
percentage points higher than in the Benchmark. This would clearly be 
unsustainable, possibly requiring remedial action when the economy was 
already in serious difficulties. 
 
As presented, this shock is
c
idly and return relatively quickly to its medium-term growth trajectory 
described in the Benchmark forecast. This rapid recovery is, in part, a result 
of the boost to economic activity from the sharp cut in international 
interest rates.  
 
The lesson f
ed not necessarily be serious long-term damage. The assumption, based 
on past experience, of considerable flexibility in the labour market is an 
important ingredient in this resilience. This flexibility has been manifested 
in recent years both when the labour market was tight (increasing wage 
inflation) and when it was somewhat slacker (a fall in the rate of wage 
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inflation in some sectors in 2001 and 2002). However, the size of this 
shock would take the labour market into uncharted waters and the low 
rates of wage increase necessary to bring about rapid recovery might not be 
realised. 
 
 Given the uncertainty that surrounds any forecasting exercise it is always 
se to rely on a single projection for the future. Following on from the 
ely consequences of a 
deterioration in our competitiveness The results suggest that there are 
sig
he possibility that Ireland will be 
more competitive over the medium term than is assumed in the Benchmark. 
Th
the world economy could be sharper and deeper than in the Benchmark.  
Th
apter, which illustrates the uncertainty inherent in 
medium-term forecasts, highlights the importance of choosing robust 
po
6.5 unwi
Benchmark forecast presented in Chapter 4, in this chapter we explore a 
number of different scenarios that could alter the future course of the 
economy over the medium term. The first two scenarios concentrate on 
competitiveness on world markets, while the third looks at Ireland’s 
vulnerability to a very sharp credit crunch shock. 
 
In the first scenario we examine the lik
Conclusions 
. 
nificant downside risks over the medium term if policy does not focus 
on promoting competitiveness, broadly defined, on world markets; growth 
and employment could fall significantly.  
 
In the second scenario we consider t
is simulation suggests that GNP could grow at 0.7 per cent per year 
above the Benchmark growth rate under these circumstances. However, it 
would require higher levels of migration than in the Benchmark forecast, 
with some consequences for congestion. Nonetheless, if policies could be 
found to bring about a higher rate of productivity growth than in the 
Benchmark scenario this could have a significant beneficial impact on the 
living standards of all of the population. 
 
Our third scenario looks at the possibility that the current slowdown in 
is scenario suggests that a severe liquidity crisis in the US could lead to a 
recession in the US, with substantial negative consequences for the Irish 
and EU economies over the three-year horizon considered here. Rapid 
deflation in this scenario, combined with much lower world demand, 
would lead to much lower output and employment than in the Benchmark 
forecast, despite significantly lower rates of wage and price inflation. There 
would be severe problems making the public finances add up in the face of 
a mushrooming deficit.  
 
The analysis in this ch
licies, which will be suitable whatever the likely outcome. In the light of 
the current substantial infrastructural deficit, delivering the major increase 
in investment that is needed to allow the economy to achieve its potential 
growth rate over the next decade continues to be appropriate. Public policy 
also needs to focus on restoring the broad competitiveness of the 
economy. This entails attention to micro-economic issues to ensure the 
efficient operation in markets, including the market for public goods. It 
also means that fiscal policy needs to preserve a focus on medium-term 
sustainability. 
  
 
7. CONCLUSIONS 
 
 The main purpose of ESRI Medium-Term Reviews is to look five to seven 
years ahead, providing some insights into the factors that will drive the 
economy over that period. This Review continues that tradition and 
concentrates the bulk of its analysis on the prospects for the economy out 
to 2015 and beyond, rather than concentrating on the immediate problems 
of the economy. A major conclusion of this Review is that, despite the 
temporary difficulties the Irish economy currently faces, the medium-term 
prospects remain bright. 
7.1 
Introduction 
 
It is likely that Ireland’s standard of living, which is already one of the 
highest in the EU and indeed the world, will show some further relative 
improvement in the coming decade. As the very substantial investment in 
infrastructure currently under way begins to come on stream, this too will 
enhance the quality of life for many residents. With the prospect of a return 
to full employment after the current difficulties, a gradual improvement in 
the quality of public services, and a substantial rise in the resources 
available for household consumption, the next decade should see relatively 
steady economic progress in terms of living standards. However, because 
of the immediacy of current problems there is always a danger that this 
prospect of a brighter future may be obscured or forgotten. Such a loss of 
focus could be damaging if the associated planning and structural changes 
needed to underpin these brighter medium-term prospects were to be 
neglected.  
 
Two and a half years ago, when we published the last Medium-Term 
Review, there was a sense of foreboding, with fears that pent up problems in 
both the Irish and the US economies could, at some future date, blight 
economic prospects. Since that Review was published in December 2005, 
some of those fears have been borne out by events. As a result, the Irish 
and the US economies have both entered on a period of below average 
growth in economic activity. To date the impact of this downturn on the 
Irish economy is less than might have been feared. In particular, the rate of 
unemployment in Ireland is well below what was anticipated in that Review 
in the scenario that incorporated a major fall in house prices. 
 
The housing market is currently undergoing serious adjustment. This is 
the unavoidable consequence of expectations about future capital gains 
running ahead of reality in the period 2004-2006 (OECD, 2006). While 
unfortunate, the timing of the current adjustment phase is not too 
unfavourable, having commenced against the backdrop of a buoyant Euro 
Area economy. Though the external environment has recently weakened, 
the adjustment process has been eased by continued strength in EU 
demand for our goods and services. This Review points to the need for a 
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large number of additional dwellings over the coming fifteen years to house 
the rapidly growing population. It is these special demographic 
circumstances that make Ireland different from most other EU countries, 
necessitating continued substantial investment in housing. 
 
It is difficult to predict exactly when the Irish and the US economies will 
recover from their current problems, and this Review does not attempt this 
task. The developments in the US financial system in Autumn 2007 have 
proved more long lasting and much more substantial than was initially 
anticipated. As a result, it remains possible that the current difficulties 
could persist longer than we envisage in the Benchmark forecast in Chapter 
4. With this in mind, in Chapter 6 we explore a scenario where the US 
recession is more severe than anticipated and where it impacts more on the 
EU economy than is assumed in the Benchmark forecast. Under these 
circumstances, the effects on the Irish economy could be more severe, 
pushing the economy, including the housing market, further down and 
delaying the eventual recovery by about one year. However, what is 
significant about this scenario is that it suggests that if the current problems 
last longer than anticipated, the eventual recovery will be all the more 
vigorous. The economy has the potential to grow at an average of 3.5 per 
cent a year over the coming decade and, provided that appropriate policies 
are implemented, this objective is attainable. 
 
On past experience our medium-term forecasts come with a margin of 
error on the average growth rate over the forecast time horizon. This 
margin is between three-quarters and one percentage point of GNP 
(Appendix 1). Also the last ten Reviews have tended towards the pessimistic 
side in terms of their forecasts, with underestimation of future growth 
being more frequent than overestimation. Chapter 6, therefore, explores 
two further scenarios where the economy grows by around 0.7 percentage 
points more and 0.7 percentage points less respectively than in the 
Benchmark forecast. This gives a range of possible outcomes and, in 
discussing future economic policies, we need to test the robustness of 
those policies against these alternative possible scenarios.  
 
The analysis underpinning the forecasting exercise involves a detailed 
examination of the domestic and foreign processes driving the economy. 
This analysis is as important as the numbers themselves in identifying key 
issues for economic policymakers. Section 7.2 of this chapter sets out the 
major conclusions on how the behaviour of the Irish economy is evolving. 
Section 7.3 summarises the main conclusions on the medium-term 
prospects for the Irish economy. Finally, in Section 7.4, we discuss some of 
the key policy implications of the analysis outlined in this Review. 
 
 The analysis in Chapter 2 examined the different channels through which 
world economic activity impacts on the Irish economy. In past decades 
manufacturing played a hugely important role in internationalising the 
economy and in helping bring about the convergence of living standards to 
the EU norm (Barry, 2002). While this analysis indicates that the 
manufacturing sector still remains very important to the economy, its role 
is now changing. Since 2001 output growth has slowed down and 
employment in the sector has been declining and this process is likely to 
continue in the forecast period. In the future, net expansion of 
7.2  
Changing 
Economic 
Behaviour 
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employment will only occur in the high-tech industries where the 
technology involves skilled workers in the production process. 
  
Commensurate with the changing role of manufacturing, the analysis in 
Chapter 2 shows that the business and financial services sector is in the 
process of becoming significantly more important as a channel through 
which world economic activity is transmitted to the Irish economy. It 
would appear that Ireland’s comparative advantage on world markets is 
shifting towards the production and export of business and financial 
services. This sector is among the most human-capital intensive in the 
economy. Many of the services produced by this sector also benefit from 
the fact that English is the language of the sector internationally. 
 
The move from manufacturing to business and financial services could 
be expected to have some negative effect on measured productivity, 
because statistical methodologies are not yet sufficiently developed to 
capture productivity changes in these services. However, even if there were 
to be a negative productivity effect, it is likely that it would be significantly 
offset by a terms of trade gain. The business and financial services sector 
seems to be able to increase exports and its market share in world trade 
without any negative impact on prices. This probably reflects a relative 
undersupply of skilled labour worldwide causing output prices of services 
with a high skill content to rise. As a result, Gross National Disposable 
Income (GNDI), a more appropriate measure of living standards than 
GDP or GNP, may rise more rapidly than GNP over the coming decade 
due to a reversal of the past trend loss in the terms of trade. 
 
The second major area where changes in behaviour are under way is the 
labour market. Whereas in the past there was a large potential supply of 
mobile Irish labour that moved backwards and forwards from the UK, the 
rest of the EU or even the US, the bulk of the mobile workers in Ireland 
today are foreigners. The variables that drive decisions on migration by 
foreigners are different from those that mattered to Irish migrants. For 
example, for Polish immigrants a key factor influencing their decision to 
come to Ireland is their potential earnings in Ireland relative to Poland 
whereas for previous generations of returning Irish emigrants it was their 
potential earnings in Ireland relative to the UK. The rapid growth of the 
economy in recent years also means that public and private infrastructure 
(housing in particular) is in short supply, raising the cost of living in Ireland 
for returning emigrants and new immigrants alike. This means that the 
more emigrants that come to Ireland in a particular year the higher will be 
the cost of housing which will, in turn, affect the numbers coming. This 
means that the bigger the increase in employment in a year, requiring more 
immigrants, the bigger will be the rise in wage rates. In effect, the supply 
curve of labour is now much less elastic than in the past, which affects the 
labour market in two important ways: 
 
First, any domestic stimulus to the economy, e.g. from fiscal policy, will 
tend to raise domestic wages and prices, crowding out the domestic 
tradable sector. This has been the experience of the economy in recent 
years, in contrast with earlier years, when there was an ample supply of 
mobile Irish labour and fewer infrastructure constraints. 
 
Second, it also shifts the incidence of labour taxation. In the past, most 
of the incidence was on employers. To the extent that they could not bear 
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the cost of increased labour taxes, they reduced output and employment. 
By contrast, today a significant part of any increase in labour taxation will 
fall on employees, having a more limited impact on competitiveness and 
employment than in the past. Obviously, the converse holds for cuts in 
taxation. 
 
A further effect of the change in labour supply behaviour is that the 
labour market seems to adjust to changes in demand for labour more 
rapidly than in the past. While in the 1970s and 1980s people were slow to 
move abroad (or move back), today they seem to relocate more readily 
when faced with strong incentives – e.g. unemployment. This helps explain 
why the current rise in unemployment, though significant, has not been as 
severe as anticipated in the last Review.  
 
The move from net emigration of Irish citizens to net immigration of 
foreigners not only changes the supply curve of labour; it also has wider 
implications for how the economy adjusts to shocks. Because many of the 
immigrants into Ireland are very well educated, immigration tended to 
narrow wage dispersion between 1997 and 2003 (Barrett, Fitz Gerald and 
Nolan, 2002). However, since then, while immigrants have still tended to 
be well educated, those from non-English speaking countries have been 
less successful in obtaining skilled jobs. This has probably contributed to 
some limited widening of wage dispersion since 2003 (Barrett and 
McCarthy, 2007). 
 
The potential effects of migration on productivity were discussed in 
Chapter 2. However, there is limited evidence to date on this issue. What 
evidence there is suggests that having a mobile and flexible labour force 
does enhance productivity (e.g. Barrett and O’Connell, 2001). Also, access 
to a work force with varied experience and backgrounds seems to be 
important for the business and financial sector. 
 
 In preparing our Benchmark forecast for the economy to 2015 we have 
incorporated a series of assumptions about the external environment, the 
stance of domestic economic policy and demographic trends. 
7.3 
Medium-
term 
Prospects 
 
The external scenario we are using is based on the January 2008 National 
Institute Economic Review89 supplemented by the IMF’s January 2008 forecast. 
It sees the US being technically in recession this year, with continuing low 
growth in 2009. However, it is expected to recover quite strongly in 2010. 
The EU economy follows a more muted path with continuing substantial 
growth this year and some slowdown thereafter. After a bounce back in 
2010, the major world economies are assumed to revert to their long-term 
growth path out to 2015 and beyond.90  
 
Domestic fiscal policy is assumed to be broadly neutral and, as a result, 
the substantial increase in the general government deficit in 2007/2008 will 
 
89Produced by the National Institute for Economic and Social Research (NIESR) in 
London. It is NIESR’s NiGEM model that is used in this Review to examine alternative 
scenarios on the external environment. 
90Because of the uncertainty inherent in any such forecast an alternative scenario is 
explored in Chapter 6 where the US and hence the world recovery is delayed. 
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be corrected gradually over the forecast period. The National Development 
Plan is assumed to continue as planned. Current government expenditure 
as a share of GNP is assumed to remain broadly unchanged out to 2015. 
This will see some improvement in public services in line with projected 
economic growth. As a first step to reducing Ireland’s greenhouse gas 
emissions, it is assumed that a carbon tax is implemented from 2010 
onwards and that it is set at the EU Emissions Trading Scheme (ETS) price 
for carbon permits. It is also assumed that after 2012 all tradable emissions 
permits are auctioned, with the revenue accruing to the government and 
being used to moderate taxes on labour. 
 
The main area of demographic uncertainty is migration. Because 
migration is driven by changing economic incentives, its level in our 
forecast is determined by the economic environment in Ireland relative to 
that elsewhere in the EU. Given our current forecasts for Ireland and the 
EU, we envisage continuing net immigration into Ireland, but at a much 
lower level than that experienced in recent years. 
 
Based on these assumptions, we see the Irish economy rebounding in 
2010, with more rapid growth making up for “lost time”. Thereafter, the 
rate of growth in GNP should be around 3.5 per cent a year. The growth in 
Gross National Disposable Income (GNDI) will be slightly slower. In the 
2005-2010 period, it is expected to grow by 1.5 percentage points less than 
GNP due to losses in the terms of trade. Between 2010 and 2015, the rate 
of growth of GNDI will be much closer to that of GNP and, as discussed 
in Chapter 2, the shift towards services exports should see GNDI growing 
more rapidly than GNP in the second half of the next decade. 
Employment will grow at a little over 1 per cent a year, much slower than 
in the recent past. This reflects somewhat lower trend growth and a 
somewhat higher productivity increase. As discussed elsewhere in this 
Review, the higher productivity is partly due to the reduction in importance 
of the low productivity building and construction sector. 
 
Unemployment (as defined by the International Labour Organisation) is 
expected to peak at just under 7 per cent of the labour force in 2011 and to 
fall back gradually in subsequent years. The economy should be back to 
close to full employment by the end of the forecast period. The pattern of 
employment growth will be different from that in the past: industrial 
employment will gradually fall while the major growth in employment will 
be in business and financial services. 
 
The consumption deflator is expected to grow at between 2.5 per cent 
and 3.0 per cent a year. However, the recent fall in the sterling exchange 
rate could imply some moderation in this rate of inflation in the next few 
years. The rate of growth in non-agricultural wage rates will be rather 
similar to that of today – around 4.3 per cent a year. This will not be 
enough to restore the competitiveness lost in recent years; hence the slow 
growth forecast for manufacturing. 
 
The balance of payments deficit is expected to peak by 2010 at over 5 
per cent of GNP. Thereafter, it is expected to fall as domestic demand 
grows more slowly than trade. It is expected that the main growth in trade 
will come from rapidly growing services exports. 
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The housing sector is expected to be back on an even keel in 2010. 
Thereafter, housing completions are expected to lie in the range 45,000-
50,000 a year. This would be consistent with unchanging real house prices 
between 2010 and 2015. 
 
 The changing behaviour of the economy, together with the evolving 
needs of a much richer and more mobile society, will pose new issues for 
policy. We explore some of these here, recognising that there are many 
others, which lie beyond the scope of this Review. Here we consider first 
fiscal policy, whose primary focus is to moderate the inherently cyclical 
nature of the economy.  In the absence of monetary policy controls, fiscal 
policy is of increasing importance for EMU countries.  We then look at 
structural policies, whose main focus is to enhance long-term economic 
growth and productivity, primarily by fostering structural change.  Next we 
look at environmental policy, which is moving up the overall national 
agenda rapidly, as concerns about climate change are growing.  Finally, we 
look briefly at the overall implications for policy of Ireland’s favourable 
demographic situation over the period to 2025. This provides a window of 
opportunity to address the long-term challenges of an ageing society, which 
will inevitably affect Ireland in the second quarter of the current century. 
7.4 
Implications 
for Policy 
FISCAL POLICY 
The changing behaviour of the economy has implications for the operation 
of fiscal policy. In the past, when labour supply was very elastic, fiscal 
policy, through influencing aggregate demand, could have only a limited 
impact on wage or price inflation. However, with the changed behaviour of 
the economy, stimulatory fiscal policy will add to labour demand, when the 
economy is close to or above its long-term potential output. In turn, with a 
less elastic supply of labour, this will give rise to higher wage rates and 
domestic prices. If the economy were already at capacity such a stimulus 
would produce little increase in output, while adding significantly to the 
loss of competitiveness.  
 
Under current circumstances this is not an issue, and with output 
growth falling below the long-run potential for the economy the 
government’s current planned fiscal deficit is appropriate. However, pro-
cyclical fiscal policy in earlier years has left the economy less well prepared 
to deal with the current problems than might otherwise have been the case 
(European Forecasting Network, 2007 Autumn Report). Given the new 
labour market situation, it will be more important to operate 
countercyclical fiscal policies in the coming decade, to keep the economy 
close to its potential growth rate.  
 
The changing incidence of taxation is also of relevance to the conduct 
of fiscal policy. While in the past the fact that all the incidence of labour 
taxes fell on employers meant that low labour taxes were good for 
competitiveness, the change in incidence has implications for fiscal policy. 
Today, while some of the benefits of a cut in labour taxes will still be 
passed through to employers, improving competitiveness, this 
improvement will be less than it was in the past. The analysis using the 
HERMES model still suggests that the imposition of a substantial carbon 
tax (as assumed in the Benchmark Forecast) would increase employment if the 
tax revenue were recycled through reducing the tax on labour.  
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As noted above, prior to EMU, member states had the opportunity to 
manage the economy using monetary policy. This was particularly 
important for the domestic housing market, where interest rates and credit 
controls could quickly affect the demand for housing. However, under 
EMU, monetary policy is targeted at the Euro Area inflation rate and, 
because of the idiosyncratic nature of the housing sector across the Euro 
Area, there can be no expectation that the stance of monetary policy will be 
able to help manage the housing market in specific economies.  This is 
particularly so if there is a housing bubble (European Forecasting Network 
Spring Report, 2006, Appendix). 
 
Under these circumstances the best instrument available to governments 
to manage national housing markets is fiscal policy (HM Treasury, 2003). 
Through suitably targeted tax instruments, the authorities can change the 
cost of housing services faced by households, influencing their investment 
behaviour. However, as housing booms and slumps do occur from time to 
time, it will be important for governments throughout the Euro Area to 
develop fiscal instruments which are administratively feasible and 
acceptable to society, recognising the potential dangers of shocks in the 
housing sector to the wider economy.   
 
Finally, it is clear that with rising living standards the public will demand 
improvements in public services, and the government’s capacity to provide 
these improvements will depend, inter alia, on the rate of growth in 
resources. In boom periods, such as we have experienced, it has been 
possible to ramp up expenditure very significantly in certain areas, for 
example, health. However, because of administrative problems, this 
expenditure has not produced the expected increase in quality services, a 
challenge which is now more difficult to face in a tighter budgetary 
situation. It will be very important in the forecast period to reform the 
administrative system in health to ensure that it will produce the demanded 
quality health service at a realistic cost. More generally, the importance of 
good public services, efficiently delivered, for the quality of life is now 
widely accepted (NESC, 2005) and may well be a factor in attracting and 
retaining the highly-skilled people that the labour market needs. In this 
context, the recent OECD report, which discussed key challenges for 
public administration in Ireland, including the implications of the current 
decentralisation plan for the efficient and coherent delivery of public 
services, warrants careful consideration (OECD, 2008b).  
STRUCTURAL POLICIES 
While governments can smooth the cycle through appropriate use of fiscal 
policy, it is not an effective instrument to influence future productivity 
growth and living standards in a modern economy. Instead, a range of 
structural policies, including investment in suitable public infrastructure, is 
the appropriate instrument that governments can use for such longer-term 
goals.91
 
 
91In effect, structural policies work in tandem with fiscal policy, but they differ in that the 
financial commitment to them should be more long term in focus and remain independent 
of the economic cycle. This is consistent with the current commitment to the NDP in the 
present budgetary situation. 
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The shift from dependence on growth in the manufacturing sector to 
growth in business and financial services as a driver of growth has 
important implications for policy. For example, there is a need to consider 
how the requirements of the business and financial services sector can be 
best met through structural policies in the future. In the past “Industrial 
policy” focused on manufacturing, with some considerable success. 
However, while industrial policy has been gradually changing its focus, 
there is a need for a broader reassessment of the suitability of a wide range 
of other public policies for the changed circumstances.  
 
Like the high-tech sector, parts of the business and financial sector are 
very human capital intensive. To some extent the labour market is already 
adjusting to the sector’s needs as individual students choose their courses 
of study at third level. In addition, it is noteworthy that the financial sub-
sector has a relatively high proportion of foreign workers and the 
continued ability to attract and hold such skilled labour is important to the 
sector. 
 
With a downturn in the economy and a return to significant 
unemployment it will be important to revisit some of the labour-market 
policies of the 1990s. Research then showed that it was important to invest 
in developing the skills and education of those who become unemployed to 
ensure that they return rapidly to the active labour market. In addition, the 
changing structure of the economy will also need to be reflected in future 
policy on training and education. 
 
Because of the importance of skilled labour to the internationally-traded 
sections of the services sector, the factors affecting the supply of such skills 
are also of concern. This not only includes ensuring an appropriate range 
of suitable third level graduates but it is also necessary to ensure that 
Ireland is an attractive location for the skilled workers in the sector, be they 
Irish or foreign. Other economies have increased the supply of skilled 
labour only to see this labour move abroad in the search for more attractive 
living conditions and lifestyle. Thus ensuring a good quality of life92 may be 
of substantial indirect benefit to the sector through its potential effects on 
labour supply. 
 
Since the late 1990s, there has been a strong commitment to investing in 
Research and Development. This policy is being implemented through a 
substantial increase in public funding for R&D, both in third level 
institutions and in businesses, as well as in supports to build research 
networks and collaborations across public and private institutions. While it 
is early days to assess the effects of this policy, it requires increasing 
attention to ensure that the economic benefits will begin to be realised over 
the forecast period.  This is essential to ensuring the process of structural 
change into high-tech manufacturing and high value-added internationally 
traded services. Also policy on R&D needs to take account of the changing 
structure of the economy, as discussed in Chapter 2.  
 
 
92We use quality of life to indicate access to good housing, a supportive working 
environment, high quality health services, good educational system, and a broad based 
cultural and social environment. 
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The analysis in this Review suggests that the objectives of the National 
Development Plan remain appropriate to the needs of the rapidly changing 
economy. The range of physical infrastructure projects planned is 
necessary, not only to facilitate future economic growth, but also to 
improve living standards, broadly defined. Even if it is not directly captured 
in GNP or GNDI, the benefits that flow from the improved infrastructure, 
such as reduced congestion, improved health services and a better 
environment, all improve the welfare of those living in Ireland. 
 
There remain certain concerns about the implementation of the NDP. 
These pertain in particular to the public transport area. It is not clear that 
the necessary planning has been undertaken to ensure the investments will 
produce the benefits that are promised. In addition, the ability of the public 
administration to manage and implement very large projects in a very tight 
time scale has yet to be proved. Ramping up investment in any sphere, be it 
public transport or R&D, is difficult at the best of times. This was one of 
the reasons why Morgenroth and Fitz Gerald (2006), suggested that large 
projects should be ramped up gradually. 
 
In addition, that report on investment priorities suggested that the 
implementation of supporting policies to ensure efficient use of resources 
is at least as important as the physical investment. In some cases, for 
instance public transport, more competition is the appropriate response, 
while in other cases more but especially better regulation is required. In 
particular, there is a need for policy on physical planning to focus on 
developing sustainable urban centres that can provide a high standard of 
living. This not only involves investment but it also requires an appropriate 
regulatory response to move towards much denser development. If good 
value is to be obtained from the huge investment in infrastructure, and if 
we are to develop sustainable urban centres, it will be important to move 
fairly rapidly towards some system of congestion charging. Given the EU’s 
plans for reducing emissions of greenhouse gases, and given its proposed 
limits for Ireland, the current trend towards dispersed development and 
long-distance commuting is simply not sustainable on environmental 
grounds.  In fact, one of the key policy challenges over the forecast period 
will be to explore how to increase the spatial coherence of the large stock 
of housing that has been created over the past decade. 
 
To some extent the shift in the sectoral pattern of production 
emphasises the need for a review of how regional policy is implemented. 
For example, jobs in the internationally-traded sections of the business and 
financial services sector are generally concentrated in large urban centres. 
Policy will need to take this into account and it provides additional urgency 
to implementing the National Spatial Strategy. 
 
In addition, to public infrastructure, the analysis in this Review suggests 
that there will be a need for many more dwellings over the coming ten or 
fifteen years. Over the period it would appear that there will be a need for 
up to 50,000 dwellings a year to meet the needs of the growing and 
wealthier population. Even with the slowdown in immigration envisaged in 
the Benchmark forecast, the relatively low existing headship rates 
(proportion of adults of a given age who are in an independent household) 
suggests that, with more realistic prices, there is scope for significant new 
demand for independent living from those in their twenties. This analysis 
suggests that there is an effective demographic floor under the housing 
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market. While output and prices may fall in the short term, with continued 
economic growth as envisaged in the Benchmark forecast, the housing 
market will eventually rebound. Thus, as suggested in Chapter 2, the 
current slowdown may provide an opportunity to explore how fiscal policy 
and government intervention can best influence the housing market in the 
future. 
ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY 
The current EU proposal for limits on emissions of greenhouse gases will 
prove extremely difficult to achieve in Ireland. The targets require a very 
large reduction in emissions compared to the forecasts outlined in Chapter 
6. These forecasts already include tradable permits (for some sectors) and a 
carbon tax (for the other sectors). 
 
The projected permit price is high enough to induce significant changes 
in the electricity generation sector, lowering its carbon emissions over time, 
but it is not high enough to substantially change behaviour in the medium 
term in other areas, such as transport, cement production and agriculture. 
Probably the most important role of a carbon tax is to provide incentives 
for both investment and research designed to achieve a more carbon 
efficient life style in the long term. Such investment in houses, cars, etc. will 
be encouraged by a carbon tax but will take many years to mature. Also a 
carbon tax would provide the vital incentive to undertake the R&D, which 
will ultimately prove crucial to developing a low or zero carbon society. 
 
The target for greenhouse gas emission reduction will, therefore, be 
missed unless further policy actions are taken. The gap between the target 
and the outturn is even larger if one considers the rapidly growing 
emissions embedded in Irish imports. The target of 20 per cent of 
renewables in the power generation sector will readily be met, mostly by 
wind power. However, this implies a substantial increase in the price of 
electricity. 
 
There is considerable uncertainty about just how costly (and as a result, 
feasible) it will be to meet the EU limits on emissions of greenhouse gases 
by 2020. For the limited carbon tax assumed in the Benchmark forecast, 
there is no net cost to the economy because the income tax reduction 
offsets the higher price of energy. For higher taxes, the costs could be 
large. However, as discussed above, the long-term benefits of a carbon tax 
would be substantial, providing the cheapest way to meet Ireland’s climate 
change objectives. 
 
If all EU countries face the same price of carbon, then no country 
within the EU will suffer a loss of competitiveness relative to its EU 
neighbours. Under these conditions, the costs of compliance will be 
limited. However, if the cost were much higher for some countries than for 
others, then the economic cost of compliance would be greatly magnified 
by the resulting loss of competitiveness. This would be true for Ireland, 
which has the most stringent target of all EU member states. Of course 
even if the price is similar for all countries in the EU, there will still be a 
loss of competitiveness relative to countries that are not part of the 
scheme, but the negative effects on production will be much more muted 
as trade is limited (Fitz Gerald, Keeney and Scott, 2007). 
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The easiest way to achieve a common compliance cost across Europe is 
to create a European-wide ‘cap and trade’ system. Under this scheme, if the 
EU cost of the permits were less than the carbon tax necessary to achieve 
compliance domestically then countries would buy permits (and vice versa 
if their domestic carbon tax were lower). Unlike the Clean Development 
Mechanism (CDM) under the Kyoto Protocol, such a regime would not 
change the overall EU emissions limit. However, it would ensure that the 
cost of compliance per unit of carbon was the same across the EU. This 
would ensure that climate policy would not change the competitiveness of 
the Irish economy (or any other EU economy) relative to its EU 
neighbours and it would minimise the cost of emissions reduction for the 
EU as a whole. 
 
For environmental problems other than climate change, we find 
relatively benign trends. Most emissions are stable or declining, primarily 
because of technological progress and structural change in the economy. 
However, biodegradable municipal waste emissions have continued to rise 
fast and have evoked a similar policy response to greenhouse gas emissions 
with a focus on setting targets rather than implementing policies to change 
behaviour. Although the government has set ambitious targets for limiting 
the share of waste sent to landfill, partly of its own volition and partly 
induced by the EU, policies have not yet been put in place to make sure 
that those targets are met. Meeting the targets would require substantial 
changes in household behaviour and post-collection treatment to favour 
some mixture of recycling, composting and incineration.  The incentives to 
induce such changes are not yet in place.  Even assuming (as the Benchmark 
scenario does) that the planned incinerators will be used fully, their capacity 
does not appear sufficient to close the gap. 
PREPARING FOR THE CHALLENGES OF AN AGEING 
POPULATION 
The gradual increase in the average age of the population and in the 
proportion of the population that is retired will put increasing pressures on 
public services in the years after 2020. These potential pressures have been 
considered in detail in Barrett and Bergin (2005).  
 
As part of the preparation for the rising burden in the second quarter of 
this century, the government has established the National Pensions Reserve 
Fund. Current policy is to save 1 per cent a year of GNP out of the public 
finances and put it into the fund. The fund is being invested so that the 
proceeds will part-fund the state’s pension liabilities after 2030. At a time 
when the economy is enjoying a favourable demographic profile, it is 
certainly appropriate that prudent provision be made for adverse changes 
in demographic structure in future decades.  
 
The Benchmark forecast suggests that by the end of the next decade 
Ireland will still be experiencing a relatively low dependency rate. However, 
by that time the bulk of Ireland’s infrastructure needs will have been met. 
As a result, that forecast envisages a continuing substantial government 
surplus of up to 3 per cent of GNP over the period 2015-25. While this 
may be an unrealistic estimate, it does remind us that it may be appropriate 
for the government to save more than the planned 1 per cent a year in the 
period 2015 to 2030 to help prefund age-related fiscal pressures that will 
arise in the middle of the next century. 
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 The research discussed in this Review focuses on the key factors that will 
drive growth in Ireland in the medium to long term. This analysis suggests 
that for the next five or ten years the Irish economy still has the potential 
to grow more rapidly than its immediate EU neighbours. However, such a 
desirable outcome is not guaranteed but will need careful tuning of 
domestic policies.  
 7.5 
Conclusions 
 
The analysis in this Review also suggests that the Irish economy is 
reasonably resilient. Thus, even if there is a significant downturn over the 
coming years, the economy will be likely to rebound in tune to a world 
recovery.  
 
Finally, the Review describes the results of new research which suggests 
that for some areas of the environment, pressure will ease in the forecast 
period in spite of continuing economic growth. However, for other areas, 
such as greenhouse gas emissions, current policies will not be sufficient to 
ensure relevant targets are met.  
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APPENDIX 1:  
FORECASTING RECORD 
OF THE MEDIUM-TERM 
REVIEW 
 
 This Medium-Term Review (MTR) 2008-2015 represents the eleventh in the 
series of reviews published since 1986. Over the last two decades, the MTR 
has been built around forecasts for the Irish economy using the HERMES 
macroeconomic model. Economic models are an invaluable tool for 
explaining the workings of the economy. Starting from a set of 
assumptions about how the economy works – about the international 
economy, demographics and domestic fiscal policy – macroeconomic 
models provide an essential framework which can be used to develop 
forecasts for key economic variables, to quantify the effect of alternative 
policy options and to simulate the impact of potential future shocks to the 
economy in an internally consistent manner. Economic models, however, 
can only provide a snapshot of the economy at a particular point in time 
and, therefore, their application in the context of an economy which is 
experiencing rapid change poses a particular challenge for the economic 
modeller.  
A1.1 
Introduction 
 
In order to describe accurately the rapidly changing behaviour of the 
Irish economy over the last two decades, major changes have been made to 
the HERMES model over time. These changes have been designed to 
model the transition underway in the Irish economy while at the same time 
improving the accuracy of the MTR forecasting process. This Appendix 
continues the exercise undertaken in previous Reviews of evaluating the 
forecasting record of the MTR. The performance of the MTR in 
forecasting three key aggregates is examined –  the volume growth rate of 
gross national product (GNP), unemployment and inflation, (as measured 
by the Personal Consumption Deflator). In each case the record is 
evaluated by comparing the forecast growth in each variable from 
successive Reviews against its actual outturn as measured by the CSO. 
Revisions to CSO data mean that final figures for a year only appear a 
number of years after the first release of the data so that the actual outturn 
figures for 2007 do not represent a definitive benchmark against which the 
forecasting record can be assessed.  
 
Successive MTR forecasts have focused on the five-year average growth 
rates for key variables rather than on the individual year-by-year forecasts 
and, therefore, these average growth rates over a medium-term horizon are 
also relevant in assessing the forecasting performance. Full details of the 
forecasts and the historical figures are given in Tables A1.4 to A1.6. 
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In the light of the major changes that have been made to the HERMES 
model since the last MTR, it is instructive to first assess the within sample 
performance of the model itself before analysing the forecasting 
performance of the MTR. Overall the latest version of the HERMES 
model used to produce this review shows more satisfactory behaviour 
within sample than any of its predecessors. This is illustrated in Table A1.1 
which contains the within sample root mean square percentage errors, 
RMSPE, (or root mean square error, RMSE, where appropriate) for a 
number of the key variables in the model. The root mean square error is a 
measure of the absolute differences between the values predicted by a 
model and the values actually observed. The errors for all of the variables 
in Table A.1.1 is lower using the latest model than was achieved with any 
previous version.  
 
The fact that the RMSPE and RMSE for single year estimates are much 
higher than those for five-year moving averages93 reflects the fact that the 
model, like economic forecasters, is not good at predicting turning points 
in the economy. However, the much lower RMSPE for the five-year 
averages reflects the fact that the model is good at explaining the behaviour 
of the economy in the medium term, what it was specifically designed to 
do. 
Table A1.1: Errors for Within Sample Estimation Period 
       
 1992   2001   2003   2005 2008  
          Root Mean Square Percentage Error 
 Annual data 
5 year 
moving average 
GDP 3.7 2.1 3.0 5.6 1.7 1.2 
GNP 4.5 2.2 2.1 6.4 1.9 1.1 
Labour Force 1.5 1.2 1.1 1.0 1.5 1.1 
Employment 1.3 1.1 1.1 1.8 1.3 0.8 
Consumer prices 1.7 1.0 1.9 2.5 1.6 0.7 
Wage rates 3.4 1.9 2.6 2.4 2.2 1.2 
             Root Mean Square Error 
Government borrowing, 
% of GNP 1.7 1.0 1.1 2.2 0.9 0.7 
Unemployment rate 1.9 1.1 1.3 1.4 1.3 0.7 
     
 
The RMSPE for the five-year average growth rate of GNP is just over 1 
percentage point and the error for GDP is rather similar. In the previous 
version of the model problems in estimating profit repatriations seriously 
impacted on performance. For the 2005 version of the model, profit 
repatriations were endogenous and this partly explains the high RMSPE 
associated with that review. With profit repatriations exogenous, the 
RMSPE for GNP and GDP for the 2005 model fall significantly. The 
respecification of the latest version made a very big improvement in this 
area. For the five-year average of the unemployment rate and the 
government borrowing rate the RMSE is 0.7 percentage points of GNP. 
 
 
 
93The error statistics are calculated on the rolling five-year average of the estimated and 
actual growth rates.  
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 For the 2001 edition of the Medium-Term Review two scenarios were 
presented: a relatively benign Benchmark scenario and an alternative 
Slowdown scenario. For the purpose of assessing the forecasting 
performance, the Slowdown scenario is used here. Similarly, the 2005 MTR 
developed two separate scenarios for the Irish economy – a High Growth 
and a Low Growth scenario. The High Growth scenario was based on an 
assumption of rapid economic growth in the US underpinning high growth 
in the Irish economy. At the time of publication the Low Growth scenario 
was viewed by the authors as providing a more realistic assessment of the 
growth potential of the economy out to 2020. Here we use that Low Growth 
forecast for the purpose of comparing MTR forecasts against actual 
outturns.94 
A1.2 
Growth in 
GNP 
 
In Table A1.2 we compare the forecasts for GNP growth rates in 
successive MTRs with the actual outturn. The average error shown in Table 
A1.2 for the forecast of GNP growth rates over the previous ten MTRs is 
0.9 percentage points. The average error represents the difference between 
the annual average growth rate forecast in each review for the relevant time 
horizon and the average growth rate for the same period as reported in the 
latest CSO National Accounts.95 While not directly comparable, it is 
interesting that this error is rather similar to the model’s within sample 
RMSPE of 1.1 percentage points (Table A1.1).  
 
A trend evident from Table A1.2 has been the tendency of the Medium-
Term Review to underestimate volume growth in GNP. Since 1986, only two 
MTR’s have overestimated the actual growth of real GNP, MTR89 and 
MTR01. The overestimation of growth in MTR89 was due to the failure to 
forecast the slowdown in the European economy that occurred post- 
German reunification. The MTR01 Benchmark forecast proved overly 
optimistic in the light of the international slowdown that occurred in the 
aftermath of September the 11th.  
 
The largest average forecast error of 3.1 percentage points was recorded 
for MTR94, which significantly underestimated the growth in GNP 
recorded throughout the rest of the decade. This underestimation of 
growth for the 1990s was not a failing exclusive to the MTR and arose 
from an unsatisfactory method of estimating potential output.  
 
The gap of 0.7 percentage points between the actual and forecast GNP 
growth rates for the last MTR is below the average absolute error of 1.0 
percentage points. If the scenario including a housing shock from MTR05 
were used, the error would be even smaller. 
 
 
 
 
94 A further scenario in the 2005 MTR looked at a housing shock superimposed on the 
Low Growth scenario. The forecast in that scenario for 2007-2009 is remarkably close to 
the current forecast in this MTR. 
95 For example, for MTR 1999, the average error is calculated by comparing the forecast 
annual average growth rate for the period 1999 to 2005 from that Review to the actual 
annual average growth rate for the same period from the CSO. 
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Table A1.2: Medium-Term Forecasts of GNP Growth Rates, Percentage 
 Points 
   
 Average Over Forecast Period Annual 
Forecast 
 
Average Annual 
Growth 
Average 
Error 
Average 
Absolute 
Error 
Average 
Absolute Error 
 MTR     CSO    
MTR 1986 2.8 3.2 0.4 0.4 1.9 
MTR 1987 2.6 3.7 1.0 1.0 1.9 
MTR 1989 4.9 4.4 -0.4 0.4 2.1 
MTR 1991 3.4 5.0 1.6 1.6 2.7 
MTR 1994 5.1 8.1 3.1 3.1 3.2 
MTR 1997 5.0 6.7 1.7 1.7 2.1 
MTR 1999 5.4 5.6 0.2 0.2 1.8 
MTR 2001 4.7 4.3 -0.5 0.5 0.6 
MTR 2003 4.3 5.1 0.8 0.8 0.7 
MTR 2005 4.7 5.4 0.7 0.7 0.7 
Average for 
10 MTRs   0.9 1.0 1.8 
      
 
The final measure of the forecasting accuracy of the MTR provided in 
Table A1.2 is the average absolute error in the year-by-year forecasts 
contained in each Review.  While  this error has generally declined in each 
MTR since MTR94, it is still much larger at 1.8 percentage points than the 
error in the forecast of the average growth rate over the forecast time 
horizon. However, as previously noted, the MTR has consistently 
emphasised the five-year average growth rates for key variables rather than 
the year-by-year forecasts. This reflects the acknowledgement by medium-
term forecasters of the hazards of forecasting turning points in the business 
cycle. It also reflects the fact that medium-term forecasts tend to predict 
with a much greater degree of accuracy trend growth rather than the 
changes in year-by-year growth rates.  
 
 
Figure A1.1: Annual Average Inflation: Actual Minus Forecast PCD 
A1.3 
Inflation 
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Figure A1.1 illustrates the forecasting record of the personal 
consumption deflator (PCD) in the ten MTRs since 1986. The standard 
deviation in the historical inflation rate since 1986 is much lower at 1.0 per 
cent than the standard deviation of the growth rate of GNP. This suggests 
that it should be possible to forecast the inflation rate with a greater degree 
of accuracy. Figure A1.1 shows that the MTR has had mixed results in 
forecasting the inflation rate. The average error in the forecast for the 
relevant time horizon of the last ten MTRs was 0.3 percentage points with 
an average absolute error of 0.8 percentage points. 
 
The early MTRs up to and including MTR91 tended to overestimate 
future inflation. During this period (1986-1996) the actual inflation rate fell 
from 3.7 per cent to 2.7 per cent. In contrast, the MTRs published during 
the peak of the economic boom (a period of rising inflation) tended to 
underestimate the inflation rate, and significantly so in the case of MTR97. 
Of the three MTRs published since 2001, two have overestimated the 
inflationary pressures in the economy by similar magnitudes while the last 
MTR slightly underestimated the inflation rate. The average absolute error 
in the year-by-year forecasts for the price deflator was 0.8 percentage points 
over successive reviews. This is identical to the error in the average growth 
rate over the forecast time horizon. The average absolute error of 0.8 
percentage points for the inflation rate is also significantly below the error 
of 1.8 percentage points calculated for the GNP growth rate. Given the 
much lower standard deviation of the actual inflation rate in contrast to the 
GNP growth rate, the more accurate forecasting performance of the PCD 
in successive MTRs is not surprising.  
 
 The labour market in Ireland experienced unprecedented change in the 
1990s as the economy moved from an era of double-digit unemployment 
to virtually full employment in the space of a decade. Another outstanding 
feature of the current decade has been the extremely high levels of inward 
migration. The pace and extent of these changes have added to the 
difficulty associated with modelling the behaviour of the labour market. 
The Irish labour market has not stood still for long enough to allow for an 
accurate reading of its behaviour to be captured by an econometric model 
and this is reflected in the forecasting performance.  
A1.4 
Unemployment 
 
For the unemployment rate, the performance is evaluated by comparing 
the forecast unemployment rate for the last year shown in each review with 
the actual rate for that year.96 The average absolute error for the 
unemployment rate in the last ten Reviews has been 3.1 percentage points. 
Forecasts of unemployment in Reviews published in the 1990s tended to be 
significantly higher than outturns. The largest error in forecasting the 
unemployment rate occurred in MTR94, which underestimated the 
dramatic reduction in the unemployment rate which occurred over the 
remainder of the decade.  As the changes in the unemployment rate have 
stabilised in recent years, the forecasting performance of the MTR has 
improved significantly. Average absolute errors of 0.9, 0.1 and 0.7 have 
been recorded for the last three Reviews indicating a greater level of success 
in capturing the changing behaviour of the Irish labour market.  
 
96 For example, the last year forecast by MTR 1999 was 2005. The forecast UE rate of 5.3 
per cent for 2005 from that Review is compared to the actual unemployment rate for that 
year of 4.2 per cent in order to calculate the average error. 
162 MEDIUM-TERM REVIEW 2008-2015 
Table A1.3: Medium-Term Forecasts of Unemployment Rate (ILO) 
     
  Forecast   Actual Average Error 
Average 
Absolute Error
     
MTR 1986 18.5 12.9 -5.6 5.6 
MTR 1987 18.3 15.1 -3.2 3.2 
MTR 1989 12.7 14.7 2.0 2.0 
MTR 1991 16 11.9 -4.1 4.1 
MTR 1994 13.4 4.3 -9.1 9.1 
MTR 1997 8.4 4.4 -4.0 4.0 
MTR 1999 5.3 4.2 -1.1 1.1 
MTR 2001 5.5 4.6 -0.9 0.9 
MTR 2003 4.7 4.6 -0.1 0.1 
MTR 2005 5.3 4.6 -0.7 0.7 
   -2.7 3.1 
     
 
 This Appendix has evaluated the forecasting performance of the Medium-
Term Review since 1986. The transformation of the Irish economy that has 
occurred since the early 1990s has necessitated major changes to the 
HERMES model in order to ensure that it accurately reflects the changing 
structure of the economy. These changes have succeeded in improving the 
behaviour of the model, as illustrated by its more satisfactory performance 
within sample. In addition, moderation in the pace of growth in the 
economy has reduced the level of variation in the key aggregates, such as 
GNP and unemployment, and this has also contributed to the generally 
improved forecasting performance of recent Reviews. Nonetheless there is 
an unavoidable degree of uncertainty associated with any forecasting 
exercise, in particular medium-term forecasting. The preparation of 
alternative scenarios around our central forecast is an acknowledgement of 
this uncertainty and indicates the possible margin of error in our Benchmark 
medium-term forecast. 
A1.5 
Conclusion 
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Table A1.4: Forecast of Annual Growth in Real GNP, % 
            
 MTR 
1986 
MTR 
1987 
MTR 
1989 
MTR 
1991 
MTR 
1994 
MTR 
1997 
MTR 
1999 
MTR 
2001 
MTR 
2003 
MTR 
2005 
Actual 
            
1986 2.5          -0.2 
1987 2.75          3.2 
1988 3 -0.4         1.5 
1989 3 3 4        5.0 
1990 3 3.3 7.1        6.8 
1991  3.7 5.6 2       2.8 
1992  3.6 4.6 3.7       2.3 
1993   4.8 4.3       3.3 
1994   3.2 3.3 4.3      6.7 
1995    3.6 6.9      7.3 
1996    3.7 5.7      7.8 
1997     4.6 5.7     9.4 
1998     4.8 5.9     7.7 
1999     4.7 5.3 6.3    8.5 
2000     4.5 4.4 5.8    9.2 
2001      3.7 5.5 6   4.2 
2002      4.5 5 1.8   3.3 
2003      5.3 4.9 4.2 2.4  5.6 
2004       5 5.1 3  4.0 
2005        5.3 4.7 5.6 4.9 
2006        6.1 5.7 4.8 6.6 
2007        4.6 5.6 3.8 4.5 
 
 
Table A1.5: Forecast of Annual Inflation Rate for Consumers’ Expenditure, % 
            
 MTR 
1986 
MTR 
1987 
MTR 
1989 
MTR 
1991 
MTR 
1994 
MTR 
1997 
MTR 
1999 
MTR 
2001 
MTR 
2003 
MTR 
2005 
Actual 
1986 4.5          3.7 
1987 4          2.7 
1988 4 3         4.0 
1989 3.5 3 3.3        4.0 
1990 3 3.7 4.2        2.0 
1991  3.7 4.2 2.7       2.7 
1992  3.7 3.5 2.4       3.0 
1993   3 2.6       2.2 
1994   3.5 3 3      2.8 
1995    3.1 2.6      2.8 
1996    3.1 2.3      2.7 
1997     2.3 2.1     2.6 
1998     2.4 1.9     4.0 
1999     2.4 2.1 1.8    3.2 
2000     2.4 2.2 2.2    4.8 
2001      2.1 2.9 4.8   4.3 
2002      2.1 2.9 3.9   5.2 
2003      2.1 2.9 3.8 3.5  4.0 
2004       3 3.5 2  1.6 
2005        3.3 3.2 2.1 1.6 
2006        3.3 2.8 2.7 2.1 
2007        3.3 3.0 1.9 3.5 
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Table A1.6: Forecast of Unemployment Rate (ILO), % of Labour Force 
 
            
 MTR 
1986 
MTR 
1987 
MTR 
1989 
MTR 
1991 
MTR 
1994 
MTR 
1997 
MTR 
1999 
MTR 
2001 
MTR 
2003 
MTR 
2005 
Actual 
1986 17          17.1 
1987 17.5          16.9 
1988 18 19.5         16.3 
1989 18.25 19.1 16        15.0 
1990 18.5 18.5 14.6        12.9 
1991  18.2 13.4 15.8       14.7 
1992  18.3 13 15.9       15.1 
1993   12.8 15.7       15.9 
1994   12.7 16 16.9      14.7 
1995    16 16.1      12.2 
1996    16 15.3      11.9 
1997     14.6 10.9     10.3 
1998     14.2 9.1     7.8 
1999     13.7 8.3 6.5    5.7 
2000     13.4 8.6 5.6    4.3 
2001      8.8 5.4 3.8   3.6 
2002      8.9 5.3 3.6   4.2 
2003      8.4 5.4 4.3 4.9  4.4 
2004       5.3 5.3 5.7  4.4 
2005        5.8 5.4 4.2 4.2 
2006        5.7 5.2 4.2 4.3 
2007        5.5 4.7 5.3 4.6 
            
  
APPENDIX 2: 
MODELLING THE IRISH 
ECONOMY 
This Appendix describes how the changing nature of the Irish economy 
is modelled in the latest version of the HERMES macroeconomic model. 
The two key areas of change discussed here are the supply side of the 
economy, especially business and financial services and the labour market. 
 
 In the latest version of the HERMES model exports of services 
(excluding tourism), Xs, are a function of world activity Qw (proxied by US 
GDP), Irish wage rates, Wi, relative to those in the UK, Wu, and the rate of 
corporation tax, T.  
A2.1 
Business and 
Financial 
Services  
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The estimated elasticity of services exports with respect to world activity 
n recent years is very high – between 4 and 5. The elasticity with respect to 
omestic wage rates is -1.3.  
Output in the business and financial sector, Qi, is a function of exports 
f services, domestic demand weighted by input output coefficients, D,  
McCarthy, 2005), and the price of output of the sector Pi relative to wage 
ates in the UK. 
 
                     (2) iP ),,(
u
si WDXfQ =  
 
When simulated as a model these equations suggest an elasticity of 
omestic output in the sector with respect to world activity of 1.37. The 
lasticity with respect to relative prices/wage rates is around -0.7 (Tables 
.2 and 2.4). 
 
A partial simulation of the model, where the effect on tax revenue is not 
aken into account, suggests that the level of GNP was raised by around 3 
ercentage points due to the reduction in the rate of corporation tax after 
994. This does not allow for the effects of the loss of revenue from 
xisting firms, which had to be made good elsewhere. If this were taken 
nto account the long-term effects would obviously be smaller. This change 
n the tax rate had a once-off effect, shifting the level of GNP upwards. 
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Once this adjustment is complete the growth rate should return to its 
original path. 
 
 Manufacturing is divided into three sectors, high-tech, traditional and 
food processing. High-tech covers chemicals and pharmaceuticals with the 
traditional sector covering the rest of the sector. The same basic model is 
applied to each of the three sectors. It is outlined in Bradley, Fitz Gerald 
and Kearney (1993). 
A2.2 
Manufacturing 
 
The model assumes that the production of goods relevant to Ireland on 
a worldwide scale can be characterised by a cost function (3) where the cost 
of world output of manufactured goods, Cw, is a function of the unit cost 
of production in Ireland cI relative to the rest of the world, cR, and 
technical progress, t. Then the share of world output that is located in 
Ireland (4) is also a function of the unit cost of production in Ireland cI 
relative to the rest of the world, cR, and technical progress, t. The output of 
each sector in Ireland is defined as QI and the relevant output in the rest of 
the world is QW. The unit cost of production in Ireland is defined in 
Equation (5) as a function of the cost of labour, pl, the price of inputs of 
goods and services, pm, energy, pe, the capital stock K and technical 
progress, t. From this the share of each of the factors of production –
labour, energy and materials – in domestic output is defined  (labour, L, is 
shown in Equation (6)). Finally, Equation (7) defines the optimal capital 
output ratio (optimal is denoted by “*”). 
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            (6) 
 
 
            (7) 
 
 
 
The model, as estimated, suggests that technical progress is particularly 
strong in the manufacturing sector. Technical progress is generally very 
labour saving and results in a very substantial reduction in the unit cost of 
production. (It is also mildly capital saving and materials using.) In turn, the 
reduction in the unit cost of production, as a result of the labour saving, 
leads to strong growth in output. Over time the rate of increase in technical 
progress has tended to rise. However, as the industries producing in Ireland 
mature the rate of increase could slow in the future. 
 
For example, in 2006 labour saving technical progress led to a 2.7 per 
cent reduction in the unit cost of production in the manufacturing sector. 
In the short run this would lead to a 0.9 per cent increase in the volume of 
output of the sector. In the long run this output effect would be almost 
doubled as the capital stock adjusts. Holding output constant, the effect of 
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technical progress would be to reduce employment in manufacturing by 7.7 
per cent in the short run. 
 
This effect on employment is quite dramatic. It means that for 
employment even to remain static in the sector, output must continue to 
grow rapidly. It explains the recent trends where what for other sectors 
would be quite rapid growth, is associated with significant falls in 
employment. 
 
The production technology used in Ireland is probably the same as that 
used in similar industries elsewhere. The result is that with substantial rates 
of technical progress endemic in the relevant high-tech sectors, the world 
price of such products falls over time. For example, with technical progress 
each year a computer of comparable power costs less than it did last year. 
This has important implications for the terms of trade. 
 
The price of output in the manufacturing sector is generally externally 
determined – firms are price takers on the world market. (The one 
exception is the food sector where output prices are based on the cost of 
production, especially the cost of the raw materials.) This is not surprising 
given the heavy preponderance of foreign firms producing for a global 
market. This result is consistent with Callan and Fitz Gerald (1989), and 
Fitz Gerald, Keeney and Scott, 2007. For the sectors that are price takers 
the weight on German prices is 55 per cent, on US prices 36 per cent and 
on UK prices 9 per cent. Compared to the results in Callan and Fitz Gerald 
(1989) the weight on US prices is substantially higher and that on UK 
prices much lower. 
 
 The traditional model of migration is given below. A2.3 
Modelling 
the Labour 
Market 
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Net migration (N) is a function of Irish real after tax wage rates (wI) 
relative to those in the UK (wU) and of the difference in the unemployment 
rate for Ireland (UI) relative to that in the UK (UU). Here we simplify by 
making net migration a simple linear function of the log of the relative 
wage rates. 
 
For migration to be zero the following must be true: 
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     (11) 
 
As shown here, with this specification, Irish wage rates must be set as a 
constant mark up on UK wage rates. Any deviation from this would give 
rise to indefinite flows of migrants – an infinitely elastic supply of labour. 
 
While this specification provided a good approximation to the 
underlying true labour market behaviour for many decades, it is no longer 
appropriate. Instead the long-term stock of net migrants, rather than the 
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flow, is modelled as a function of the factors affecting the relative 
attractiveness of the Irish and UK labour markets. In addition, information 
on the sensitivity of labour force participation, especially by women, is 
taken from Doris (2001) and incorporated into the model. 
 
 The demand for housing uses an inverted demand function 
specification.97 Real Irish new house prices are positively related to the level 
of real disposable income per capita (Y) and the percentage of the 
population aged 25-34 years (POP2534), and is negatively related to the per 
capita housing stock (HSTOCK) and the real cost of capital for housing 
(rr).98 A dummy variable is also included for 2003.99  
A2.4 
Housing 
Sector Sub 
Model 
 
Log Ph = A + B1log(Y) -B2(HSTOCK) + B3(POP2534)- B4(rr)+B5(2003) 
 
A similar equation is included for second-hand house prices, which 
suggests that these prices are driven by changing living standards, with 
demographic changes and short-run income volatility having a much 
reduced effect. 
 
The housing supply equation, which estimates the number of house 
completions  (Hs), is modelled as a function of the profitability of new 
house building. Thus, it is driven by new house prices (Ph) and the cost of 
building (cc), represented by wage costs, input costs and the cost of capital. 
 
Log Hs = A + B1log(Ph/cc). 
 
Finally, the model includes an equation for the housing stock 
(HSTOCK) based on the housing stock in the previous period, housing 
completions in the current period, and assuming depreciation of 0.5 per 
cent a year: 
 
HSTOCKt = 0.995 * HSTOCKt–1 + HCOMPt 
 
 
97 This specification draws on the work of Murphy (1998). 
98 The user cost of housing (proxied by the nominal mortgage interest rate less the change 
in house prices). 
99 This is in keeping with the approach of Murphy (2005). Murphy includes dummy 
variables for 1997 and 2003 that “…pick-up the combined effects of financial 
liberalisation, policy interventions since 1998 and speculative frenzy effects.” 
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BENCHMARK  FORECAST
Table A3.1: Expenditure on GNP 
 2007 Volume Price 2008 Cont. to Volume Price 2009 Cont. to
 €m % % €m Growth 
% 
% % €m Growth 
% 
Personal Consumption 90,913 6.5 3.5 95,764 1.7 3.0 2.3 100,522 1.9 
Public Consumption 27,809 5.0 6.2 30,452 0.7 4.0 5.3 33,041 0.6 
Fixed Investment 47,011 1.9 0.0 44,730 -2.0 -6.9 2.2 45,867 -0.1 
  Building 36,339 -1.3 1.2 33,031 -2.5 -11.9 3.2 33,367 -0.5 
  Machinery 10,673 13.0 -1.5 11,700 0.6 8.0 1.5 12,491 0.4 
Final Domestic Demand 165,734 4.9 2.8 170,946 0.4 0.4 2.7 179,430 2.4 
Stock Building 661   530 -0.1   421 -0.1 
 Agricultural -12   -12 0.0   -12 0.0 
 Intervention -231   -231 0.0   -231 0.0 
 Non-Agricultural 904   772 -0.1   664 -0.1 
Total Domestic Demand 166,395 4.4 2.8 171,476 0.4 0.3 2.7 179,851 2.3 
Total Exports 148,844 6.6 -0.2 158,109 5.4 5.4 0.8 168,785 5.9 
  Merchandise 84,230 3.5 -2.6 85,925 1.5 2.6 -0.6 87,654 1.6 
  Services 64,614 11.5 2.7 72,183 3.8 9.5 2.0 81,131 4.4 
Total Demand 315,239 5.5 1.3 329,584 5.8 2.8 1.7 348,637 8.2 
Total Imports 129,826 6.1 1.2 137,299 3.3 4.0 1.7 146,454 4.4 
Gross Domestic Product 186,424 4.9 1.5 193,296 2.1 1.8 1.9 203,194 3.7 
Net Factor Income -27,065 6.9 -1.0 -28,347 -0.5 2.7 2.0 -30,098 -0.9 
Gross National Product 159,358 4.5 2.0 164,949 1.6 1.6 1.8 173,095 2.9 
         
 2009 Volume Price 2010 Cont. to Volume Price 2011 Cont. to
 €m % % €m Growth 
% 
% % €m Growth 
% 
Personal Consumption 100,522 3.2 1.7 105,978 1.6 2.7 2.7 111,035 1.2 
Public Consumption 33,041 3.5 4.8 34,698 1.0 6.1 -1.0 36,716 0.5 
Fixed Investment 45,867 -0.3 2.9 48,476 1.5 5.9 -0.2 47,906 -0.8 
  Building 33,367 -2.6 3.7 34,753 1.0 5.6 -1.3 35,093 -0.3 
  Machinery 12,491 5.2 1.5 13,525 0.5 6.8 1.4 12,761 -0.6 
Final Domestic Demand 179,430 2.3 2.6 189,153 4.1 4.1 1.3 195,657 0.8 
Stock Building 421   886 0.2   835 0.0 
 Agricultural -12   20 0.0   20 0.0 
 Intervention -231   0 0.2   0 0.0 
 Non-Agricultural 664   866 0.1   815 0.0 
Total Domestic Demand 179,851 2.3 2.6 190,038 4.3 4.3 1.3 196,492 0.8 
Total Exports 168,785 5.7 1.0 180,759 7.1 6.6 0.4 194,027 6.7 
  Merchandise 87,654 2.6 -0.6 91,392 2.8 4.8 -0.5 93,473 2.0 
  Services 81,131 10.0 2.2 89,367 4.2 9.1 1.0 100,554 4.6 
Total Demand 348,637 4.0 1.7 370,797 11.4 5.5 0.8 390,519 7.5 
Total Imports 146,454 5.2 1.4 159,163 5.8 6.7 1.9 167,756 3.1 
Gross Domestic Product 203,194 3.1 1.9 212,645 5.6 4.6 0.0 223,774 4.4 
Net Factor Income -30,098 4.4 1.7 -30,933 -0.5 2.3 0.4 -32,443 -0.7 
Gross National Product 173,095 2.9 2.0 181,712 5.1 5.1 -0.1 191,331 3.7 
 
 
100 The detailed tables associated with the environmental output from the ISus model are available at: 
http://www.esri.ie/research/research_areas/environment/isus/ISusMTR08.xls. 
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Table A3.1 (continued): Expenditure on GNP 
 2011 Volume Price 2012 Cont. to Volume Price 2013 Cont. to
 €m % % €m Growth 
% 
% % €m Growth 
% 
Personal Consumption 111,035 2.0 2.7 117,042 1.5 2.6 2.7 124,436 1.9 
Public Consumption 36,716 3.0 2.8 38,662 0.4 2.5 2.7 40,742 0.4 
Fixed Investment 47,906 -3.3 2.2 50,770 0.7 3.1 2.7 53,522 0.6 
  Building 35,093 -1.6 2.6 37,457 0.6 3.5 3.2 39,450 0.3 
  Machinery 12,761 -7.1 1.6 13,296 0.2 2.4 1.8 14,035 0.2 
Final Domestic Demand 195,657 0.8 2.6 206,473 2.6 2.7 2.7 218,699 2.8 
Stock Building 835   832 0.0   812 0.0 
 Agricultural 20   20 0.0   20 0.0 
 Intervention 0   0 0.0   0 0.0 
 Non-Agricultural 815   812 0.0   792 0.0 
Total Domestic Demand 196,492 0.8 2.6 207,305 2.6 2.7 2.7 219,511 2.8 
Total Exports 194,027 6.2 1.1 209,543 6.9 6.3 1.6 225,997 6.5 
  Merchandise 93,473 3.4 -1.1 95,376 1.6 2.6 -0.6 97,617 1.5 
  Services 100,554 9.6 2.7 114,166 5.4 10.5 2.7 128,379 5.1 
Total Demand 390,519 3.6 1.7 416,848 9.6 4.6 2.0 445,508 9.3 
Total Imports 167,756 3.4 1.9 180,928 5.2 5.9 1.9 194,651 5.0 
Gross Domestic Product 223,774 3.7 1.5 236,930 4.4 3.7 2.1 251,867 4.3 
Net Factor Income -32,443 3.7 1.1 -33,729 -0.4 2.3 1.6 -35,230 -0.5 
Gross National Product 191,331 3.7 1.5 203,202 3.9 3.9 2.2 216,637 3.8 
 
 
    
 2013 Volume Price 2014 Cont. to Volume Price 2015 Cont. to
 €m % % €m Growth 
% 
% % €m Growth 
% 
Personal Consumption 124,436 3.3 2.9 132,790 2.0 3.6 3.0 142,016 2.2 
Public Consumption 40,742 2.5 2.8 43,013 0.4 2.5 3.0 45,437 0.4 
Fixed Investment 53,522 2.4 2.9 55,770 0.3 1.2 3.0 58,093 0.3 
  Building 39,450 1.9 3.3 40,838 0.0 0.0 3.5 42,239 0.0 
  Machinery 14,035 3.6 1.9 14,861 0.3 3.9 1.9 15,744 0.3 
Final Domestic Demand 218,699 3.0 2.9 231,573 2.7 2.8 3.0 245,547 2.8 
Stock Building 812   780 0.0   760 0.0 
 Agricultural 20   20 0.0   20 0.0 
 Intervention 0   0 0.0   0 0.0 
 Non-Agricultural 792   760 0.0   740 0.0 
Total Domestic Demand 219,511 2.9 2.9 232,353 2.7 2.8 3.0 246,307 2.8 
Total Exports 225,997 5.8 2.0 243,741 6.3 5.5 2.2 262,528 6.2 
  Merchandise 97,617 2.5 -0.1 100,246 1.4 2.5 0.2 103,145 1.4 
  Services 128,379 9.3 2.9 143,496 4.9 8.6 3.0 159,384 4.7 
Total Demand 445,508 4.5 2.3 476,095 9.0 4.3 2.5 508,836 9.0 
Total Imports 194,651 5.6 1.9 208,867 4.9 5.3 1.9 223,886 4.8 
Gross Domestic Product 251,867 3.6 2.6 268,239 4.2 3.5 2.9 285,961 4.2 
Net Factor Income -35,230 2.4 2.0 -36,991 -0.5 2.7 2.2 -38,852 -0.5 
Gross National Product 216,637 3.8 2.7 231,248 3.6 3.6 3.0 247,109 3.7 
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Table A3.2: Output 
     2007 Volume    Price 2008 Cont. to Volume Price 2009 Cont. to 
    €m % % €m Growth % % % €m Growth % 
Agriculture 3,996 -10.0 13.3 4,075 0.0 1.0 1.0 4,157 0.0 
Industry 54,320 3.9 -1.4 53,732 -0.3 -0.9 -0.2 54,448 0.6 
  Manufacturing 37,035 5.7 -2.4 37,697 0.7 2.6 -0.8 38,137 0.8 
  Utilities 2,190 7.5 3.2 2,313 0.1 4.0 1.6 2,443 0.1 
  Building 15,096 -1.6 1.4 13,722 -1.1 -12.3 3.7 13,869 -0.2 
Market Services 76,493 6.4 2.3 81,008 1.7 3.6 2.2 87,227 2.4 
  Distribution 16,258 5.0 1.5 16,872 0.2 2.0 1.7 17,494 0.2 
  Transport &    
Communications 8,333 5.0 1.5 8,648 0.1 2.0 1.7 8,976 0.1 
  Other Market Services 51,903 7.2 2.7 55,488 1.4 4.4 2.4 60,756 2.1 
Non-Market Services 29,779 4.2 7.8 31,728 0.5 2.9 3.5 33,320 0.5 
  Health & Education 23,909 4.7 8.6 25,594 0.5 3.4 3.5 27,002 0.5 
  Public Administration 5,870 2.5 4.4 6,134 0.0 1.0 3.5 6,318 0.0 
GDP at Factor Cost 163,577 4.8 2.3 169,533 2.0 1.9 1.7 178,141 3.5 
Taxes on Expenditure 26,039 5.5 -1.4 26,876 0.2 1.5 1.7 28,037 0.2 
Subsidies 3,193 3.0 15.2 3,113 0.1 3.0 -5.3 2,984 0.1 
GDP at Market Prices 186,424 4.9 1.5 193,296 2.1 1.8 1.9 203,194 3.7 
Net Factor Income -27,065 6.9 -1.0 -28,347 -0.5 2.7 2.0 -30,098 -0.9 
GNP at Market Prices 159,358 4.5 2.0 164,949 1.6 1.6 1.8 173,095 2.9 
 
 
    
    2009 Volume Price 2010 Cont. to Volume Price 2011 Cont. to 
   €m % % €m Growth % % % €m Growth % 
Agriculture 4,157 1.0 1.0 4,225 0.0 2.1 -0.5 4,412 0.0 
Industry 54,448 1.7 -0.4 52,139 1.9 5.2 -9.0 52,216 0.9 
  Manufacturing 38,137 2.9 -1.7 35,378 1.3 4.8 -11.4 34,888 0.9 
  Utilities 2,443 3.6 1.9 2,588 0.2 11.0 -4.6 2,605 0.1 
  Building 13,869 -2.7 3.8 14,173 0.4 5.6 -3.2 14,722 -0.1 
Market Services 87,227 4.8 2.7 95,466 2.5 5.0 4.3 103,218 2.9 
  Distribution 17,494 1.9 1.7 11,508 0.3 2.6 -35.9 11,499 0.3 
  Transport & 
Communications 8,976 2.0 1.7 9,337 0.2 2.9 1.1 9,835 0.2 
  Other Market Services 60,756 6.2 3.1 74,621 2.1 6.0 15.8 81,884 2.5 
Non-Market Services 33,320 2.9 2.1 34,817 0.3 2.0 2.5 36,543 0.3 
  Health & Education 27,002 3.4 2.0 28,241 0.3 2.0 2.5 29,669 0.3 
  Public Administration 6,318 1.0 2.0 6,575 0.1 1.9 2.1 6,874 0.1 
GDP at Factor Cost 178,141 3.4 1.7 185,634 5.2 5.0 -0.7 195,378 4.1 
Taxes on Expenditure 28,037 1.4 2.9 30,049 0.4 2.3 4.8 31,509 0.3 
Subsidies 2,984 3.0 -6.9 3,038 0.0 2.0 -0.2 3,112 0.0 
GDP at Market Prices 203,194 3.1 1.9 212,645 5.6 4.6 0.0 223,774 4.4 
Net Factor Income -30,098 4.4 1.7 -30,933 -0.5 2.3 0.4 -32,443 -0.7 
GNP at Market Prices 173,095 2.9 2.0 181,712 5.1 5.1 -0.1 191,331 3.7 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
172 MEDIUM-TERM REVIEW 2008-2015 
 
Table A3.2 (continued): Output 
 2011 Volume Price 2012 Cont. to Volume Price 2013 Cont. to
 €m % % €m Growth 
% 
% % €m Growth 
% 
Agriculture 4,412 0.4 4.0 4,589 0.0 0.0 4.0 4,742 0.0 
Industry 52,216 2.4 -2.2 53,214 1.0 2.9 -1.0 54,608 0.8 
  Manufacturing 34,888 3.3 -4.6 34,814 0.7 2.7 -2.8 35,271 0.7 
  Utilities 2,605 4.5 -3.7 2,625 0.1 4.3 -3.4 2,644 0.0 
  Building 14,722 -1.6 5.6 15,775 0.2 3.5 3.6 16,693 0.1 
Market Services 103,218 5.8 2.2 111,417 2.6 5.1 2.7 120,552 2.6 
  Distribution 11,499 2.5 -2.5 12,543 0.2 2.5 6.4 13,855 0.2 
  Transport & 
Communications 9,835 3.4 1.8 10,391 0.2 3.7 1.9 11,010 0.2 
  Other Market Services 81,884 7.1 2.5 88,483 2.2 6.1 1.9 95,687 2.2 
Non-Market Services 36,543 2.0 2.9 38,307 0.3 2.0 2.8 40,194 0.3 
  Health & Education 29,669 2.0 3.0 31,130 0.3 2.0 2.9 32,694 0.3 
  Public Administration 6,874 1.9 2.6 7,177 0.1 1.9 2.4 7,500 0.1 
GDP at Factor Cost 195,378 3.9 1.3 206,517 4.0 3.8 1.9 219,084 3.8 
Taxes on Expenditure 31,509 2.0 2.8 33,604 0.4 2.8 3.8 36,055 0.5 
Subsidies 3,112 0.6 1.8 3,190 0.0 0.6 1.9 3,272 0.0 
GDP at Market Prices 223,774 3.7 1.5 236,930 4.4 3.7 2.1 251,867 4.3 
Net Factor Income -32,443 3.7 1.1 -33,729 -0.4 2.3 1.6 -35,230 -0.5 
GNP at Market Prices 191,331 3.7 1.5 203,202 3.9 3.9 2.2 216,637 3.8 
          
          
 2013 Volume Price 2014 Cont. to Volume Price 2015 Cont. to
 €m % % €m Growth 
% 
% % €m Growth 
% 
Agriculture 4,742 0.5 2.8 4,873 0.0 0.8 2.0 5,006 0.0 
Industry 54,608 2.4 0.2 56,230 0.7 2.0 0.9 57,970 0.7 
  Manufacturing 35,271 2.5 -1.2 36,168 0.7 2.5 0.0 37,231 0.7 
  Utilities 2,644 1.9 -1.2 2,658 0.0 1.6 -1.0 2,669 0.0 
  Building 16,693 1.9 3.8 17,404 0.0 0.0 4.2 18,071 0.0 
Market Services 120,552 5.0 3.0 130,564 2.6 4.9 3.2 141,417 2.6 
  Distribution 13,855 2.5 7.8 15,295 0.2 2.5 7.7 16,755 0.2 
  Transport & 
Communications 11,010 3.9 2.0 11,692 0.2 4.0 2.1 12,433 0.2 
  Other Market Services 95,687 5.9 2.1 103,577 2.1 5.7 2.4 112,229 2.1 
Non-Market Services 40,194 2.0 2.9 42,269 0.3 2.0 3.1 44,483 0.3 
  Health & Education 32,694 2.0 3.0 34,414 0.3 2.0 3.2 36,249 0.3 
  Public Administration 7,500 1.9 2.5 7,856 0.1 1.9 2.8 8,234 0.1 
GDP at Factor Cost 219,084 3.6 2.4 232,926 3.6 3.4 2.8 247,866 3.6 
Taxes on Expenditure 36,055 3.5 3.7 38,671 0.6 3.8 3.4 41,544 0.6 
Subsidies 3,272 1.1 1.5 3,358 0.0 1.2 1.4 3,448 0.0 
GDP at Market Prices 251,867 3.6 2.6 268,239 4.2 3.5 2.9 285,961 4.2 
Net Factor Income -35,230 2.4 2.0 -36,991 -0.5 2.7 2.2 -38,852 -0.5 
GNP at Market Prices 216,637 3.8 2.7 231,248 3.6 3.6 3.0 247,109 3.7 
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Table A3.3: National Income and National Product, Current Prices, € million 
 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
Agricultural Incomes 3,270 3,335 3,402 3,446 3,649 3,813 3,949 4,060 4,172
Non-Agric. Wage 
Income 78,926 82,079 85,920 90,424 95,451 100,711 106,440 112,830 119,704
Non-Agric. Profits Net 61,478 63,286 66,806 67,910 71,795 76,293 81,387 86,984 93,188
Non-Agric. Profits 
Gross 61,678 63,486 67,006 68,110 71,995 76,493 81,587 87,184 93,388
Adjustment for Stock 
Appreciation 200 200 200 200 200 200 200 200 200
Domestic Income 143,674 148,700 156,127 161,781 170,895 180,817 191,775 203,874 217,064
Depreciation 19,903 20,832 22,014 23,854 24,483 25,700 27,309 29,053 30,801
GDP (Factor Cost) 163,577 169,533 178,141 185,634 195,378 206,517 219,084 232,926 247,866
Taxes on 
Expenditure 26,039 26,876 28,037 30,049 31,509 33,604 36,055 38,671 41,544
  Domestic 25,585 26,398 27,535 29,510 30,943 33,010 35,431 38,016 40,856
  EC 454 478 502 539 566 594 624 655 688
Subsidies (-) 3,193 3,113 2,984 3,038 3,112 3,190 3,272 3,358 3,448
  Domestic 1,237 1,353 1,400 1,484 1,558 1,636 1,718 1,804 1,894
  EC 1,956 1,760 1,584 1,554 1,554 1,554 1,554 1,554 1,554
          
GDP (Market Prices) 186,424 193,296 203,194 212,645 223,774 236,930 251,867 268,239 285,961
Net Factor Income -27,065 -28,347 -30,098 -30,933 -32,443 -33,729 -35,230 -36,991 -38,852
Gross National 
Product 159,358 164,949 173,095 181,712 191,331 203,202 216,637 231,248 247,109
 
Table A3.4: Personal Income and Personal Expenditure, Current Prices, € million 
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
Agricultural Incomes 3,270 3,335 3,402 3,446 3,649 3,813 3,949 4,060 4,172
Non-Agric. Wage Income 78,926 82,079 85,920 90,424 95,451 100,711 106,440 112,830 119,704
Transfer Income 20,807 22,263 23,934 25,243 26,872 28,446 30,048 31,712 33,525
Domestic 21,095 22,046 23,516 24,804 26,411 27,962 29,540 31,179 32,964
Foreign -289 217 418 439 461 484 508 533 560
Other Personal Income 17,414 18,857 19,519 18,767 21,199 23,722 26,494 29,486 32,697
Non-Agricultural Profits 61,678 63,486 67,006 68,110 71,995 76,493 81,587 87,184 93,388
National Debt Interest 1,471 1,707 1,903 2,014 2,252 2,622 2,874 3,182 3,395
Net Factor Income -27,065 -28,347 -30,098 -30,933 -32,443 -33,729 -35,230 -36,991 -38,852
Government Trading & 
Investment Income (-) 2,011 2,292 2,300 2,358 2,416 2,477 2,539 2,602 2,667
Other Private Income 34,073 34,554 36,511 36,834 39,388 42,909 46,693 50,773 55,263
Undistributed Profits (-) 16,659 15,696 16,991 18,067 18,189 19,188 20,199 21,287 22,566
Personal Income 120,416 126,535 132,774 137,880 147,170 156,693 166,930 178,088 190,099
Taxes on Personal Income 23,641 24,465 25,460 27,841 30,202 32,690 34,797 37,141 39,665
Personal Disposable Income 96,775 102,069 107,315 110,040 116,969 124,003 132,133 140,947 150,433
Personal Consumption 90,913 95,764 100,522 105,978 111,035 117,042 124,436 132,790 142,016
Personal Savings 5,862 6,306 6,792 4,062 5,934 6,961 7,697 8,157 8,417
Tax Ratio  
   (% Personal Income) 19.6 19.3 19.2 20.2 20.5 20.9 20.8 20.9 20.9
Savings Ratio  
   (% of Disposable Income) 6.1 6.2 6.3 3.7 5.1 5.6 5.8 5.8 5.6
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Table A3.5: Balance of Payments, Current Prices, € million 
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
Exports – Total 148,844 158,109 168,785 180,759 194,027 209,543 225,997 243,741 262,528
  Merchandise 84,230 85,925 87,654 91,392 93,473 95,376 97,617 100,246 103,145
  Services 64,614 72,183 81,131 89,367 100,554 114,166 128,379 143,496 159,384
Imports – Total 129,826 137,299 146,454 159,163 167,756 180,928 194,651 208,867 223,886
Balance of Trade 19,018 20,810 22,331 21,596 26,271 28,614 31,345 34,875 38,643
  as % of GNP 11.9 12.6 12.9 11.9 13.7 14.1 14.5 15.1 15.6
International Transfers           
  EC Subsidies 1,956 1,760 1,584 1,554 1,554 1,554 1,554 1,554 1,554
  EC Taxes (-) 454 478 502 539 566 594 624 655 688
  Government Payments (-) 2,241 2,480 2,500 2,638 2,747 2,863 2,987 3,118 3,258
  Government Receipts 427 381 400 420 441 463 486 511 536
  Private Transfers -289 217 418 439 461 484 508 533 560
Net International Transfers -600 -600 -600 -763 -857 -956 -1,062 -1,175 -1,295
Factor Income Flows -27,065 -28,347 -30,098 -30,933 -32,443 -33,729 -35,230 -36,991 -38,852
  National Debt Interest (-) 801 929 1,036 1,064 1,222 1,516 1,720 1,971 2,124
  Profits etc. Outflows (-) 22,915 27,536 32,834 33,969 35,272 36,694 38,534 40,647 42,950
  Other Factor income -3,349 118 3,771 4,100 4,052 4,481 5,024 5,628 6,222
Current Account Balance -8,647 -8,137 -8,367 -10,101 -7,028 -6,071 -4,947 -3,291 -1,504
  as % of GNP -5.4 -4.9 -4.8 -5.6 -3.7 -3.0 -2.3 -1.4 -0.6
Capital Transfers 300 300 300 0 0 0 0 0 0
Effective Current Balance -8,347 -7,837 -8,067 -10,101 -7,028 -6,071 -4,947 -3,291 -1,504
  as % of GNP -5.2 -4.8 -4.7 -5.6 -3.7 -3.0 -2.3 -1.4 -0.6
 
Table A3.6: National Debt, Current prices, € million 
 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
Total Government 
Securities 31,306 31,307 31,306 32,203 32,647 33,115 33,602 34,103 34,612
Other Borrowing from 
Central Bank -5,463 -5,463 -5,463 -5,463 -5,463 -5,463 -5,463 -5,463 -5,463
Small Savings 7,139 7,140 7,137 9,826 10,401 11,051 11,774 12,550 13,359
Total Debt Held 
Domestically 6,278 6,278 6,274 9,546 10,250 11,053 11,948 12,910 13,914
Total € Debt 32,983 32,983 32,979 36,566 37,585 38,703 39,913 41,190 42,509
Foreign Debt:          
  Foreign Currency 80 88 170 1,607 5,343 8,597 10,919 11,316 9,567
  Government Securities 26,705 26,705 26,705 27,020 27,335 27,650 27,965 28,280 28,595
Total Foreign Debt 26,785 26,793 26,875 28,627 32,678 36,247 38,884 39,596 38,162
Total National Debt 33,062 33,072 33,149 38,173 42,928 47,299 50,833 52,506 52,076
General Government Debt 47,277 52,626 60,229 65,253 70,008 74,379 77,912 79,586 79,155
Other Bank Borrowing -2,310 -2,310 -2,310 -2,310 -2,310 -2,310 -2,310 -2,310 -2,310
Debt Ratios (% of GNP)          
  Total National Debt 20.7 20.0 19.2 21.0 22.4 23.3 23.5 22.7 21.1
  General Government 
Debt 29.7 31.9 34.8 35.9 36.6 36.6 36.0 34.4 32.0
  Total Domestic Debt 3.9 3.8 3.6 5.3 5.4 5.4 5.5 5.6 5.6
  Total Foreign Debt 16.8 16.2 15.5 15.8 17.1 17.8 17.9 17.1 15.4
Total € Debt 20.7 20.0 19.1 20.1 19.6 19.0 18.4 17.8 17.2
Total Foreign Currency 
Debt 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.9 2.8 4.2 5.0 4.9 3.9
Debt Ratios (% of GDP)          
Total National Debt 17.7 17.1 16.3 18.0 19.2 20.0 20.2 19.6 18.2
General Government Debt 25.4 27.2 29.6 30.7 31.3 31.4 30.9 29.7 27.7
Total Foreign Debt 14.4 13.9 13.2 13.5 14.6 15.3 15.4 14.8 13.3
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Table A3.7: Public Authorities Accounts, Current Prices, € million 
 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
Taxes on Income and 
Wealth 30,030 31,031 32,389 35,180 37,662 40,576 43,176 46,078 49,216
  Company 6,391 6,569 6,932 7,342 7,463 7,889 8,381 8,940 9,553
  Personal 23,639 24,463 25,457 27,838 30,199 32,687 34,794 37,138 39,663
Taxes on Expenditure 25,585 26,398 27,535 29,510 30,943 33,010 35,431 38,016 40,856
  Gross 25,802 26,639 27,800 29,811 31,272 33,366 35,818 38,434 41,306
  EU Taxes deducted (-) 217 241 265 302 329 357 387 418 451
Net Trading & Investment 
Income 2,011 2,292 2,300 2,358 2,416 2,477 2,539 2,602 2,667
Transfers From Abroad 427 381 400 420 441 463 486 511 536
Total Current Receipts 58,056 60,106 62,626 67,470 71,465 76,528 81,635 87,209 93,278
Subsidies 1,237 1,353 1,400 1,484 1,558 1,636 1,718 1,804 1,894
National Debt Interest 1,471 1,707 1,903 2,014 2,252 2,622 2,874 3,182 3,395
Other Transfer Payments 23,336 24,527 26,016 27,441 29,158 30,826 32,527 34,297 36,222
  Foreign 2,241 2,480 2,500 2,638 2,747 2,863 2,987 3,118 3,258
  Residents 21,095 22,046 23,516 24,804 26,411 27,962 29,540 31,179 32,964
Public Consumption 27,809 30,452 33,041 34,698 36,716 38,662 40,742 43,013 45,437
Total Current Expenditure 53,853 58,038 62,360 65,638 69,685 73,746 77,861 82,296 86,948
Public Authorities Savings 
(net) 4,203 2,067 266 1,832 1,781 2,782 3,774 4,913 6,329
  as % of GNP 2.6 1.3 0.2 1.0 0.9 1.4 1.7 2.1 2.6
Total Capital Receipts 6,162 6,229 6,298 6,739 7,109 7,500 7,913 8,348 8,807
  Grants – Housing 67 68 69 67 72 76 80 84 87
  Grants – Industry 56 59 60 57 53 49 51 53 55
  Investment 7,376 8,413 10,336 10,847 10,957 12,211 12,608 12,198 11,802
  Other Capital    
Expenditure 3,347 3,410 2,809 2,622 2,565 2,324 2,483 2,601 2,761
Total Capital Expenditure 10,846 11,950 13,274 13,594 13,648 14,659 15,222 14,936 14,706
Borrowing for Capital 
Purposes -4,684 -5,721 -6,976 -6,856 -6,538 -7,159 -7,309 -6,588 -5,899
Total Borrowing -481 -3,653 -6,710 -5,024 -4,758 -4,377 -3,535 -1,674 430
  as % of GNP -0.3 -2.2 -3.9 -2.8 -2.5 -2.2 -1.6 -0.7 0.2
Budgetary Definitions          
EBR -1,626 -5,351 -7,603 -5,917 -5,651 -5,270 -4,428 -2,567 -463
  as % of GNP -1.0 -3.2 -4.4 -3.3 -3.0 -2.6 -2.0 -1.1 -0.2
Current Budget Saving / 
Deficit 6,990 4,282 2,585 4,151 4,099 5,101 6,092 7,232 8,648
  as % of GNP 4.4 2.6 1.5 2.3 2.1 2.5 2.8 3.1 3.5
EU Definitions          
General Government 
Balance -896 2,330 4,189 2,502 2,236 1,855 1,014 -847 -2,952
as % of GDP -0.5 1.2 2.1 1.2 1.0 0.8 0.4 -0.3 -1.0
as % of GNP -0.6 1.4 2.4 1.4 1.2 0.9 0.5 -0.4 -1.2
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Table A3.8: Employment and the Labour Force, Thousands 
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
Agriculture 110 110 109 106 103 101 98 95 93
Industry 567 548 541 548 542 535 528 521 513
Manufacturing:          
    Traditional  87 84 81 75 72 69 66 64 63
    Food Processing 49 49 49 49 48 47 46 45 44
    High Technology 139 139 139 153 151 148 145 141 137
 Manufacturing 275 272 269 276 270 264 257 250 243
  Utilities 14 14 14 14 13 13 12 12 11
  Building 278 261 258 259 259 259 259 259 259
Market Services 860 865 880 885 905 929 954 980 1,007
  Distribution 287 290 293 280 283 288 295 301 307
  Transport &    
Communications 121 121 121 119 119 119 119 120 121
  Other Market Services 451 454 466 486 504 522 540 559 579
Non-Market Services 476 490 504 515 525 535 546 557 568
  Health & Education 363 375 388 396 404 412 420 428 437
  Public Administration 113 115 116 119 121 123 126 128 131
Total 2,013 2,012 2,035 2,054 2,076 2,100 2,126 2,153 2,181
Unemployment 119 160 173 186 193 190 181 169 160
Labour Force 2,133 2,172 2,208 2,240 2,269 2,290 2,307 2,322 2,340
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
